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ABSTRACT
What are the factors that impact the effectiveness of International NonGovernmental Organizations (INGOs) in Ethiopia?
By Ermias Abraham
Dr. Jessica Word, Committee Chair
Associate Professor, Academic Director of the Non Profit Community and
Leadership Initiative

Since the 1970s Ethiopia has experienced a massive increase of International
Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) in its territory. The multiplication of these
INGOs seems to be the result of the activities of both international donors and
governments in Ethiopia. International donors considered INGOs as efficient, flexible or
adoptive to the needs of the community and more trustworthy than government
agencies in implementing development projects. International donors also believe that
the proliferation of INGOs in Ethiopia will stimulate the growth of political democracy
and trade liberalization. The government allowed the influx of these INGOs in order to
tap the resources they bring in to its territory and to secure legitimacy from the
international community. Various scholars discussed the projects of these INGOS, their
proliferation and the challenges they face in Ethiopia and other similar less developed
nations. But the question of what factors impact such INGOs to become consistently
iii

effective in Ethiopia has not been studied in a comprehensive and empirical fashion. The
purpose of this research is to fill this gap and identify a theoretical model that would
help analyze factors impacting INGOs effectiveness in Ethiopia and possibly similar other
less developed nations. Using this theoretical model the research concludes that two
factors determine INGOs’ effectiveness in Ethiopia. These factors are 1) Positive or
strong relation between INGOs and their main stakeholders and 2) Positive or strong
relation between INGOs’ stakeholders independently of their relation with INGOs but in
the process of their participation in INGO projects.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) became significant
contributors in the relief and development work of nations after the end of the Second
World War. In African countries which have mostly come out of colonial rule in the
1950s and 1960s, INGOs have supported the resource strapped new African
governments in providing basic services to their people. Over the last three decades
African nations and other developing countries have seen a massive increase in INGO
activity as governments become less able to meet demand for services because of
economic decline and high population growth (Obiyan (2005, Walsh & Lenihan, 2006).
The frequent occurrence of drought and other natural calamities has also shown
theses countries’’ vulnerability and their dependence on foreign aid. But INGOs’
operation in developing countries and their effectiveness can be impacted by the
political, economic and cultural circumstances of these countries. The purpose of this
research is to find out what factors impact the effectiveness of INGOs in Ethiopia and
provide an informed lesson to these INGOs and their stakeholders about managing
these factors and become effective.
Studying INGOs experience in Ethiopia seems to be more pertinent because
Since the 1970s and 1980s there has been a large influx of INGOs in the country because
of frequent drought caused humanitarian crisis. The government that came to power in
Ethiopia in 1991 encouraged INGOs to come and be partners of new development
programs subject to enforcing strict financial and administrative accountability on them.
1

In the eyes of international donors Ethiopia has made significant progress in making an
effective use of INGO resources and changing the socio –economic life of its people.
Because of this determination Ethiopia has become the largest aid recipient in Africa.
Government restriction of INGOs’ rights based activities few years ago showed the
volatility of INGO-Government relation in the country.
These circumstances will provide a broad array of cases to study the factors that
determine INGO effectiveness in Ethiopia. The purpose of this research is to formulate a
model that can help study INGO effectiveness in Ethiopia and in other developing
countries that have similar contextual characteristics.
Defining and Understanding INGOs
INGOs have been classified as Northern and Southern; National and
International; small and large; voluntary and professional; membership and nonmembership; developmental and advocacy; grass root and elite; developmental and
advocacy organizations; etc. Yet this researcher found out that there are three general
definitions that seem to capture the vast majority of INGOs. Anheier & Salamon (2010)
define INGOs from the viewpoint of a conflict model by saying that INGOs are “--- the
organized vehicle of citizen protest against dominant elites in both political and
economical life” (p. 91). Clarke (1998) defines INGOs as “--- private, nonprofit,
professional organizations with a distinctive legal character concerned with public
welfare goals” (p.36). A third definition is “… any nonprofit- voluntary citizen’s group
that is organized on a local, national or international level” (Quota, Par. 8). Generally
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speaking this research accepts, yet refines Clarke’s 1998 definition in such a way that
many INGOs are private or civic in character, while still having significant government
influence and/or levels of ownership. Even with this mixed pattern of control, an NGO is
a professional organization with a distinctive legal character concerned with public
welfare goals.
INGOs are also differentiated by the type of service they provide. A common
differentiation and the one of most importance here is Szporluk’s (2009) identification
of three primary types of services –developmental, emergency relief assistance and
policy advocacy (see also Johnson & Prakash2007). Some of the largest INGOs such as
Care International, World Visions International, Plan International and OXFAM, initially
offered more than one type of service in Ethiopia, but later became developmental
INGOs that focused almost entirely on development projects. This research will focus
specifically on the effectiveness of INGOs that conduct long term development projects
in Ethiopia.
Research Questions
The research questions in this study are the followingWhat does INGO effectiveness mean from the perspective of officials of donors,
government departments and beneficiary communities in relation to the goals and
missions of INGOs?
What are the causes of INGO effectiveness from the perspectives of donors,
government offices and beneficiary community members in relation to the goals and
missions of INGOs?
3

Is there any convergence in perception of causes of INGO effectiveness by these
three constituencies and INGOs?
INGOs typically collaborate with the government and communities to achieve
their developmental goals. In the case of Ethiopia, projects may include: providing
agricultural extension services to farmers; basic infrastructure building; providing
education about soil/water conservation; family planning and HIV prevention ( Care
International,2010; World Vision International, 2009); drilling water wells; providing
rehabilitation programs for homeless children in urban areas; educating farmers about
better farming techniques and increasing access of children to primary education (
World Vision International, 2010; OXFAM International, 2011; Plan International, 2009).
The rationale for focusing on INGOs rather than all domestic NGOs is developed in detail
in the Research Methodology chapter (Chapter 3).
Governments in developing countries like Ethiopia tend to have weak
governments with severely limited resource bases and a general inability to consistently
offer the depth and breadth of public goods and services their citizens demanded
(Makoba, 2002). The weakness and inability to deliver all too typically extends into such
basic goods and services as clean and safe water supplies, basic medical services,
sanitation services, primary public education, and so on (Makoba, 2002, Obiyan,2005).
Into this breach in the developing world stepped a growing number of INGOs, many as
partners of UN agencies, funds and projects.
By all accounts NGO numbers have exploded more than tenfold in the past 30
years (Edwards, 2000) and now hundreds of thousands of groups provide basic services
4

that governments in developing countries fail to provide (Bratton 1989; Manji and
O’Coill 2002; Hearn 2007). For example, NGOs registered in the Philippines showed an
increase of 148% from 1984-93, while in Kenya INGOs increased by 184% from 1978-87
(Clarke 1998). By 1998 Brazil was presumed to have the largest number of NGOs in a
developing country with approximately 110,000 INGOs, while India was considered
second with 100,000 NGOs (Clarke, 1998).
Role of INGOs in less developed countries
INGOs have multiplied in number and project size in less developed countries
like African countries. But what is less clear is whether the explosion in INGOs and their
growing importance has been matched by a corresponding growth of effective INGOs.
The literature offers little help here. Scholars like Walsh and Lenihan (2006) and Smillie
(1999) are dismissive of the question itself. Instead, they argue that INGOs lack
effectiveness in developing countries because they typically have weak organizational
structures coupled with the lack of well-organized civil society and a weak state
infrastructure. Walsh & Lenihan (2006) go on to conclude that INGOs should adopt the
organizational structure of for profit organizations in order to be effective, yet do so
without subjecting their suggestion to field testing. Mebrahtu (2002), in her study of
eight INGOs, finds a general lack of systematic monitoring and evaluation practices
capable of assessing the effectiveness of field practices and outcomes. Rahmato,
Bantirgu, and Endeshaw (2008) and Bratton (1990) demonstrate the increase of NGO
activities in their target communities, but use a fairly simple single measure—the
number of people receiving services—to illustrate effectiveness. Clarke (2000) discovers
5

improved effectiveness for INGOs to the extent they are embedded in an NGO network,
or coalitions as an umbrella organization, but does not focus on individual NGO (in)
effectiveness. Obiyan (2005) and Fowler (1991), suggest there is no evidence that NGO
proliferation equates with general improvements in either democratic governance, or in
the betterment of the economic and social lives of the local people being served. They
also suggest that INGOs have comparative advantages vis-à-vis government
organizations in terms of more flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances,
more cost effective methods for delivering services, and the ability to introduce and
adopt innovation and best practices. However, they do not subject these effectiveness
factors to empirical tests.
The Role of INGOs in Ethiopia
The level of effectiveness of INGOs in Ethiopia varied through different political,
economic and legal circumstances of the country under the reign of different
governments. When the country was governed by king Haileselassie I (1930-1974) only
few INGOs were allowed to stay in the country and provide relief and developmental
services. The effectiveness of these few INGOs during the king’s period did not seem to
have been studied as no records were available showing that fact.
Ethiopia is one of the least developed countries in the world ranking 144 th from
world countries in economic development and “30th of 46 countries in the Sub-Saharan
African region---“(Index of economic freedom, 2011). The World Bank categorized one
fourth of the Ethiopian population as extremely poor earning one dollar a day and three
fourth of the population as poor earning two dollars a day (Reinhert, 2007). Child
6

mortality which is considered one of the key indicators of poverty is also high in Ethiopia
with one in six children dying before the age of five (Reinhert, 2007).
The government of King Haileselassie I did not provide a favorable environment
for INGOs to come in to the country and provide assistance in alleviating the widespread
poverty and related social problems. Before the famine crisis of the early 1970s the few
International mostly faith based INGOs that were operating in the country had limited
role in providing relief and development services (Campbell, 1996). But this situation has
changed dramatically when the scale of the 1973 famine was known and the
government was placed under national and international pressure to allow large scale
INGOs’ involvement (Campbell, 1996).
The 1973 famine and its resulting public anger led to the overthrow of the
monarchy and its replacement with a communist military government led by Colonel
Mengistu Hailemariam (1974-1991). The heavy influx of foreign INGOs at the height of
the famine crisis and the emergency food assistance they brought with them not only
helped stave off the crisis but also provided a foundation for the growing involvement of
INGOs in the country’s subsequent relief and rehabilitation programs (Rahmato,
Bantirgu, and Endeshaw ,2008).
Despite their humongous relief operations of the 1970s that saved millions of
lives, INGOs continued to have limited roles in providing developmental assistance
during the reign of the military government (1974-91) for the following two reasons.
First International donors were not willing to provide development assistance to
Ethiopia because of the government’s communist ideology, and second the military
7

government was suspicious of the motives of INGOs and their local affiliates when these
organizations demanded to operate in the country autonomously (Campbell, 1996).
However the military government allowed few INGOs to operate in the country
because of its desire to win legitimacy and resources that come through INGOs (Lautze
Raven-Roberts and Erkinesh, 2009). The absence of specific NGO law during the reign of
the monarchy and the military governments tends to show the lack of sufficient desire
by these governments to regard INGOs as development partners. Since there was no
favorable environment until 1991 for INGOs to function properly let alone effectively
this research will limit itself at looking in to the experience of INGOs’ effectiveness with
in the period of the current government.
The current government of Ethiopia which is led by the EPRDF (Ethiopian
Peoples’ Republic Democratic Front) took power in May 1991 and has been more
supportive of INGOs involvement in the country as development partners. The relatively
favorable environment created as a result of the new government’s positive approach
towards INGOs seems to have provided an opportunity for an improved effectiveness of
INGOs (Campbell, 1996).
The Change in Legal Environment in Ethiopia and its Effect on Growth of INGOs
With the change in government in 1991 new rules for organizing and operating
INGOs were promulgated. The new rules primarily Civil Society Proclamation 621/2009
(CSP) fostered an accelerated growth rate in the numbers and types of INGOs. Before
CSP came in to action there was no specific NGO proclamation and NGO issues were
governed by the Ethiopian Civil Code of 1960. While the absence of specific NGO
8

regulation may have provided less restrictive environment for INGOs in their activities in
Ethiopia it is not clear if INGOs have become more effective or less effectives as a result
of this situation.
In its effort to answer the research questions this research will shade light on the
effect of absence of regulation on INGOs effectiveness. Most of the INGOs and their
partner domestic NGOs under the leadership of Christian Relief Development Agency
(CRDA) believed that lesser legal restriction promotes their effectiveness (CRDA, 1999).
To show to the EPRDF government that INGOs can function well without the
intervention of restrictive state regulation these INGOs signed a code of conduct in
March 1991. The signing of this code of conduct by INGOs in Ethiopia is widely regarded
as an effort by these INGOs to appease the government and discourage it from issuing a
new restrictive law (Campbell, 1996).
But the code of conduct did not hold the EPRDF government from enacting the
CSP in 2009. CSP was the first NGO legislation in Ethiopian history governing INGOs and
domestic NGOs. Even though CSP did not specifically discuss NGO effectiveness per se it
showed in its preamble that admitting and maintaining effective NGOs is the core
principle of the proclamation. The preamble of this proclamation also indicated that
effectiveness of NGOs is related to their contribution in “… the overall development of
Ethiopian people’s” (CSP, 621/09). By enacting CSP the government made it clear that it
has a high stake in NGO effectiveness and the only way the government can ensure NGO
effectiveness is by maintaining a tight regulatory regime and holding NGOs accountable
to a high standard of achievement. In particular through CSP the government
9

rearranged its relationship with NGOs in three respects with the purpose of achieving
their effectiveness.
First, three different kinds of NGOs were identified based on membership and
source of funding. These are: Ethiopian NGOs “all of whose members are Ethiopian,
generate income from Ethiopia and wholly controlled by Ethiopians” (CSP 621/09 2.2);
Ethiopian resident NGOs “… that are formed under the laws of Ethiopia and which
consist of members who reside in Ethiopia and who receive more than 10% of their
funds from foreign sources” (CSP 621/09 2.3); and INGOs “ … formed under the laws of
foreign countries or which consist of members who are foreign nationals or receive
funds from foreign sources” (CSP 621 2.4).
Second, from these three kinds of NGOs the law authorized only Ethiopian NGOs
who receive less than 10 % of their funds to do the following rights based activities.
1) Advancement of human and democratic rights.
2) Promotion of equity of nations, nationalities and peoples as well as gender and
religion.
3) Promotion of the rights of the disabled and that of children.
4) Promotion of conflict resolution or reconciliation.
5) Promotion of the efficiency of justice and law enforcement services.
Ethiopian resident NGOs and INGOs that both depend on international funding
cannot engage in any of the service areas mentioned. Before CSP was enacted all NGOs
including INGOs were active in these areas as part of their broader scheme to provide
developmental services in an effective manner. The law did not specify the reason for
10

the exclusion of these rights based services from the realm of INGOs and their partner
Ethiopian resident NGOs.
Policy documents of the EPRDF party show that the government needs to
reserve rights based activities to fully Ethiopian NGOs with local funding source for two
reasons. First these activities are democratic rights bestowed by the constitution only to
citizens; and the second is to avoid the imposition of foreign donor’s agenda on local
government policies through international funding (Hailegebriel, 2010). The question
whether or not divorcing INGOs’ rights advocacy services from their development and
relief services fits in to the general discourse of INGO effectiveness is a matter to be
explored in the research.
Third, the government introduced a more centralized national regulatory
structure to control INGOs and hold them accountable in regard to their effectiveness.
Policy documents of the ruling party disclosing the reason behind tighter government
control indicate that the government had a notion that INGOs were in the country
mainly to serve the interest of international donors and perpetuate aid dependency
behavior on the public with no significant impact in changing the livelihood of the
people (Hailegebriel, 2010).
CSP strengthened the federal government’s control on INGOs by requiring:
INGOs to register within three months of establishment (CSP 621/09, Art. 64.2 &65.4);
INGOs to use at least 70% of their budget for program cost (CSP 621/09, Art. 88);
denying INGOs the right to raise funds from local sources or pursue income generating
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projects or receive money from anonymous donors without the approval of the civil
society Agency (The Agency) (CSP 621.09 Arts. 93, 98, 77.3).
Policy documents that include the text of government officials’ discussion before
the enactment of CSP showed that INGOs tend to create a rent-seeking behavior in
which they spent most of their funding on costs other than direct program cost and this
caused them to be too ineffective to have any meaningful progress in their communities
(Hailegebriel, 2010).
Various INGOs in Ethiopia conduct projects that fall under different sectors of the
economy and in different communities. The goals of these INGOs are determined by the
current needs of the stakeholders in different communities which can change overtime.
This research focuses on three service categories in which most INGOs in Ethiopia have
projects. These categories are the Food Security Program; Education Program and
Health Program. A brief overview of each program in Ethiopia is presented as follows.

Food security program
The current Ethiopian government made poverty reduction its main priority
since it took power in 1991. For example Famine tied to drought--the lack of seasonal
rain—caused humanitarian crises in Ethiopia from 1973-74; 1984 to 1986; more recently
in 2009 with emergency food aid required for 6.2 million people (Independent, 2009)
and in 2011 with emergency food aid required for 4.5 million people (World Food
Program, 2011). Each time thousands upon thousands of Ethiopians saw their
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livelihoods destroyed, while many also died. Provision of basic services and long term
development projects fell far short of the needs of the population. The Ethiopian
government adopted the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in
September 2000. The MDG laid out eight goals with specific performance targets and
deadlines. The first goal is the “eradication of extreme poverty and Hunger” (MDGs,
2000). The two specific targets of this goal aim to reduce by half the number of people
whose daily income is less than a dollar as well as the number of people suffering from
hunger by 2015 (MDGs, 2000).
The government in consultation with the donor community and INGOs (referred
to as development partners) rolled out three five year development plans that aim at
breaking the cycle of poverty, doing away with dependence on foreign food aid and
coordinating a multi-sector intervention to improve the living conditions of people.
These three development plans are: Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction
Program (SDPRP) that run from 2000/01 to 2005/06; A Plan for Accelerated and
Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) that run from 2005/06 to 2009/10 and
Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) which already began in 2010/11 and is
scheduled to be completed in 2015.
The Food Security program targets community members in the rural or urban
areas who have chronic or temporary food shortages due to lack of : sufficient
production, stable food pricing which restricts access to supply, or insufficient income to
purchase adequate food (MOFED, 2002). The lack of food security in the country has
also caused a widespread malnutrition problem in children. MOFED (2002) estimated
13

that the population that faced hunger and became dependent on relief services reached
four million out of a total population of 65.3 million in 2001.
The main causes for the persistent state of food insecurity in the country were:
drought, degradation of soil fertility, high population growth, high level of land
fragmentation and internal conflict in communities (MOFED, 2002). The Food Security
Program focuses on bridging the food gap and decreasing vulnerability to hunger that
has been existent in communities for decades (Cerritelli $Abagodu, 2008). In order to
achieve food security the program institutes a multi-sector intervention including
irrigation; rotation of crops; improvement of farming and marketing techniques;
improvement of health service provision; diversification of income sources; and
establishment of functioning microcredit system (MOFED, 2002).
PASDEP which came in to effect after the end of the SDPRP in 2005 indicated 15
million people (8.29 million chronically and 6.71 million people transitionally) could
suffer from food shortages in a bad crop year (MOFED, 2006). The ultimate goal is to
help the chronically food insecure achieve food security and help the transitionally food
insecure people achieve improved status of food security (MOFED, 2006). PASDEP used
four strategies to improve food security: household asset building, voluntary
resettlement programs, and the productive safety net program (PSNP) and promoting
nonagricultural income (MOFED, 2006). SDPRP has demonstrated significant gains in
reducing food shortages because the size of population under poverty fell from 47% in
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1995/96 to 42% in 1999/2000 (MOFED, 2002). This gain has also been strengthened by
the subsequent PASDEP program.
The government invited INGOs and private organizations to be partners in the
food security/ poverty reduction programs and following this invitation several INGOs
established themselves in the country and managed diverse kinds of projects within the
program. Most of the foreign donor organizations formed a group called Donor
Assistance Group (DAG) to organize their effort and influence the government’s policy
on development projects as well as use of donor funds (The Development Assistance
Group, 2003).
So the questions this research will answer in the first category is how INGOs in
Ethiopia have been and continue to be effective in meeting the overarching goal of the
government to significantly reduce food shortage and hunger by the year 2015 and
beyond. In this regard the research will measure INGOs’ program effectiveness in terms
of reducing food poverty and increasing food security and traces the factors that helped
them achieve such outcome from the perceptions of INGOs, donors and government
offices.
For the purpose of the Food Security and Poverty Reduction Program INGOs’
effectiveness can be defined as stakeholders’ (donors, government and target
communities) perceived level of NGO impact in reducing food poverty and increasing
food security with proper accountability of their efficient utilization of resources.
Education program
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In 1994 the Ethiopian government put in place an education policy focused on
increasing access to education, improving equity, quality and relevance of education
(MOFED, 2002). The millennium goals focuses on eliminating the rampant gender
differences in primary and secondary schools and providing access of primary education
to all boys and girls by 2015 (MDG, 2000).
With the implementation of the Education Sector Development Program (ESDP I)
in 2000 educational access for preschool children around the country has shown
improvement and enrollment increased by 9.6% compared to the previous year
(MOFED, 2002). ESDP I (2000) and SDPRP (2002) indicate the government encourages
INGOs and communities to take the lead in investing and expanding preschool programs
for children. Although kindergarten capacity increased in the year 2000 compared to the
previous year, only a minimal number of children between the ages of 4-6 (2%) got
access to Kindergarten education (MOFED, 2002).
Access to primary education (grade 1-8) however showed a rapid growth in 2001
from 34.7% to 57.4 % (MOFED, 2002). But access to education or building schools in the
country side alone does not result in the comprehensive achievement of educational
goals in Ethiopia. Such achievement can be reached when education has: equity
(reduction of disparity in gender or age); relevance (making education relevant to the
specific lifestyle of different groups of students); quality (improving success rate of
students and having qualified teachers); and access (increasing availability of primary
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education, secondary education, alternative basic education and special needs
education (MOFED, 2006).
Alternative Basic Education (ABE) is an innovation that has first been introduced
by INGOs for children who are aged 7-14 years and who have no access to primary
education schools (Personal communication with an INGO official , 2011). Nomadic
people who wander from place to place also benefit from such program. Students who
are enrolled in ABE can attend their classes in a makeshift class rooms with in their
neighborhood and complete their 1st to 4th grade education in three years and then will
be on track to join 5th grade students in nearby formal elementary schools (Personal
communication with an INGO official , 2011). The ESDP II and ESDP III, which are integral
parts of the PASDEP sought to strengthen the achievements made in the educational
goals of increasing access, quality, relevance, and equity.
PASDEP estimated that out of the 53.7 billion Ethiopian Birr ( 40.09 million US
dollars) that is required to implement the projects planned in ESDP III the government
can only cover 67% and the rest is expected to come from other development partners
like private organizations, INGOs and the communities. Several INGOs have directly or in
partnership with domestic NGOs implemented projects with a purpose of achieving one
or many of the educational goals of the government. Many of them have also
introduced innovations in improving access, equity, quality and relevance of education
to the people.
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So for the purpose of education program, foreign NGO effectiveness can be
defined as stakeholder ‘s (donors, government and target communities) perceived level
of INGO impact in improving access, equity, quality and relevance of education to the
people with proper accountability of their efficient utilization of resources.
Healthcare program
Ethiopia has one of the least developed healthcare infrastructure and delivery
system in the world (MOFED, 2002). About 85 % of the population lives in the rural
areas and access to healthcare in such areas is very limited because of factors like lack of
healthcare infrastructure; lack of trained professionals; and lack of public awareness in
seeking healthcare benefits (Personal communication with an INGO official in the health
care sector, 2001). Within the framework of the poverty reduction strategy the
government initiated a twenty year health sector development program (HSDP) guiding
a comprehensive overhaul of the healthcare delivery system (MOFED, 2002).
The first phase of this program (HSDP I) embarked on increasing access to
primary healthcare facilities by expanding existing healthcare centers and building new
ones; training increased number of healthcare professionals; and increasing public
awareness of disease prevention mechanisms (MOFED, 2002). The MDG goals 3, 4, and
5 aim at reducing by two third the number of children who die before age 5; reduce by
three quarters the size of maternal death; stop the spread of HIV; stop the spread of
malaria and other diseases by 2015 (UN documents, 2000).
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But achieving these goals in the Ethiopian case cannot be done by increasing
access to healthcare facilities and training healthcare professionals alone. A major
barrier in this effort can come from lack of healthcare literacy and negative cultural or
traditional influences (Personal communication with an INGO official, 2011). HSDP I was
criticized for focusing its strategy and investment on treating existing diseases than
preventing their occurrence (MOFED, 2002). It also was not successful in coordinating its
efforts with INGOs and as a result showed a budget gap of over 1.6 billion Ethiopian birr
or 23.1 million USD (MOFED, 2002). HSDP II which was implemented in 2003-06 aimed
at correcting these main deficiencies and created enabling environment for INGOs,
private organizations and communities to take part in implementing the program; and
provided more emphasis on preventions of causes of diseases (MOFED, 2006).
In consultation with donors, INGOs and communities the government designed
an innovative healthcare delivery system in which at least two healthcare extension
agents will be trained for each woreda (small district managed by a local government in
Ethiopia) and be responsible for their area’s provision of healthcare (Argaw, 2007).
These extension agents not only make referrals for medical treatment but also go with
in the community and educate people about subjects like immunization, family
planning, and avoidance of harmful traditional practices like circumcision of girls (Argaw,
2007).
The intervention of HSDP II showed positive impact and by the end of the plan in
2004/05 infant mortality dropped to 85 per 1000 live birth compared to 97 per 1000 live
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births in 2000/01; mortality of mothers dropped 400-450 per 100,000 live births
compared to 500-700 per 100,000 live births; and provision of health services jumped
from 52% to 65% in the same period (MOFED, 2002). HSDP II also showed significant
gain in reducing spread of diseases like malaria, TB, HIV and was able to entirely
eradicate Polio and Guinea Worm (MOFED, 2002). Most importantly, it created a culture
of community led disease prevention mechanisms in which health extension agents
would be stationed in each Woreda and coordinate the provision of health services and
educate the public about disease prevention and control (Argaw, 2007).
HSDP III took over from HSDP II in 2005 and expanded the effort of preventing or
controlling contagious diseases; extended healthcare access to each Woreda through
healthcare agents; and expanded construction of health posts (MOFED, 2006). The
organization of the health extension services focused on “… hygiene and environmental
sanitation, disease prevention and control, family health services and health education
and communication on an outreach basis” (MOFED, 2006, p. 114-115). Deploying health
extension agents that was done on a pilot basis in the time of HSDP II became a national
phenomenon with the deployment of 30,000 health extension agents (two per each
Woreda) and the construction of at least one health post in each Woreda (PASEDEP,
2006).
While the total cost for HSDP III excluding HIV prevention is estimated to be 34.9
billion birr or 4.03 billion USD, the government covers only 44 % of it and the rest is
expected to be covered by INGOs, the private sector and the communities (PASDEP,
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2006). In regard to HIV prevention and control during the HSDP III the government
covered only 23% of the total cost of 6 billion Ethiopian birr or 692.8 million USD and
majority of the cost (77%) came from INGOs, communities and others (PASDEP, 2006).
In both the HSDP I and II periods significant gains have been achieved in stopping the
spread of HIV, in creating awareness of the people, and causing cultural change in
regard to having an open discussion about the disease and its prevention mechanisms
(Rahmato,Bantirgu and Endeshaw, 2008).
With the support and financial assistance from donors like USAID and the Global
Fund for HIV AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria INGOs in partnership with their local
counterparts spearheaded the multi-sector intervention against HIV epidemic in
Ethiopia (Personal communication with official of Path Finder International, July, 2011).
In regard to healthcare, effectiveness of INGOs can be defined as stakeholders’ (donors,
the domestic unit and INGOs) perceived level of INGOs’ impact in improving access to
healthcare, its delivery system to the people and prevention or control of disease with
proper accountability of their efficient utilization of resources.
Theoretical Framework of Understanding and Explaining INGO Effectiveness
The concept of organizational effectiveness has been defined and understood
differently by various researchers (Zamuto, 1984). Some of the theories these
researchers considered as relevant for this research are the following.
1) The rational or purposive model understands or measures organizational
effectiveness by the extent to which organizations achieve their own goals (Price 1972,
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Pennings & Goodman, 1976). An organization however may have different goals which
may at times be conflicting and in this case the stronger group in that organization
influences other groups to follow its specific goals (Price 1972, Pennings & Goodman,
1976). This theory may apply in a circumstance where one stakeholder wields more
influence than the others and get its goals pursued.
2) The system resource theory rejects the goal theory by saying that goals are
goals of individuals and not of the organization and as such individuals cannot achieve
consensus on them. Instead it emphasizes on acquisition of resources as the main
activity of an organization and says effectiveness of an organization can be measured by
their strength of acquiring scarce resources in a competitive environment (Yuchtman &
Seashore, 1967). But this theory suggests that INGOs can be effective so long as they
win the resource battle and secure funding with no regard for other factors and this
seems to be limited in its view.
3) The multiple constituency theory of organizational effectiveness rejects the
rational goal or the system resource models or any other models that came before it
because they are limited by the unrealistic desire to develop a unilateral criterion of
effectiveness. Instead this theory as developed by Connolly, Conlon, Deutsch (1980),
Keeley, (1978),and Zamuto, (1984) state that strategic constituencies of an organization
can have different assessment about what effectiveness constitutes in that organization
and determine whether or not the organization is effective from their stand point. But
multiple constituencies approach raises some questions like: what are the various
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competing goals of the constituencies, how does the organization select which goal to
follow and to what extent does it try to accommodate other competing goals.
In his comparison of four different variant models of the multiple constituency
theory Zamuto (1984) acknowledged that “the construct of organizational effectiveness
is both value based and time specific” (p.p.606). In the same research Zamuto (1984)
identified the four variant models of multiple constituency approach as “Relativism,
power perspective, social justice perspective and evolutionary perspective” (p.p. 607608). According to Relativism which was advocated by Connolly et.al (1980),
effectiveness is represented not in single united criterion but in a collective group of
criteria of the constituency of that organization (Zamuto, 1984). In this case
determination whether or not an organization‘s performance has been effective is made
by someone other than the constituents (Zamuto, 1984). The power perspective as
advocated by Emerson, (1962); Hinings, Schneck and Pennings, (1971); Salanck and
Pfeffer (1974) indicates some constituencies are more powerful than others in terms of
resources and other measurements and so the effectiveness of an organization is
measured by the extent to which it satisfies its more powerful constituent members.
The Impartiality and Participant Interest Model as advocated by Keeley (1978) argues
that the effectiveness of an organization can only be judged by the extent to which it
satisfied the interest of the least advantaged person. The evolutionary perspective
which is endorsed by Zamuto (1982) says consideration of satisfying the interest of
strategic constituencies alone does not measure the effectiveness of an organization
without additionally taking in to account other factors like limitations in the
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performance of the organization and temporal change in constituencies or their
expectations. Accordingly the evolutionary perspective would consider as effective
those organizations that can adapt well to changing circumstances and accommodate
the ever evolving needs of their constituencies (Zamuto, 1984)
The Multiple Constituency model and its four variants as discussed in this
paragraph seem to have more relevance and pertinence in analyzing INGO effectiveness
in Ethiopia because setting a goal for INGO effectiveness or determining the presence of
INGO effectiveness can be relative, contextual and evolutionary. This process can also
be considered to be in a continuum where one stake holder can have power perspective
at one time where as another stake holder can have its way at another time or in
another context. This process also include a constant pull and push of one stake holder
by another (s) and negotiation to find a common ground in a case where concessions
and benefits can be exchanged.
4) The existence of multiple constituencies and the need to accommodate the
various and sometimes competing demands in organizations’ goals led to another
effectiveness model called the Paradox model as crafted by Quinn and Cameron, (1982);
Quinn and Rohrbough, (1981), Faehiman and Quinn, (1985). The Paradox model allows
the functioning of multiple organizations simultaneously in different environments by
balancing various competing interests and demands of constituencies (Cameron and
Whetten, 1996). It also advocates for the existence and functioning of previous
effectiveness models including rational goal model, the system resource model and the
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multiple Constituency model together in a simultaneous and coherent fashion (Cameron
and Whetten, 1996).
5) In regard to measuring the effectiveness of nonprofit organizations different
organizational effectiveness models have been suggested by various researches
(Kushner &Poole, 1996; Kushner, 2002; Cameron &Whetten, 1983; Sowa, Seldon and
Sandfort, 2004). In their Multidimensional Integrated Model, Sowa, Seldon and Sandfort
(2009) reiterate that multidimensional model is more appropriate to measure nonprofit
organizations’ effectiveness than searching for a single measure of effectiveness.The
Multidimensional Integrated Model laid out four principles:
1) Two forms of effectiveness (Management and program)
2) Management and program effectiveness each need to be evaluated in terms of
“capacity (process and structure) and (b) outcomes.”(pp. 715).
3) The need to employ both objective and subjective (perception) methods to measure
effectiveness and
4) Flexibility of the model to allow diversity in both program and management functions
in the organization (Sowa, Seldon and Sandfort, 2009).
The Multidimensional Integrated Model offered a well-structured measurement
system to capture the effectiveness of nonprofit organizations. But this model and its
other predecessor models seem to be assuming the existence of developed civil society
system where various constituencies of nonprofit organizations can freely seek and pass
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information freely. It also assumes that the political system of the country encourages
nonprofit sector; and there is a well-developed system of monitoring and evaluation as
well as collection of information.
But INGOs whose main function is in developing and least developed countries
are more likely to operate in an environment where there is no well-developed civil
society structure, non-democratic political system and absence of free information flow
between the various constituencies of these INGOs (Campbell, 1996, Reinhert, 2007,
Harrison, 2002). The multi constituency approach can serve as a foundation framework
for studying the effectiveness of INGOs. But I argue that it may not entirely capture the
effectiveness of INGOs which operate in the complex political, economic and cultural
condition of less developed countries.
By studying the organizational and project effectiveness of INGOs in Ethiopia,
this research offers a model which builds on the multi- constituency theory and
demonstrates how the effectiveness of INGOs can be measured and understood in less
developed countries like Ethiopia. The model emerged from the following hypothesis:
The effectiveness of INGOs depends on:
1) INGO’s management of the frequently conflicting goals of their main constituencies
2) The positive collaboration of the main constituencies independently of the INGOs
but in the process of facilitating the works of INGOs1. The model considers INGO

1

The term INGOs in this model refer only to those INGOs that have a principal objective of directly
implementing or indirectly facilitating various projects. Those INGOs that have a principal objective of
being strictly a donor are considered as donors in this model.
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effectiveness in terms of both organizational and project effectiveness in Ethiopia
and tease out the common factors that are regarded by the main stakeholders of
INGOS as key to the effectiveness of INGOs in Ethiopia.
The effectiveness model as indicated below is reflected in a form of Venndiagram that has three intersecting circles. Each of the three main stakeholders
represented by the three intersecting circles are the: domestic unit (government
including beneficiary communities); donors and INGOs. The letters W shows weakness
or negativity whereas the letter S shows strength or positivity of the relationship these
stakeholders have either with INGOs or with one another independently of their
relationship with INGOs but in the process of working with INGOs. The portion that is
intersected by all the three stakeholders is a strong relationship area for all of them.
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FIGURE 1.1- MODEL OF INGO EFFECTIVENESS IN ETHIOPIA
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The model has seven different features as indicated in the diagram above. Type I
is where INGOs have strong positive relationship with donors and domestic units but the
relationship between donors and the domestic units is weak or negative. In type II
INGOs have weak or negative relationship with donors but have a strong positive
relationship with the domestic unit. The relationship between the donors and domestic
units is strong or positive. In type III INGO relationship with donors is strongly positive
but their relationship with the domestic unit is weak or negative. The relationship
between donors and the domestic unit is strongly positive. In type IV INGOs relationship
with donors and the domestic unit is weak or negative but the relationship between
donors and the domestic unit is strongly positive. In type V INGOs’ relationship with
donors is weak or negative but their relationship with the domestic unit is strongly
positive. The relationship between donors and the domestic unit is weak or negative.
In type VI INGO relationship with their donors is strongly positive where as their
relationship with the domestic unit is weak or negative. The relationship between
donors and the domestic unit is weak or negative. In type VII which is the ideal goal for
the relationship of these stakeholders the relationships between INGOs and their
donors or the domestic unit is strongly positive and at the same time the relationship
between the donors and the domestic unit is strongly positive.
This model will be used to analyze INGO activities in all the three sectors of
Ethiopia that will be discussed in this research (Food Security, Education and Healthcare)
and to answer the research questions indicated in a previous section of this chapter.
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Conclusion
Since the 1970s developing countries experienced a massive increase in the
number of domestic and INGOs in their territories. International donors, who believed
that INGOs are more efficient, flexible and responsive to people’s needs, were partly
responsible for the proliferation of INGOs in developing countries (Harsh, Mbatia and
Shrum, 2010, Obiyan 2005). International donors also hoped that the proliferation of
INGOs will eventually lead to democratic political system and economic liberalization in
those countries (Bratton, 1990, Reimann, 2006, Makoba, 2002).
Developing countries also supported the expansion of INGOs’ service within their
territories to obtain international aid resources and legitimacy (Campbell, 1996,
Harrison, 2002,). Many INGO scholars discussed what INGOs do in developing countries,
how they multiplied in number, and the challenges they face in their everyday work
without exploring the factors that make them consistently effective in developing
countries like Ethiopia.
The purpose of this research is to fill this gap and study how INGOs in Ethiopia can be
consistently effective in their organizational capacity and project performance.
Ethiopia is one of the poorest nations in the world with a typically weak
government structure and less developed civil society network (Campbell, 1996,
Reinhert, 2007). Frequent occurrence of famine aided by incessant drought; lack of
government capacity to deal with the famine and related problems; and severe
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underdevelopment in the provision of basic public services attracted many INGOs to
establish their operation in the country.
In the period between 1991 and 2005 the current EPRDF government in Ethiopia
provided a relatively positive environment for the establishment of INGOs in the country
subject to the general condition that they adopt the government’s development goal in
their missions and objectives (Campbell, 1996, Harrison, 2002). Particularly in the
sectors of food security, healthcare and education which are the focus areas of this
study INGOs established several projects around the country with significant resources
and impacts on the living condition of the people (SDPRP, 2002, PASEDEP, 2006). The
strain in the relationship between all INGOs and the government that followed the
2005 national political election led to the promulgation of Proclamation 621/ 2009
which tightened government control on foreign and Ethiopian resident INGOs (that
receive most of their funding from international donors) and strengthened their
accountability to the government. Chapter I of this research presents the literature
review which shows how NGO researchers viewed the question of INGO effectiveness in
developing countries by considering the perceptions of various constituencies. The
literature review serves as a prelude to the main focus of the research which is
providing an answer to the research questions.
Chapter III lays out the methodology part of the research and provides detailed
analysis about the selection of INGOs in Ethiopia as subjects of this research and why
case study method is the best approach to conduct the research. Chapter IV will analyze
data collected in different forms from representatives of the main constituencies and
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provide its findings of INGO effectiveness in the Food Security, Education and
Healthcare sectors. Chapter V works on finding a common pattern of the perceptions of
INGO effectiveness in a way that provides a comprehensive answer to all the research
questions in this research. Chapter VI will provide a conclusion of the research and
recommendation.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Emergence of INGOs in Developing Countries
The field of NGO studies is a recent phenomenon and its body of literature is still
developing (Landim, 2008, Martens, 1999). The literature reviewed for this research
covers the experiences of INGOs from different perspectives and identifies certain
common factors that are likely to render NGO activities effective. The works of many
NGO scholars included in this literature review explore the causes and effects of
NGO proliferation in developing countries; why INGOs have become favored means
of distributing relief and developmental aid in developing countries; and how INGOs
that operate in developing countries changed their strategy of delivering service
from direct implementation of projects to forming partnership with domestic NGOs.
But the main discussion in this literature review is devoted to showing in detail
the series of factors that have been commonly identified as impacting the
effectiveness of INGOs in developing countries. Throughout the discussion of these
factors of effectiveness, the literature emphasizes that the effectiveness of INGOs in
developing countries is more than the proliferation of organizations in number and
the abundance of resources delivered by those organizations.
The spread of INGOs in to developing countries was spurred not only by the
charitable needs but also by the need for INGOs to ensure their continued survival
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(Manji and O’Coill, 2002). INGOs like OXFAM emerged in the Second World War
ravaged Europe as a means of providing social welfare assistance and helping with
the reconstruction effort. But when their purpose was accomplished in Europe these
INGOs decided to expand their services to developing countries rather than shutting
down (Manji and O’Coill, 2002).
The work of INGOs in developing countries has also been portrayed as creating a
continuity of welfare services initiated by foreign missionaries when African
countries were under colonial control (Hearn, 2007). At the beginning, these INGOs
focused on providing mostly relief and humanitarian services in the remote and
marginalized parts of developing countries. In particular, the lack of capacity of
newly independent African countries to serve people located in the remote parts of
their territories became a staging ground for the proliferation of INGOs (Obiyan,
2005).
The deficiency in government capacity to provide basic human and social
services in developing countries was accentuated with these countries’ receiving
loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF was established in 1944
to provide short term emergency loans to countries facing severe economic crisis,
subject to stringent conditions called Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) (Jauch,
2009). As SAP’s conditions like: trade liberalization; and cutting government
subsidies on public services increased the people’s hardship and prevented
governments from providing social welfare services, INGOs stepped in to fill the gap
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(Fowler, 1991). Various NGO scholars identified characteristics of INGOs which
makes them a preferred channel of supplying welfare and development aid to
people in developing countries.
Why are INGOs necessary to deliver these services as opposed to business
organizations and governmental offices? Brinkerhoff, Smith & Teegen (2007), explained
that there are two important theories that explain why INGOs are necessary. These
theories are market failure and government failure theories.
Market failure
It can be seen when “the market cannot function properly or no market exists;
the market exists but produces an economically in efficient allocation of resources or
the market produces undesirable results as measured by certain social objectives”
(Worth, 2009 pp.60). A well-functioning market assumes that both buyers and sellers
have sufficient information about the commodity on which they are transacting (Worth,
2009).
Worth (2009) also indicates that the market may not function effectively for
poor people or for those who are under discrimination for various reasons. Poor or
discriminated people are not likely to have the resource to acquire information which
will place them at a disadvantage in the market. For example during the time of
apartheid in South Africa Black Africans neither had the resource nor the knowledge to
use market information in their market transactions with white people.
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Regarding market failure, Brinkerhoff, Smith & Teegen (2007), also noted that it can be
related to “public Goods” and further argued that “ A more equal distribution of income
itself can be considered a public good when it is an agreed social objective” (p.60).
Where the agreed social objective in society is reducing poverty, universal healthcare
coverage or college education for all and the market does not support that objective we
see market failure.
Government failure
Governments can intervene and correct market failures to the extent they can by
enacting regulations and by providing public goods that could not be provided by
private businesses. But governments have also political and structural failures that
prevent them from filling the gap left by business enterprises. Worth (2009) explained
the following as political reasons of government failures: Governments tend to be more
responsive to the needs of the majority than to the needs of the minority as
government officials need to secure majority vote for their stay in power. Government
may not be willing to provide a service that becomes controversial in society.
Government officials may keep postponing actions on controversial issues when they
think that it may have a political cost to their stay in power. Government officials may
tend to act on those projects that show result within their political term period as they
would want to show result for their reelection effort.
In regard to structure failures of the government, worth (2009), explained that
because governments are large and have bureaucratic structure, they lack complete
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information. The fact that people are disinclined to interact with governments because
of their negative perception of government bureaucracy adds up to the lack of
information governments may have. Brinkerhoff, Smith & Teegen (2007), saw
government from the view point of transferring a good or benefit that can be used to
people outside the national border. Typical example for this could be new vaccines for
infectious diseases like the Swine Flu or new forms of treatment for cancer diagnosis.
Governments may not be willing to spend their public resources for the benefit
of other countries as that may have adverse political consequences for them. INGOs as a
third sector fill the gap created by market and government failures. These organizations
have comparative advantages that enables them fill the gap left by the business
enterprises and government offices. (Brinkerhoff, Smith & Teegen, 2007; Bratton, 1989;
Fowler, 1991; & Obiyan, 2005) identified seven different kinds of comparative
advantages:
1) InnovationINGOs work closely with the poor and are in a position to know the specific
problem of each community. INGOs will use this socialized knowledge to innovate on
new improved plan or practice of reducing poverty. For instance in a new farm village
where production is low, INGOs could educate the farmers how to be efficient, what
methods of farming to use and how to maintain the productivity of their farm land.
Private businesses may not find any incentive in such kind of innovation while
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government does not have a successful track record in introducing and maintaining such
kind of innovation.
2) Program flexibility –
INGOS are not constrained by government policies or profit motive and can
make adjustment to their programs in accordance with the needs of their target
community. This fact is especially true to INGOs that are not dependent on the
government or external donors for their budget. INGOs which have new innovations of
reducing poverty can update their programs faster than governments or business
enterprises.
3) Specialized technical knowledgeINGOS have opportunity to amass specialized or technical knowledge about a
certain target community with which they are working. For example Plan International
USA is a large INGO which has involvement in 49 countries with a program that focuses
on children’s wellbeing. This INGO not only has social knowledge about the children’s
problems in its program countries but also has established a wealth of technical
innovation that improve children’s way of life and that cannot be matched by business
enterprises or governments. Such INGOs are also in a position to train and cross transfer
their specialized knowledge from one country to another at no special cost.
4) Targeted local public goods-
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INGOs are well positioned to provide important public goods to their target
communities. Such public goods may include hospitals, health clinics, schools,
telecommunication and power stations, clean drinking water processing plants and
others. For instance World Vision International (a Christian INGO) has built roads,
schools, children’s and adult day care centers, health clinics and other similar public
goods in Ethiopia with the purpose of improving the people’s quality of life in the
country side. Their small size and the specific nature of service they are providing
allowed INGOs to focus all their resources on their communities’ needs and get results,
unlike in the case of governments which are bogged down in trying to satisfy widely
conflicting interests of various constituencies (Fowler, 1991).
5) Common property resource management systemINGOs which have target communities that are dependent on natural resources
can help their community in managing their resource appropriately. For instance big
INGOs like CARE International train their targeted community members: how they can
maintain fertility of their soil; how they can keep rivers and lakes clean; and educate the
people about the benefits of forestation, irrigation and protecting their fish population.
Neither governments nor private enterprises can accomplish this at the scale INGOs can
accomplish it.
6) Trust and credibilityWell-functioning INGOs are more trusted by their communities than either the
government or business organizations. Most governments in developing countries are
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perceived by their citizens as corrupt and inefficient. Western government donors and
intergovernmental organizations like UN agencies prefer to distribute their aid program
through INGOs and domestic NGOs because governments in developing countries have
experience of misusing donor’s money for bolstering their political power and
perpetuating unpopular policies (Obiyan 1995, Fowler, 1991). The unique characteristics
that make INGOs more trusted than government bodies or business organizations
include being “… close to the poor, encourage popular participation, flexibility and
innovation, sustainability, advantage from small size, cost effectiveness and
commitment of staff” (Obiyan, 2005 p. 311).
7) Representation and advocacyINGOs are well positioned to know the needs of the poor people because they
work very closely with them. They also know what the long term solutions for the
problems are and can represent the people’s interest in front of the local government or
intergovernmental organizations. INGOs advocate the interests of minorities and those
members of the community who are disenfranchised.
In the 1980s and 1990s many developing countries’ governments had to cut their
social spending and abandon their services to the poor because of high interest rate in
their foreign debt payment, declining revenue of export products, and the pressure of
SAP on states to stop subsidizing public services and social programs (Fowler, 1991,
Obiyan, 2005). This situation forced governments in developing countries to allow
INGOs step in and fill the gap by supporting critical public services like healthcare and
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welfare services. Many donor countries and organizations also believed that INGOs are
instruments of building a vibrant civil society in developing countries (Fowler, 1991,
Obiyan, 2005).
The period of the 1980s and 1990s saw massive proliferation of INGOs in
developing countries and steep increases in the volume of funds brought by INGOs in to
these countries (Clarke 1980, Charlton and May 1995, Parks 2008, Reiman 2006, Manji
& O’Coill 2002, Smillie 1997). For instance Clarke (1980) found that the number of
domestic NGOs and INGOs registered in the Philippines from 1984-93 increased by 148
percent while in Kenya the same number increased by 184 percent from 1978-1987.
The ability of INGOs to mobilize financial and other kinds of resources in
developing countries has also increased significantly during the same period. For
example between 1984- 1994 the United Kingdom increased its funding to INGOs by 400
percent (68.7 million pounds), while by 2002 the US government was transferring 40
percent of its foreign aid to developing countries through INGOs (Manji and O’Coill,
2002). Some scholars like Charlton and May (1995) went to the extent of commenting
that INGOs “… displaced governments as the primary recipients of a number of Official
Developments Assistance (ODA)…” (pp. 237). In the case of Ethiopia Rahmato, Bantirgu
and Endeshaw (2008) reported that the resources that were brought in to the country
through INGOs increased dramatically from 444 million dollars in 2004 /05 to 537.4
million dollars in 2006/07.
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However, not all NGO scholars agree upon the increased role of INGOs in
managing international donors’ money in developing countries. For example Lewis
(1998) and Szporluk (2009) argue the funds that were transferred to developing
countries through INGOs declined over the years. Szporluk (2009) further argued
that multilateral organizations like the World Bank, IMF, and the European
Community distribute a much higher volume of resources to developing countries
than INGOs. Szporluk (2009) goes on to argue that the majority of the funds that
came to developing countries from international donors come directly to states
through bilateral or multilateral agreements.
The 1980s and 1990s were also the decades when INGOs shifted from their
traditional system of self-implementation of their projects to implementing many of
their projects through NGO partners (Lewis, 1998). According to Lewis (1998) the
main rationales for this operational change was the desire to increase effectiveness
by overcoming cultural and communication barriers through partnership with
domestic NGOs and attaining added legitimacy with local people.
Other scholars like (Parks, 2008) concurred with Lewis (1998) but offered a
different rationale for it by stating this new approach was required by international
donors to make project implementation more cost effective. As more INGOs shifted
gears and moved to form partnerships with domestic NGOs the focus of their
operations also shifted towards three activities: Building the capacity of domestic
NGOs and local government offices, providing funds to selected national NGO
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projects and supervising the proper implementation of these projects through
periodical evaluations and feedback (Lewis, 1998, Parks, 2008).
INGOs partnership with domestic NGOs led to enhanced involvement of
domestic NGOs in project planning, implementing and supervising, and encouraged
more international donors to send in resources with the intention of accessing a
large number of needy people through strong domestic NGOs. As previously noted
the foreign currency that was coming in to Ethiopia through INGOs grew from 440
million dollars in 2004/05 to 537.4 million dollars in 2006/07, making it the second
highest source of private income for the country after foreign remittance by its
Diaspora (Rahmato, Bantirgu and Endeshaw, 2008).
A third rationale for the shift towards partnerships has been identified as the
role these partnerships could play in building civil society and democratic
governance in developing countries (Obiyan 2005; Fowler 1994; Bratton 1989).
Major donors such as Western governments and multilateral organizations like UN
agencies, World Bank and IMF wanted INGOs and domestic NGOs to stimulate the
growth of modern civil society, especially in newly independent African countries
with weak civil societies (Obiyan 2005; Fowler 1994; Bratton 1989; Hearn 2002).
What is INGO Effectiveness?
According to the multiple constituency theory of organizational effectiveness
INGOs’ effectiveness could be viewed differently based on the perception of the
main stakeholders
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Meaning of INGOs effectiveness from the perspective of the government, donors
and communities
As it was discussed in the introduction chapter the main constituencies in the
effectiveness model have their own perspective of INGO effectiveness that is directly
related to their individual goals. To understand how these different perceptions are
seen it is important to understand the goals of each constituency in the INGO
effectiveness model. For example the following discussion about the goals of the
domestic unit, donors and INGOs in the Ethiopian Food Security Program can show how
these important stakeholders could have different perceptions about INGO
effectiveness.
Government’s goal of the Food Security Program
The government adopted the Food Security Strategy as part of its Poverty
Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP) which has been required by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to receive development loans and financial grants (IMF,
2000). The PRSP, the government claims the causes of Food Insecurity were the
repeated occurrences of droughts, poor fertility of soil, lack of diversifying income
resources, the effect of high population growth and lack of well-developed
infrastructure, credit, and updated market information system (MOFED, 2002). 2 The

2

The government understands and defines poverty as a combination of four factors which are poor
access to material necessities, lack of proper educational and healthcare services; increased vulnerability
to risk with no insurance and lack of empowerment of the people to make their voice heard (Woldehana,
2004)
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PRSP also indicates that factors relating to national policy have been causes of Food
Insecurity but did not specify which policy it is referring to or why (MOFED, 2002).
The government believes that household asset depletion in the Food Insecure
parts of the country occur when crop failure hits because there is no off- farm business
activity that provides alternative source of livelihood. When the Food Security program
was launched in its first three years interim period the goal of the government has been
to “ --- to attain food security for five million chronically insecure people while at the
same time improving and sustaining the overall food security of an additional ten million
people” (MOFED, 2002, P.P. 61)
To achieve this goal the government followed three pronged strategy: improving
food supply and access with the assistance of productive safety net; promoting off- farm
income earning activities; and organizing a voluntary resettlement program for people
that have a chronic risk of food insecurity due to environmental degradation (MOFED,
2002)3. The government indicated in its PRSPs that all INGOs and their NGO partners are
its development partners so long as they share its goals and work with the government
to meet these goals (MOFED, 2002).

3

Voluntary resettlement program has been designed by the government to transfer farmers who are
susceptible to chronic food insecurity to fertile and less densely inhabited lands. Farmers who are
resettled in this way receive a bigger land and relatively developed infrastructure like irrigation scheme.
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Donor’s goal of food security program in Ethiopia
The Paris Convention of Aid Effectiveness4 requires donors to support the
development goals of countries by coordinating their projects and activities within the
goals of these countries’ governments (Paris Convention, 2005). Accordingly donors in
Ethiopia which include foreign governments, multilateral organizations and foundations
integrated the government’s Food Security goals in to their own goals. But the donors’
goal in the Food Security Program goes further than what the government aims to
achieve in that it requires the government to introduce serious reforms that accords
democratic governance and economic freedom to its citizens as part of its food security
strategy (DAG, 2006). Donors noted that a food security strategy that does not
encourage democratic governance, government accountability and independence of
judiciary will only perpetuate the current poverty status rather than changing it (DAG,
2006).
As an example the researcher saw goals of four major donors in the Food
Security program which are USAID, DFID, World Bank, and the European Union. USAID
has an ambitious goal of helping 50 million people climb out of poverty in Africa through
an investment by a public-private partnership aimed at improving small scale agriculture
(Suarez, 2012). The US government through USAID expressed its goal of pushing

4

nd

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness has been signed on March 2 , 2005 by 138 countries
including Ethiopia. The core principles of this convention are: encouraging aid beneficiaries to formulate
their aid priorities or strategies; donors’ following these priorities and strategies in providing aid; to make
these strategies identified by recipient countries goal oriented and verify progress towards the goal by
monitoring and evaluation; and making both donors and aid beneficiary countries accountable for
achieving these goals (OECD, Par 2).
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Ethiopia towards democratic governance system and seeing Ethiopia reform its land
tenure system so that small farmers could have titles over their land and be able to
borrow money by placing their land as collateral (Suarez, 2012)
The United Kingdom through its international development arm DFID, expressed
its goal of seeing “--- democratization, decentralization and increasing respect for the
human rights of all Ethiopians “. DFID believed that the government should have
transparent decentralized and democratic governance with active civil society system
and a rule of law enforced by independent judiciary (DFID, 2012). The European Union
believes that Food security is a multifaceted challenge that needs to be tackled by a
partnership of the government; donors and a strong civil society network that need to
thrive in democratic governance (EU Country Technical Paper, 2011). The EU’S Food
Security assistance in Ethiopia addresses both building the capacity of the government
for overcoming emergency food shortages and supporting the government’s long term
strategy of helping certain targeted chronically food insecure areas achieve Food
Security (Delegation of EU, 2013). The EU’s goal as a major donor of the government’s
Food Security Program is based on the Cotonou Agreement which aims at achieving
democratic governance with strong participation of Non State Actors (NSAs)5, rule of
law, transparency and respect for Human Rights (Delegation of EU, 2013).
World Bank as a major donor in the country’s Food Security Program has a goal
of helping democratic governance take root in the country through decentralization of
5

The Cotonou agreement which was made to coordinate the financial and economic aid of EU members
to African Caribbean and Pacific countries refers all national or international Non-Governmental entities
or organizations in these African, Caribbean and Pacific countries as Non State Actors.
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political power, improved accountability and participation of citizens in the political
process by nurturing a strong civil society network (World Bank, 2013). The Donor
Assistance Group (DAG) which is a framework that was set up to coordinate the actions
of all the major donors in Ethiopia also reflects the interests of its members in its goal of
promoting democratic governance, independent judiciary that protects private
property, reform of the land tenure system and removal of barriers on trade and
investment (DAG, 2006)

INGO’s goal of Food Security in Ethiopia
The goal of INGOs in Ethiopia regarding Food Security shows different
characteristics before and after the enactment of the CSP. Before the enactment of the
CSP INGOs’ goals and objectives were similar to that of the donors in the sense of
addressing the root causes of poverty not only through relief and economic
development but also through development of a vibrant civil society system and
democratic governance. But this has changed after the enactment of the CSP because
the domestic unit (government and community) aggressively demanded all INGOs to
limit their services only to relief and economic development. An example for this would
be the change which occurred to the objective of a prominent INGO called Action Aid
International in Ethiopia. Before CSP came in to the picture one of the objectives of the
organization was “to strengthen the capacity and action of poor and excluded people’s
organizations and movements, to assert their rights and overcome causes and
symptoms of poverty and injustice” (Action Aid, 2011, par. 2.8). Action Aid also showed
that one of its activities was to “operate human rights based antipoverty programs”
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(Action Aid, 2011, par. 2.9). The current objective of Action Aid says “Action Aid Ethiopia
is committed to the eradication of absolute poverty and the realization of social equity
and dignity in Ethiopia” (Action Aid Ethiopia, 2013, par.3)
INGO Effectiveness in Developing Countries
As previously noted the dependent variable in this research is effectiveness of INGOs
in Ethiopia. The literature reviewed for this research is grounded in the study of INGOs
in Ethiopian and other similarly situated developing countries. This literature suggests
that the following factors are associated with INGOs effectiveness in developing
countries.
1. Level of organizational experience and endurance
Most INGOs are set up to serve long term goals. But not all of them survive for a
long period of time. Charlton and May (1995), noticed that in the NGO boom period of
1980s and 1990s a number of INGOs were set up in response to the abundant and easily
accessible foreign donation. Many of these INGOs died away when foreign donation
became scarce and competitive. Conradie (1999) suggested that in order to become
sustainable and effective, INGOs should “--- be able to carry on almost indefinitely or for
at least five to ten years (depending on the nature of the project)” (N.pn). Lewis (1998)
also suggested that in the eyes of all stakeholders INGOs which showed higher level of
longevity or endurance tend to be more effective than more short lived INGOs. Lewis
(1998) further argued the longevity of INGOs is closely related to other factors like
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financial stability of an organization, and support of local government officials and
support of target community members.
2. Level of organizational resources
Level of financial resources
Most INGOs in developing countries rely on international donors for their survival.
Their dependency on international donors has been exacerbated by the lack of national
government support and the absence of local public culture to donate (Obiyan, 2005,
Bratton, 1989). In the 1980s and 1990s governments of developed countries and
intergovernmental organizations were transferring a significant portion of their official
aid to developing countries through INGOs.
Reimann (2006) stated that in the 1990s UN agencies were transferring more than 2
billion dollars to developing countries through INGOs while the World Bank increased
INGOs’ share of project funding from 6% in 1973-88 to 50% in the late 1990s. While
most local and INGOs functioning in developing countries continued to depend on
international donors’ money, others were able to develop a sustained source of income
locally (Hearn, 2007, Parks, 2008). For instance, Parks (2008) reported that in the 1980s
many INGOs in Thailand have become independent of foreign donations by developing
sustainable sources of local funding.
In the case of Ethiopia, domestic NGOs like the Amahara Development
Association (ADA), Tigray Development Association (TDA) or Oromo Development
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Association (ODA) are not dependent on foreign funding since they get most of their
funds from membership contribution, local fund raising efforts and limited business
practices like renting an office building or crop farming (Clarke, 2000, Publications of
ADA, 2010; TDA; 2009; and ODA, 2010).
As Lewis (1998) discussed, foreign funding for international and domestic NGOs
declined in the late 1990s. Such scarcity in foreign donations caused some INGOs to shut
their doors while others were forced to go in to fierce competition to get funding. Two
opposing views were expressed regarding NGO competition for foreign funding. Those
who argued in favor of NGO competition for foreign funding like Conradie (1999) said
that “--- INGOs should run their organizations more like business initiatives and move
away from a purely welfare approach” (Section 4.3 Para. 4). Others like Johnsone and
Prakash (2007) argued that competition and market oriented approach for INGOs will
lead them away from pursuing their original objectives.
Competition for scarce resources also forces INGOs to give priority to the
objectives or missions of international donors rather than their own priorities. INGOs
which prioritize the implementation of international donors’ agenda over the priorities
of the local communities are likely to see a decline in their effectiveness in the following
three ways:
a) INGOs will see their local support base eroded since their communities’ needs
have become secondary to donors (Szporluk, 2009, Hearn, 2007).
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b) States in developing countries will find easier grounds to discredit the activities
of INGOs by claiming that the true purpose of INGOs in developing countries is
serving the purpose of foreign powers rather than meeting the needs of local
people (Moore and Stewart, 1998).
c) Fierce competition for foreign funds may not win the support of donors who
prefer collaboration to competition (Moore and Stewart, 1998).
In regard to financial status, those INGOs receiving most of their funding from
local sources are likely to have more financial stability and thus can be more effective
than those INGOs dependent on foreign funding (Parks, 2008). INGOs that depend on
international donors for their funding will find it hard to have a long term plan or work
on projects since they do not have a stable and continuous source of funding ( Smillie,
1997, Makoba, 2002). INGOs dependent on foreign funding have to compete with
others at each funding period and try to meet the ever changing requirements of donors
(Smillie, 1997). In addition INGOs who receive most of their funding from local sources
do not have to spend as much time on finding new sources of funding.
Level of other resources
The level of other resources INGOs can bring in to a developing country
determines their effectiveness (Boulding, 2008). Resources can include capacity in the
following ways: a well-developed management structure (Welsh&Lenihan, 2006), ability
to hire adequate number of staff, and the ability to increase productivity of staff by
investing resources on staff training and development (Lewis, 1998). INGOs with a
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higher level of such resources at their disposal or those that can bring a higher volume
of resources to target community are more likely to be effective than INGOs lacking
significant resources (Boulding, 2008, Smillie, 1999, Walsh & Lenihan, 2006).
The level of expertise possessed by the employees of INGOs is a determining
factor in the effectiveness of INGOs. Level of expertise refers to the level of educational
training and /or professional experience employees have in the NGO field (Lewis, 1998,
Walsh & Lenihan, 2006). Employees of INGOs also tend to show dedication and courage
towards the accomplishment of their organization’s mission (Anheier & Salamon, 2006,
Walsh & Lenihan, 2006).
The level of trained manpower INGOs can hire or maintain depends mainly on
their level of resources and the nature of the project in which they are engaged. For
instance the number of college graduates small INGOs can hire or maintain is limited
compared to larger INGOs. Scholars like (Smillie, 1997, Conradie, 1999) believe that
other factors being equal, INGOs which have higher level of trained staff will be more
effective than those INGOs which have lower level of trained staff.
3. Level of organizational project effectiveness and efficiency
Project effectiveness
INGOs are established with specific missions and objectives. Their mission
determines the kind of service they deliver and the way they get permitted to operate in
developing countries. In Ethiopia INGOs which apply to be registered by the Ethiopian
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Charities’ and Societies’ Agency need to identify their mission in a specific way. For
example Water Aid is one INGO that focuses on expanding access to clean drinking
water and sanitation whereas Hunger Project is another INGO which has an objective of
reducing poverty by teaching farmers better farming methods and how to access
education and healthcare services (interview with officials of Water Aid and the Hunger
Project, 2011). INGOs have the advantage of specializing their effort or investment on a
limited area or population which helps them to be more focused and effective in their
programs. Program effectiveness is related to the ability of INGOs to complete their
mission in a timely manner. But program effectiveness may mean more than achieving
the organization’s missions. INGOs are also required to integrate the development goals
of both donors and the governments in to their programs or missions. For instance, the
current Ethiopian government required all INGOs that conduct relief and development
services to adopt the main principles of PASDEP (a government poverty reduction
strategy synchronized with the United Nations Millenium Development Goals (MDGs)
that were adopted in 2000 (Rahmato, Bantirgu & Endeshaw ,2008).
In this strategy the government stated that hunger and poverty have been
perennial problems of the country and have impeded economic development for a long
time. As the urge to get rid of hunger and reduce poverty levels was in line with the
MDG goals, the government wanted to steer the efforts of both governmental
organizations and INGOs towards these goals. In regard to implementing the PASDEP,
Rahmato, Bantirgu & Endeshaw (2008) noted that all the achievements of the Ethiopian
government in fighting hunger and poverty would not have been possible without the
54

significant contribution of INGOs. INGOs which originally expressed concerns that strict
government oversight was an encroachment on their autonomy, later accepted it as a
meaningful approach (Campbell, 1996).
Boulding (2008) argued that as far as program effectiveness goes INGOs which
operate in less densely populated areas or rural areas where the economy has limited
resources are more effective in bringing political impact than INGOs which function in
urban areas or high population density areas where the communities have more
resources. INGOs in urban areas or high density areas tend to be large and bureaucratic
which makes them detached or non-participatory. In their pursuit of funds the main task
of urban NGOs’ may be to satisfy donors’ requirements rather than the long term needs
of the community (Szporluk, 2009, Hearn, 2007). INGOs in rural areas tend to be more
participatory and able to mobilize the community for political change (Boulding, 2008)
as well as economic growth (Bratton, 1989).
INGOs in rural areas can also specialize on a specific community problem, have a
small area of population coverage and are likely to be more effective than those that
dealing with a large array of community problems or cover a wide area of the
population (Boulding, 2008). By the same token INGOs that specialize on a specific
sector like healthcare, education or water resource development in a smaller area and
for a shorter duration are able to focus their resources on that specific problem or area
and can be more effective than others that do not have such a high level of
specialization ( Bonzi, 2006,Seckinelgin,2005).
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Campbell (1996) and Obiyan (2005) argue the state’s requirement for INGOs to
follow its developmental goals will help coordinate their activities and make them more
effective as long as the requirements provide them with sufficient room for flexibility in
implementation. This view clashes with the conventional argument that government
development goals limit NGO’s autonomy (Clark, 2000, Fowler 1991), and argues
developmental goals like the PASDEP in Ethiopia increases the effectiveness of INGOs.
INGOs that collaborate with other INGOs tend to be more effective than those
INGOs which compete against each other (Smillie, 1997). Those INGOs which are
members of an umbrella organization like Christian Relief Development Association
(CRDA) assist each other in information sharing, equipment sharing, staff training and in
other similar programs (CRDA, 2010). INGOs that compete against others tend to use
questionable fund raising tactics where they convey only positive information and hide
negative information to donors (Szporluk, 2009, Conradie, 1999). Competing INGOs also
do not coordinate their efforts with others and thus are not in a position to maximize
the use of resources (Szporluk, 2009, Conradie, 1999).
Efficiency of Organizations
Donors want to see INGOs utilize most of their funds to implement programs
(Szporluk, 2009). Many large INGOs indicate on their website that a low percentage of
their operation goes to administrative cost and a majority of their funds go to their
programs. For instance Plan International USA in its 2010 financial report showed that
its management and general cost were only 8.2 % of the budget while programs made
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up 77.4 % of the budget (Plan International USA, Annual review, 2010). OXFAM
International reported its support expenditures were 9% while its program expenditure
were 90% of the total (Oxfam Annual report and accounts, 2010).
However not all scholars agree on the necessity of INGOs to maintain low
administrative costs. For example Smillie (1997) argues forcing INGOs to minimize their
administrative costs will make them less effective since it can lead them to do one or
more of the following:
i)

Cut corners and reduce the quality of their service or product

ii)

Fraudulently report administrative costs as program cost

iii)

Conducting improper method of fund raising

iv)

Deception of private donors whose money is used for administrative
expenses, although they were advised that their donation will be used for
program purposes.

v)

Lack of transparency in the expenditures and fund raising programs of
INGOs.

Smillie (1997) also argues that it would be unethical for intergovernmental
organizations like the UN agencies to accept project funds including administrative cost
from donor countries and withhold the administrative cost when they transfer the fund
to INGOs. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is a typical
institution for this case since it requires INGOs to use all the money they receive for
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program implementation and cover the administrative expenses from their own pockets
(Smillie, 1997).
According to Smillie (1997) and Makoba (2002) lower administrative costs are
not always better in INGO fiscal administration andINGOs should have flexibility to
determine their individual administrative cost subject to transparency. INGOs tend to
allocate their resources on the basis of certain factors like their communities’ priorities
the expertise or specific experience they have (Lingan, Cavender, Lioyd and Gwynne,
2009). For instance in Ethiopia, from 2004-2008 the bulk of INGOs resources were
invested in four of the ten regions of the country as follows: 4.4 billion birr (492.7
million USD) In Oromia region, 1.8 billion birr (201.5 million USD) in Amhara region, 1.1
billion birr (123.1 million USD) in Addis Ababa region, and 1.004 billion birr (112.4
million USD) in Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s region (Rahmato, Bantirgu
& Endeshaw, 2008).
From 2004-2007 INGOs’ investment in Ethiopia was high in the following sectors:
Integrated urban/rural development including food security and education (2.97 billion
birr or 321.2 million USD); Health (1.08 billion birr or 117.3 million USD) and fighting
HIV/AIDS (710. 96 million birr or 76.9 million USD). Although the government’s poverty
reduction plan (PASDEP) has a role in the distribution of NGO resources, INGOs have
also looked for projects where they could demonstrate efficient performance (Rahmato,
Bantirgu & Endeshaw, 2008).

58

In regard to fiscal efficiency prior research suggest INGOs which have a transparent
organizational structure tended to be more effective than those who are not
transparent. INGOs which are transparent in terms of financial expenditures feel
accountable in terms of expenses and tend to avoid waste and abuse of funds (Szporluk,
2009, Conradie, 1999, Lingan, Cavender, Lioyd and Gwynne, 2009). INGOs which
promote transparency are also more likely to enforce strict auditing and evaluation of
their cost efficiency while those that do not promote trasparency are not likely to do the
same.
4. Level of Organizational accountability
INGOs which are accountable to a specific authority tend to perform effectively.
Lingan, Cavender, Lioyd and Gwynne (2009) paint a broad picture of NGO accountability
by stating INGOs are in general accountable to both internal and external stakeholders.
In the accountability perspective, INGOs have relationship with three stakeholders:
donors; target communities; and governments (Szporluk, 2009).
Scholars like Szporluk (2009), Lewis (1998), Conradie( 1999) believe INGOs show
more accountability to international donors than the other two stakeholders groups
because they are dependent on international donors for their financial survival. Lloyd
and del las Casas (N.D.) indicated NGO’s accountability relationship to donors and the
government are strong because they provide funding and regulatory mechanisms
respectively while their accountability relationship with their community members is
weak as the latter do not have any power over INGOs. Lloyd and del las Casas (N.D.)
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concluded that “… balancing the needs of these different stakeholders is the crux of
being accountable” (pp. 3). As Rahmato, Bantirgu and Endeshaw, (2008) observed
INGOs in African countries like Ethiopia receive 90% of their funds from international
donors. These INGOs seek to promote their donor’s agenda at the expense of the
priorities of their target communities and the government (Szporluk, 2009, Obiyan, 2005
and Moore &Stewart, 1998).
In developing countries like Ethiopia, the government’s relation with INGOs
reflects two opposing events. On the one hand the government considers INGOs as
threat to its absolute rule and tries to control their activities, while on the other hand
the government needs the existence of INGOs because of the resources they bring in to
the country (Harrison, 2002). In regard to the relationship between INGOs and the
target communities, Szpoluk (2009) argued INGOs should be accountable to their
communities if they want to be effective in their operation.
However Lingan, Cavender, Lioyd and Gwynne (2009) argue that INGOs which
can maintain an approach of balanced accountability to donors, the government and
their target community members are likely to be more effective than those that cannot
maintain such a balanced accountability approach. INGOs need to interact not only with
their community members but also with their outside environment which includes
donors and the government. Both donors and the government wield a lot of influence
on the survival of INGOs. In addition, Bratton, (1990) stated political decision making in
developing countries is determined not only by formal authorities but also by informal
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authorities. INGOs which maintain the proper accountability relationships with both
formal and informal authorities in developing countries are more likely to be effective
than those who do not maintain this kind of accountability relationship (Bratton, 1990).
Lingan, Cavender, Lioyd and Gwynne (2009) caution, overburdening INGOs with multiple
accountability obligations make their work cumbersome and render them less effective.
5) Level of organizational relation with external bodies
Relation to National or local governments
Najam (2000) proposed a model that explains INGO- government relation as four
kinds. These are: Cooperative when both share similar goals and strategies of achieving
their goals; Confrontational when both have opposite goals and strategies;
complimentary when they share similar goals but need to use different strategies and
Cooptation when they have different goals but use similar strategies to achieve their
goals.
Obiyan (2005) on the other hand stated that INGOs can have a symbiotic
relationship with local governments in which governments need INGOs for much
needed foreign resources while INGOs need the support of governments to maintain a
sustained existence in that country. Developing countries like Ethiopia have a shortage
of foreign currency as their export commodities are fetching declining prices than in
previous years (Reinert, 2007, Rahmato, Bantirgu & Endeshaw, 2008). For example in
2008 the amount of foreign currency Ethiopia received from its leading export
commodity coffee dropped by 65.8% from the previous year. The foreign currency
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INGOs bring in to the Ethiopia helps the country make up the shortfall it had in foreign
currency ( Rahmato, Bantirgu & Endeshaw, 2008).
I believe that in the period between early 1990s to the 2005 political election
INGOs were enjoying a relatively enabling environment created by the government and
they formed all the types of relationship discussed by Najam (2000) with the
government except confrontational type. During this time the influence of INGOs on the
formulation and execution of the government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy was
supported by all major donors (Clark, 2000). The donors provided direct budget support
to the government in addition to funding INGOs’ projects so long as the government
was open to nurturing the growth of democratic culture and the role of INGOs in
cultivating this culture in their communities (World Bank, 2010).
Right after the 2005 political election in Ethiopia the relationship between some
INGOs and the domestic unit turned confrontational and filled with animosity and
mutual suspicion when the government thought that these INGOs crossed the line of
their mandate and supported the opposition forces. In such cases the government tends
to stop providing enabling environment for INGOs because they regard them as threats
to their political rule or legitimacy (Fowler, 1991, Campbell, 1996). A typical example is
Ethiopian government’s refusal to renew the licenses of several INGOs after the
enactment of the CSP (personal communication with CSA official, 2011). On the other
hand relation between governments and INGOs can be cooperative and mutually

62

beneficial if governments do not feel threatened by the presence of INGOs in their
territories (Campbell, 1996, Najam 2000).
INGOs that integrate their goals and activities with the government’s goals and
activities; and support the political will of government are likely to enjoy a more
enabling environment. Conversely INGOs that deviate from the government’s will and
are critical of the government’s policies have difficulty receiving government support
necessary to be effective (Fowler, 1991, Campbell,1996). In Ethiopia the higher
correlation between degree of closeness to national government and effectiveness of
INGOs has been depicted with the effectiveness exhibited by some NGO partners like
Amahara Development Association (ADA), Oromo Development Association (ODA), and
Tigray Development Association (TDA) (Rahmato, Bantirgu & Endeshaw, 2008). These
INGOs receive considerable government support and maintain cooperation with federal
and local government offices which allows them to use government structure to
implement their projects and raise funds locally.
In African countries like Ethiopia, the state power constitutes formal and
informal structure. The policy of the state, its ideology and governance is determined
not only by the formal state bureaucracy, but also by the informal ethnic group leaders
of the ruling party (Bratton, 1990, Hearn, 2002). INGOs that have closer ties with the
informal network of governance in developing countries are likely to get the support of
the official state structure and be more effective than those INGOs that do not have
such support (Bratton, 1990). A typical example in the case of Ethiopia is the national
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NGO known as Rist and the closer ties it has with the informal structure of the ruling
elite. Some NGO partners like the ADA, TDA and the ODA also have closer ties with the
informal structure of the ruling elite in their respective ethnic regional administration
(Clarke, 2000). These INGOs are likely to be more effective than other INGOs with no
such advantages.
Relations to other INGOs through a network
Prior to explosion of development of INGOs in Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s
networks of INGOs had not been established. Christian Relief and Development
Association (CRDA) was the first NGO network organization set up to coordinate the
relief and development effort of these INGOs. CRDA was established in 1974 with only
12 members and in 2008 its membership numbers increased to 266 (Rahmato, Bantirgu
& Endeshaw, 2008).
As of 2007, in addition to CRDA, 11 other networks of different sizes have
emerged. The two largest networks after CRDA are a network of INGOs that work with
Orphans and vulnerable children, with a membership of 118 INGOs and the networks of
INGOs that work on poverty reduction, with a membership of 90 INGOs (Rahmato,
Bantirgu & Endeshaw, 2008). In their study regarding Ethiopian INGOs, Rahmato,
Bantirgu & Endeshaw, (2008) found out that out of over 3000 INGOs that were
operating in Ethiopia in 2007 only 640 were members of various networks.
The literature argues that INGOs which integrate their operations with other
INGOs tend to be more effective than those that operate unilaterally (PFE, 2003, CRDA,
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2010, PANE, 2010). The networks share new information between members; provide
ethical standards or operating procedures for members; evaluate the activities of
member INGOs and provide appropriate feedback for them; and provide a strong
representation of their members’ interest in front of national or regional governments,
donors and other organizations (Clarke, 2000, Rahmato, Bantirgu & Endeshaw,2008,
CRDA, 2010).The literature also shows INGOs which operate within the framework of a
network or coalition are able to avoid criticisms from donors directed at not being
willing to collaborate with others and use their resources efficiently (Parks, 2008,
Makoba, 2002).
6) Level of community trust on INGOs
Partnerships with local organizations
The growth of domestic NGOs in a country solidifies the ownership, partnership
and participation of local stakeholders in that country’s political, social and economic
development (Lingan, Cavender, Lioyd and Gwynne, 2009). According to the NGO
registry in the Ethiopian Ministry of Justice, domestic NGOs have been growing at a
much faster pace than INGOs. The same document shows that as of March 2007 out of
the 2305 registered INGOs, 1742 (75.57 percent) are domestic NGOs while 234 (10.15
percent) are INGOs (Rahmato, Bantirgu & Endeshaw, 2008). Domestic NGOs are
established by local people who share a common language, culture, tradition and
aspirations with the members of target communities. But INGOs do not have this
advantage when they operate in communities of developing countries like Ethiopia.
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To make up for this cultural gap, many INGOs: partner with local organizations
like domestic NGOs or cooperatives; operate indirectly through these local organizations
by building their capacity and funding their projects (Lewis, 1998). In Ethiopia, the state
administration has been subdivided on the basis of ethnic federalism which adds
another dimension to the cultural tie factor. Some INGOs operate in more than one
ethnic region in the country. INGOs whose staff shares common language, culture and
tradition with the community seem to be more trusted and effective in their functions
than other INGOs which do not have the same leverage (Lewis, 1998, Obiyan, 2005).
Strength of community trust on INGOs
Certain scholars like Fowler (1991) and Obiyan (2005) argued that INGOs have
certain unique features that make them more effective than governments which include
flexibility, less bureaucracy, being allies of their communities and their ability to spend
most of their funds on the priorities of their communities. INGOs can win the trust of
the local communities and are considered by the local communities as genuine allies, in
their pursuit of economic, political and social goals tend to be more effective (Lewis,
1998, Fowler, 1991). Closely associated with this is the degree of legitimacy as measured
by the perceptions of community members (Makoba, 2002). INGOs that earn the trust
of their community members assume the role of representing or leading their
community in advocating for an appropriate policy change (Fowler, 1991). Those INGOs
that have a higher degree of legitimacy in their community tend to be more effective
than INGOs which do not have this advantage.
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Conclusion
The literature review showed that INGO effectiveness has different meanings for
each of the three main stakeholders groups. In developing countries INGOs have
multiplied in number and programs complexity since the late 1990s and became venues
of a large transfer of international resources to developing countries. But it is not clear if
such increase in number and complexity have brought effectiveness to INGOs. The
literature review showed that some factors like: organizational experience and
endurance; organizational resources; project effectiveness and efficiency;
accountability; relation with external bodies; membership of INGO network; and
Community trust have been commonly listed by NGO scholars as possible factors of
INGO effectiveness in developing countries. This research will focus on finding out if
these factors are also applicable to the effectiveness of INGOs in the current political
and economic environment of developing countries by taking the specific case of
Ethiopia. The following chapter shows the methodology used in this research to find out
the common factors of effectiveness across all INGOs and the factors that can be
considered as unique to INGOs of specific sectors.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
There are many different kinds of INGOs operating in Ethiopia today. The old
method of classifying such groups focused attention on six primary categories: domestic
NGOs, INGOs, professional associations, civic advocacy groups, religious groups, and
adoption agencies (Rahmato, Bantirgu and Endeshaw, 2008). Yet, the current
government, which took power in May 1991, reduced the official regulated categories
of INGOs to three.
1. Charities or societies that operate in more than one regional state or
societies whose members are from more than one regional state.
2. Foreign charities and Ethiopian resident charities and societies even if they
operate only in one regional state.
3. Charities or societies operating in the city administration of Addis Ababa or
DireDawa (Proclamation 621 Article 3, 2009).

This research will focus on Category 2--foreign charities--and studies the actual
practices of such INGOs in three focus programs: Food Security, Healthcare, and
Education in order to explore and document the factors leading to effectiveness in this
particular developing country setting.
Selection of Cases
Specifically, this research focuses on the practices and choices of wellestablished cases of INGOs in Ethiopia in order to find out what effectiveness looks like.
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The selected cases had significant experience with successful projects. The decision to
focus on such well-established (exemplary) cases was made for several reasons.
First, there were data collection concerns. If I picked a case of clear failure, it was
not clear that participants would have been willing to talk about their experience(s).
Second, it was reasonable to expect that if effectiveness was possible, it would be most
likely to exist and to be recognized in cases of long-term operational presence, since
longevity is, by itself, recognized by most as a one measure of ongoing effectiveness.
Such cases would thus offer a rich array of descriptive data across the full range
of variables with which to paint an initial, yet reasonably accurate picture of an
effectiveness framework or frameworks which could then be tested using a broader
range of successful, mixed success, and failed attempt cases. Third, this research
broadens the range of cases examined relative to the existing literature by focusing on
cases where success is likely. The expectation is that the empirical record will cast light
on what factors might contribute to the achievement of NGO effectiveness.
Fourth, vast majority of INGOs have a long history of service in Ethiopia in food
security, healthcare and education projects and thus provide established track records
for such in-country project implementation. For the purpose of this research only those
INGOs with a minimum of four years of operational experience in the focus areas of
food security, healthcare and education were considered. The multiple years of
experience means officials from these INGOs will have the depth of perspective required
to provide the answers this research seeks. This research’s selection of experienced
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INGOs also means government officials and citizens are more likely to have well
developed perspectives on these INGOs’ activities. At the same time, there is a robust
universe of INGOs from which to choose. Table 1 shows the numbers and growth trends
of INGOs in Ethiopia since 1994.
Table 3:1- Growth of INGOs in Ethiopia from 1994-2007

INGOs

1994

1996

1998

2000

2007

46

96

119

122

234

Table 1-Source- Dessalegn, 2002, MOJ, 2007 as cited by Rahmato, Bantirgu and
Endeshaw, (2008)
Fifth, INGOs were chosen because, while there are many more domestic NGOs
operating inside Ethiopia (about 1700 as of 2007), over the past 10 years INGOs have
shifted from the direct, or sole control of project implementation to partnerships with
many of these domestic NGOs. Given this, most domestic NGOs cannot be considered as
standalone, independent groups for the purposes of research observation. Their direct
involvement and dependence on foreign NGO funding, as well as project development
and initiation, makes INGOs the key decision-makers, and thus the best source of
information for what makes INGOs effective in Ethiopia.
Sixth, INGOs are a rich source of information because they have put in place a significant
number of “active” projects across the country, thus providing a resource rich database
for exploring the main research question. In 2008, for example, INGOs conducted 235
programs and projects across the various regions (see Table3: 2).
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Table 3:2- Number of INGO Projects in All Administrative Regions of Ethiopia
Oromia

Addis

SNNPR

Amhara

Tigray

Somalia

BSGR

Afar

Ababa
53

44

Dire

Gambella

Harrari

7

3

Dawa
28

34

14

22

14

11

5

Table 2- Source- EU Mapping Report (2008)
Seventh and finally, INGOs are more likely to be high impact because they bring
significant resources to bear in-country. Taken together, the amount of resources all
INGOs bring into the country via foreign currency exchanges reached 9.580 billion
Ethiopian birr (920.9 million USD) in 2008-09. This was more than double the amount
only five years earlier, and up roughly 450% from ten years earlier (see table 3). To gain
some added perspective on the relative importance of NGO foreign currency
importation, it is much higher than the foreign currency the country obtained from its
number one export product, coffee, in all the years noted in Table 3.
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Table 3:3 – Foreign Currency Transfers of INGOs in Ethiopia Compared to Foreign
Currency Transfers through Other Sources
(In thousands of USD)
Period

Private

INGOs

transfer

Private

Official

Individuals

transfers

Export*

1996/97

259,011

129,649

132,457

227,215

354983.7

1997/98

316,975

187,066

133,002

260,348

419,989.9

1998/99

288,958

208,419

88,219

203,884

281,278.7

1999/00

378,012

272,057

117,560

208,254

261,858.1

2000/01

445,822

282,862

177,610

394,005

182,531.1

2001/02

445,659

260,361

199,386

434,678

163,161.7

2002/03

564,524

346,736

233,488

599,804

165,290.4

2003/04

771,270

456,821

333,397

566,476

223,497.1

2004/05

1,022,774

457,385

582,712

749,701

335,343.7

2005/06

1,226,345

499,823

736,713

755,918

354,393.9

2006/07

1,728,570

536,100

1,207,625

1,199,135

425,473.9

2007/08

2,388,276

638,541

1779,714

1,312,471

529,780.5

2008/09

2,706,785

920,994

1,812299

1,551,394

387,023.7

Table 3- Source- the National Bank of Ethiopia foreign currency transfer data base,
as of June 2011. * Source- Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority (2010)

And although there is no specific data showing how much of these foreign currency
transfers were due directly to INGOs, it is common knowledge that INGOs are the
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principal conduits of non-governmental foreign aid resources into Ethiopia. This
impression is supported by the following two strong anecdotal cases suggesting that the
majority of it was channeled through INGOs.
The first anecdotal evidence is Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) which is
part of the government’s Food Security program aimed at reducing poverty in the
country to the level indicated in the MDG goals. The main purpose of PSNP is to provide
food security to families who have chronic food shortages and cannot feed themselves
for more than 3-6 months out of the year unless they receive assistance (Cerritelli,
Bantirgu and Abagagodu, 2008). When this program was launched it targeted 8.2 million
people in eight regions of the country and it planned to provide food security by
building community and household assets in a form of grain for work program (Cerritelli,
Bantirgu and Abagagodu, 2008). USAID, which is the major fund provider to the program
with an estimate of more than 110 million USD per year over the past five years, chose
to channel its funds through INGOs instead of transferring it directly to the government
(USAID, 2011). For the same purpose USAID selected seven major INGOs of which six are
INGOs: CARE Ethiopia, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Ethiopia, Family Health
International (FHI); Save the Children Fund UK; Save the Children Fund US; and World
Vision Ethiopia.
The second anecdotal evidence is PEPFAR (U. S. President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief) which is also a USAID managed fund and aimed at preventing HIV-AIDS
epidemics. The program started operating in 15 selected countries that had a very high
rate of the AIDS infection including Ethiopia (PEPFAR, N.D). In Ethiopia the annual
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budget of PEPFAR’s has been increasing from year to year and reached 354.3 million US
dollars by the year 2008, (PEPFAR, N.D). As in the case of PSNP most of the primary
partners who receive funding from USAID are INGOs, which are then allowed to subgrant the funds to appropriate domestic NGOs through partnership agreements. These
two anecdotal cases seem to validate the appropriateness of selecting INGOs as subjects
of this research.
Thus this manuscript offers a rich description of what foreign NGO effectiveness
looks like in Ethiopia from the perspective of the participants, and how it can be seen to
work in the selected cases. Just as importantly, this research provides critical conceptual
underpinnings for future empirical analysis, as found in the operationalization of
effectiveness in Ethiopia and the discussions of the conditions likely to promote
effectiveness. The approach follows the advice of King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) and
accepts that rich, descriptive “case studies … are … fundamental to social sciences. It is
pointless to seek to explain what we have not described with a reasonable degree of
precision “(44, emphasis added). In short while the data provided by the exemplary
cases do not provide definitive answers to the main research questions, they are a
necessary first step for future research designed to build the kind of explanatory theory
that will help us to know with greater certainty what NGO effectiveness in developing
countries like Ethiopia looks like.
Further for the purpose of an explanatory study of a descriptive question it is
acceptable methodologically speaking to select on the dependent variable and to
explore the dynamics of cases that are widely regarded as exemplary instances of a
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process or institutional arrangement. The key, according to King, Keohane, and Verba
(1994, 129) and Yin (1994), is that the complexity of foreign NGO operational dynamics
is such that there is a reasonable expectation of variation in how similar levels of success
or effectiveness (the dependent variable), are accomplished. This is because studying
the effectiveness of INGOs in Ethiopia brings out contextual experiences of different
organizations through different time periods and in different areas in Ethiopia, where
the contemporary experience would be the most relevant to study. In addition the
activities of INGOs in Ethiopia are as diverse as their mission, environment or the level
of their staff expertise. Such features of the research question led to the selection case
study research method for this project. As Yin (1994) explained this research also
needed to benefit from the unique strength a case study method has at its disposal
which is “… a full variety of evidence –documents, artifacts, interviews and observations
beyond what might be available in the conventional historical study” (P ,8).
Approach to Data Gathering: Documents, Articles, Interviews and Focus Groups
Data was gathered using a multi-source approach involving the review of
primary documents, the review of secondary sources, and a series of interviews with
key participants, and focus groups. More specifically, this research effort has reviewed:
published and unpublished government documents, policies, legislations and survey
researches; published and unpublished documents from international donors and
INGOs; the websites of government offices, international donors and INGOs, and
Secondary sources such as published and unpublished research conducted on INGOs in
developing countries, as well as that focused on Ethiopia itself.
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In terms of interviews, semi-structured, open ended interviews were conducted with
relevant government officials, INGOs employees and leaders, community leaders and
other key stakeholders impacted by NGO projects. The researcher travelled to Ethiopia
on 6/1/11 and stayed in-country for six weeks. During this time the researcher visited
30 INGOs, 6 major donor organizations, 7 federal government offices, 5 network
institutions, 10 local NGO projects that were working in partnership with INGOs, and
community members who received NGO goods and services.
Interview data was transcribed immediately after interviews were completed. In
some cases the transcribed record was shared with interviewees to make sure that the
record was accurate and to give them another opportunity to add or clarify their
statements. At the end of the interviews most of the interviewees provided various soft
and hard copy documents to aid in the analysis of effectiveness of their INGOs’
programs. These documents included project evaluation reports; audit reports, project
plans, literature showing best practices, impact assessment surveys and previous
researches conducted by other researchers. The same documents were used as a
triangulation mechanism for the data collected by individual interviews and focus group
interviews. In addition, the survey statistics documents the researcher obtained from
the various ministry offices and the Central Statistics office helped him to compare the
level of contribution of INGOs in Ethiopia to government development goals on the one
hand and the needs of the population on the other hand.
A total of 7 Ethiopian government officials were selected from the ministry of
Finance and Economic Development (MOFED), the Charity and Society Agency, the Food
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Security Office in the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of
Education, Ministry of Youth and Women Affairs and the Federal as well as the Addis
Ababa HIV/ AIDS Prevention and Control Offices (HAPCO). These particular government
officials were selected for the interview because they have more frequent working
relationship with INGOs than other government offices and their officials are more
knowledgeable about INGOs operation in Ethiopia than other government officials.
For instance MOEFED represents the government in any meetings or agreements
that deal with the securing or use of foreign funding through any channels including
INGOs. Its large network from the federal level to Woreda (district) level allows it to be
an active participant of the process of INGOs’ project approval and implementation
throughout the country. The Charities and Societies Agency is the main government
body that registers and supervises INGOs. The Ministries of Education, Health,
Agriculture, Youth and Women’s Affairs and the federal HAPCO offices have been
selected because they are sector offices that have been given authority by the new
proclamation to supervise foreign NGO projects which fall in their sector and because
most of the foreign NGO projects in food security, healthcare and education areas are in
their sectors.
The key participants from INGOs operating in Ethiopia were selected from a list
of 262 INGOs registered by the Ethiopian Charities and Societies Agency. INGOs were
categorized into three groups according to the following sector focus areas: Food
Security, Healthcare and Education. A key rationale behind this categorization scheme
for INGOs is the kind of project agreements these groups must sign with federal and
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regional governments in order to fit within the overall development goals of the
Ethiopian national government. As the federal government and regional governments
are the institutions which set priorities and allow INGOs to establish their projects
within the limits of those priorities, it is important to look at government priorities and
the kind of project agreements INGOs sign with regional government offices.
Checking such records for project agreements that were signed after the new
proclamation and discussing with relevant government officials indicated that majority
of the project agreements INGOs sign currently fall in the three sector focus areas used
in this research (Food Security, Healthcare and Education).

A total of 36 Interviews were conducted with NGO representatives. Many of the NGO
officials Interviewed were from INGOs that have projects covering two or all three
sector focus areas while some were from INGOs that have projects belonging to only
one sector focus area. Those interviewed were middle to senior level managers in their
organization who possessed an average service period of three to five years in their
position. In order to encourage all the interviewees to speak freely the researcher
provided assurance that their names or any other identifying information would not be
disclosed. Such anonymity is important for the following reasons:
The relationship between INGOs and the current government has become sour
after the 2005 national election period as the government blamed some INGOs for
inciting public unrest against the government. The government sought to tighten its
control on INGOs by enacting proclamation 621/2009 which denied all INGOs the right
to engage in any rights based issues. In many cases interviewees required that their
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names and the names of their organization be kept confidential in order to avoid being
placed in the spot light of state control.
Most of the interviewees also stated that their organizations’ rule about
providing internal information to external sources is not clear and in this circumstance
they want to remain anonymous and avoid any chance of being punished by their head
office for providing sensitive information which should not be disclosed.
A lot of the interviewees also stated that they live in a competitive world where
they have to depend on the good will of donors who choose to fund their project among
many other NGO projects. These interviewees were not sure which information could
potentially upset donors and make them change course. Interviewees who also were
willing to provide sensitive documents like project evaluations and project impact
assessment for this research agreed to do so because the researcher offered a pledge of
anonymity.
All interviews were semi-structured with open ended questions that lasted
between 30 to 60 minutes. Following the initial interview, many interviewees were
contacted by phone or email to clarify details or ask additional questions. Some of the
interviewees were willing to meet the researcher in person more than once to answer
further questions. The interviews took place from6/6/11 to 6/28/11. Appendix 1
contains the list of interview questions.
Finally, focus groups were also used. The first focus group interview was
conducted in an NGO setting which is active in the HIV/AIDS category and provides
medical and psychological services for children and adults that were affected by the
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HIV/ AIDS virus in the Yeka and Bole districts of Addis Ababa city. The meeting of this
focus group was held on the afternoon of 6/10/11 from 3p.m. to 4:30p.m. The seven
participants included two children who were service recipients, the parents of these
children, one NGO staff member, one project manager in the same NGO, one
community HIV/AIDS task force leader, and a co-facilitator. The gender and age
composition of this group showed that there were four female and three male
participants whose age varied from 16-53.
The second focus group meeting was arranged in the sub-city of Addis Ketema in
an NGO setting that is active in the Child Welfare / Development category and provides
services including food and nutrition, hygiene, health, education, legal protection,
shelter and psychological support to orphan and vulnerable children. Thirteen people
participated in this focus group, including three volunteers, four eligibility and
recruitment committee members and their chairman, two service recipients, and three
staff members of the service providing NGO. This meeting was held on 6/28/11 from
4p.m. to 6p.m. Each member of the focus group provided her/his opinion at least once
throughout the session. In regard to gender and age composition there were seven male
and 6 female participants in the group whose age varies from 18-46.
In both focus group meetings semi-structured, open ended interview questions were
used. The researcher tried to maintain even participation and encouraged each
participant to share her/his opinion more than once. The information shared by all the
participants was recorded in writing by the co facilitator. At the end of both meetings
the researcher asked the co facilitator to read out the notes taken during the discussion
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and allowed each participant to clarify or add more details to what she/ he discussed
before. Some of the participants were also contacted by phone or email for further
clarification. In addition, when the meeting ended the researcher wrote up his
observations of the focus group meeting because the researcher’s observation is an
important method of gathering information because “… meaningful knowledge cannot
be generated without observation because not all knowledge is… articulable,
recountable or constructable in an interview” (Mason, 2007 p.85). Beyond the focus
groups, the researcher travelled to NGO project sites like communities benefiting from
the PSNP, healthcare centers like HIV/AIDS clinics and adult literacy programs where he
was able to see the traditional and social fabric of the community and how they
perceive the intervention of INGOs in their locality. There was however limitation in the
availability of data and in verifying the accurateness of information obtained because of
the reluctance of some officials to speak candidly or provide requested documents due
to the political situation.

Conclusion
This chapter discussed principally the lack of previous research conducted in the
area of INGO effectiveness in Ethiopia. The country is a less developed country which
has a rudimentary infrastructure and information system without a well-coordinated
data collection system. The scarcity of the data led me to select an exploratory
qualitative research methodology which is based on collecting and analyzing interview
data along with some primary resource documents. This chapter also made the case and
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discussed why I decided to focus only on INGOs instead of studying all INGOs in the
country.
Since the existence of INGO effectiveness or ineffectiveness can be perceived
differently by the three stakeholders the interview and data collection was conducted
from the three stakeholders and some other agencies like NGO networks and coalitions.
Although each stakeholder has different understanding or measurement of INGO
effectiveness as indicated in the introduction chapter this research found there are
common understandings or differences by taking the context of INGO, donors and the
domestic unit in Food Security, Healthcare and Education sectors and has a plan of
showing what each of the three stakeholders can do to make INGOs effective in their
specific sector. The following chapter presents the analysis of the data gathered and
show where the similarities and differences lie in factors of effectiveness across the
various INGOs that operate in the Food Security, Healthcare and Education sectors.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION OF INTERVIEW AND DOCUMENT ANALYSIS
Brief Overview of the Food Security Sector in Ethiopia
This chapter has two sections. In its first section it provides a brief background
information about the food Security, healthcare and education sectors of Ethiopia and
how INGOs’ operations are integrated in the government’s and donors’ goals of these
sectors. The second section of this chapter discusses the result of the data analysis in all
the three sectors and identifies a common perception of the stakeholders across all the
sectors in two ways: 1) Common factors of INGO effectiveness throughout all the three
sectors 2) Factors of INGO effectiveness based on different sectors
Food security has been an important development goal of the current Ethiopian
government. Some of the areas in the country have been subject to successive famine
caused by among other things: lack of sufficient rain, “… land degradation, recent
drought, poor and inadequate management of risk, population pressure and subsistence
agricultural practices” (World Bank, N.D.). After the 2002-2003 food crises the Ethiopian
government identified severe underdevelopment as the root cause of Food Insecurity in
the country (Gebru, Gentilini, Wickrema &Yirga, N.D.)
Most people in drought affected areas were forced to sell their productive and
household assets to survive the crisis and ended up falling in to the depths of poverty.
The current Ethiopian government unveiled a poverty reduction strategy with the food
security program at its heart. The food security program came in to effect in 2000 for
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the duration of five years (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2002). The
country is currently engaged in the third five year plan known as the Growth and
Transformation Plan (GTP).
The purpose of food security program is to alleviate chronic and transitory food
insecurity in the country (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2002). When
the program first became active it carried three components: the Productive Safety Net
program (PSNP), the Voluntary Resettlement Program6, and the Promotion of Non-Farm
related employment Program (Gibson and Nyhus, 2009). The voluntary resettlement
Program moved 213,000 households from chronically food insecure areas to areas with
less population density (Personal communication with Food Security administration
official, 2011). According to the government’s assessment 98% of the new settlers have
now overcome food insecurity and become self-reliant (Personal communication with
Food Security administration official, 2011).
The Food Security Program is supported by both government and donor funding.
The government’s commitment has been two billion Ethiopian Birr (240,673, 886.88
USD in an exchange rate of 2005) and it was devoted to build community resources
(Personal communication with Food Security administration official, 2011). The
governments’ funding was initially administered by local government finance offices but

6

The voluntary resettlement program provides incentives for farmers who are willing to leave their land
and move to a less densely populated and relatively more fertile land. Farmers got 2 hectares of land
compared to 0.2 hectares and they were given access to irrigation scheme, Micro credit funding and
market exchange information. This program projected to help about 440,000 people become food secure
in three years period (Food Security Coordination Bureau, 2009)
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was later placed in a revolving fund managed by credit associations (Personal
communication with Food Security administration official, 2011).
The government believes the Food Security Program does not leave many
loopholes for abuse since the domestic unit and donors hold frequent joint evaluation
and inspections (Personal communication with Food Security administration official,
2011). The purpose of PSNP as an instrument of the Food Security program is to avoid
the loss of household assets and build community assets (Ministry of Finance and
Economic Development, 2002). Household assets are saved when people avoid selling
their personal belongings and livestock because of the resource transfer from PSNP.
When PSNP started its operation it covered a little over 4.8 million people who qualified
for the program because they cannot feed themselves after 3 months without selling
their assets (Personal communication with USAID official, 2011). Later the program was
expanded to cover those community members who cannot feed themselves for more
than 6 to 9 months without selling their assets (Personal communication with USAID
official, 2011).
At full capacity the PSNP program is expected to cover 15 million chronically and
non-chronically insecure people. Its current coverage stands at 7.9 million and those
who are not covered now are given risk financing if their product is lost because of
drought (Personal communication with officials of Food Security Administration and
USAID, 2011). The individuals who have been selected for the work and pay program
are required to work five days in a week for six months of the year at a period in which
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they do not have to work on their individual farm (Personal communication with USAID
official, 2011).
In relation to transfer of resources PSNP employs two methods. The first is
payment for physical work done by household members in community public work
projects like soil and water conservation, terracing, water point development, irrigation
canals, forestation and road construction (Ministry of Finance and Economic
Development, 2002). The payment can take the form of cash or grains depending on
the preference of individual donors and community members. USAID which provides a
third of the PSNP funding (150 million USD per year) out of the total 450 million USD per
year uses grains to pay for services in community projects (Personal communication
with USAID official, 2011). The second method is the direct transfer of resources to
households which do not have members able to work on community projects like the
elderly or those who are permanently disabled (Ministry of Finance and Economic
Development, 2002).
Beneficiary residents are selected by the community and their graduation from
the program is also evaluated by the community (Personal communication with Food
Security administration official, 2011). 80% of the PSNP beneficiaries are expected to
graduate from the PSNP while 20 % of them are never expected to graduate because of
old age or disability and will eventually be supported by a government social transfer
scheme (Personal communications with government food security and USAID officials,
2011). But graduation cannot be realized without helping communities get access to
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other food security program which reduces the dependence on PSNP cash and grain
transfers.
Under OFSP, PSNP has been added to encourage beneficiary farmers to start
nonfarm related income earning projects through microcredit financing, agricultural
extension services and providing market exchange information (Burns & Bogale, 2012).
In support of the OFSP, PSNP PLUS program 7has been designed by a major donor to
connect certain targeted beneficiaries of the original PSNP to a faster micro credit
finance and market information system and help them graduate from the Food Security
Program by increasing their household assets (Burns &Bogale, 2012).
Beneficiary community members can graduate from PSNP when they can
establish a food reserve that can support them for at least a year and help them resist
emergency food shortages without selling their household assets (Burns &Bogale, 2012).
But delay in the approval of regional government offices to implement the PSNP Plus
program and the severe drought of 2009 greatly diminished the impact of the program
on the graduation rate of PSNP beneficiaries (PSNP PLUS Final Evaluation, 2011). The
first phase of PSNP (2005-2010) was not as successful as expected in graduating
beneficiaries because it did not include the micro-financing scheme to build household
assets through creating nonfarm related incomes (Personal communication with Food
Security administration official, 2011). According to government records since the
7

PSNP PLUS program is a program created by USAID with a three year long and 12 million dollars
commitment and channeled the funds through a consortium of five INGOS;(CARE Ethiopia, Save the
Children U.K., Catholic Relief Service and partners, The Netherland’s Development Program; The Feinstein
International Center and one national NGO partner; The Relief Society of Tigray (Burns &Bogale, 2012,
USAID, 2003)
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launching of the safety net program 194,000 households or a total of 970,000 people
graduated from the PSNP and in 2011 an additional 14,800 households or 74,000 people
have graduated from the program (Personal communication with Food Security
administration official, 2011.
The food Security program did not address food security issues in two
populations: the nomadic people of the Afar and Somali regions and the population in
urban areas. In its second phase, the program launched a pilot program to serve the
targeted communities in the Afar/ Somali regions (Gibson & Nyhus, 2009). Regarding
the urban poor, some INGOs have projects to help communities with chronic food
insecurity to achieve sufficient level of food security. Some examples are the projects
INGOs conduct in slum areas of Addis Ababa and Diredawa cities with funding from
Finland’s Embassy. These INGOs identify a trade which is feasible to become sufficient
income for slum dwellers, train them with the specific trade selected and provide seed
money and mentoring for them (Personal communication with Finland Embassy official,
2011).
Brief Overview of the Healthcare Sector in Ethiopia
Ethiopia is one of the least developed countries in the world with about 47% of
the population living below poverty line (Health Sector Development Program II, 2002).
The country’s healthcare system has also been one of the least developed even in the
standard of underdeveloped sub-Saharan countries (Health Sector Development
Program II, 2002). Various factors contributed to the low quality of healthcare in the
country including: high levels of poverty; high illiteracy rate at 36% (46% males and 25%
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females); lack of adequate access to sanitation and drinkable water; poor access to
healthcare services and facilities; prevalence of preventable infectious diseases;
malnutrition and high population growth (2.7% per annum) (Health Sector Development
Program II, 2002).
In 1995/96 only 39.1% of children got measles immunization and 40.1% of
children born in that year received Bacillus Calmette- Guerin (BCG) vaccine for
preventing Tuberculosis (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2005). During
the same period only 19.1% of the population had access to safe water while in 1997
only 40 % of the population had access to general healthcare coverage. In order to
change this dire circumstance the government laid out four long term Health Sector
Development Programs (HSDPs I, II, III, and IV) which will be implemented over a twenty
years period from 1997/98 to 2016/17 (Ministry of Health, 1997)
HSDPs are integrated with poverty reduction programs (SDPRP, PACDEP, and
GTP) and the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Ministry of
Finance and Economic Development, 2002). In relation to health, the MDGs require
member states to: Reduce child mortality by two thirds from 93 children dying in every
1000 live birth to 31 children dying in every 1000 live birth by 2015; reduce by three
quarters the maternal mortality rate; achieve universal access for reproductive health
by 2015; stop the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other major diseases and start
decreasing their incidence rate; and provide universal access of HIV/AIDS treatment to
all people who need it (MDG, 2002)
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HSDP I, which was implemented from 1996-2001 focused on identifying and
tracking the main health issues in the country while HSDP II (2001-2004) started the
reforming and building process based on the knowledge gained from HSDP I (Ministry
of Health, 2010). The review of health status in the country indicated that most of the
“… health problems … are largely preventable communicable diseases and nutritional
disorders. More than 90% of child deaths are due to pneumonia, diarrhea, malaria,
neonatal problems, malnutrition and HIV/AIDS, and often as a combination of these
conditions” (Ministry of Health, 2010, p.p. 3). Regarding maternal death the government
study showed that: 13% of women die of labor complication; 12 % die of ruptured
uterus; 11% die of acute preeclampsia/eclampsia and 9% die of malaria.
This has been aggravated by reasons like: the lack of sufficient healthcare
professionals, lack of medical equipment; absence of sufficient healthcare facilities and
referral system; and influence of culture and traditional beliefs (Ministry of Health,
2010). In the health policy (National Health Policy) that was enacted before HSDP I, the
government reorganized the healthcare delivery system in the following way (National
Health Policy, 1993). 1) The administration of the healthcare system was decentralized
and management or decision making power was transferred from the federal
government offices to regional, zonal and woreda government offices to help local
governments focus on their communities’ priorities (Ministry of Health, 2010). 2) The
health delivery system has been organized in primary healthcare system composed of: a
satellite health post covering up to 5000 people; health center covering up to 25,000
people; primary hospital covering up to 100,000 people; a general hospital system
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serving up to 1.5 million people and a specialized hospital system serving up to 5 million
people (Ministry of Health, 2010). Each woreda healthcare bureau manages its primary
healthcare system and connects it with the two higher level hospitals through a referral
system (Ministry of Health, 2010). 3) The main goal of the primary healthcare system is
increasing access of people to healthcare services (Ministry of Finance and Economic
Development, 2002). The primary healthcare system spurred the construction of new
healthcare facilities and training of several healthcare professionals. The following table
shows the increase in the number of healthcare facilities and professionals.

Table 4:1- Growth of Healthcare Facilities and Professionals in Ethiopia
1996/97

2003/04 (HSDP I)

2011 (HSDP IV)

Health posts

76

3135

12507

Health centers

243

519

1188

Hospitals

87

126

156

Doctors

-

-

1035

Nurses

-

-

26345

Source- Central Statistical Agency, 2011 and Ministry of Finance, 2010.
1) Expanding access of specialized healthcare in most parts of the country
including: maternal and neonatal care; immunization; reproductive health;
prevention or treatment of infectious diseases like TB and malaria; and stopping
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and scaling back the spread of HIV/AIDS virus (Ministry of Finance and Economic
Development, 2005). After the introduction of the primary healthcare system in
woredas, access of the population to healthcare expanded in the following way.

Table 4:2- Percentage of Population with Access to Healthcare in Different
Regions of Ethiopia
Year

2005/06

2006/07

2007/08

2008/09

Growth in

76.9

86.7

89.6

90

percentage
Source- Ministry of Health, 2001
HSDP also promoted the partnership of INGOs and private healthcare
organizations to increase access of healthcare services across the country. The following
table shows the number of healthcare facilities built and operated by non-governmental
bodies including INGOs in 2011.
Table 4:3- Comparisons of Healthcare Facilities Built by Non-Governmental
Organizations and Governmental Organizations.
Facilities

Government

Non-Governmental

Percentage of nongovernmental

Hospital

93

63

40%

Heath Clinics

1666

1065

38.99%

Health Centers

1171

17

1.4%

Health Posts

12507

-

-

Source- Central Statistics Agency, 2011
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Several INGOs have projects in healthcare sector that focus on the government’s
goals (synchronized with MDGs) including the following activities: reducing maternal
and child mortality rate; prevention and treatment of infectious and communicable
diseases like malaria and TB; increasing access to universal healthcare including timely
immunization of children; controlling the impact of HIV/AIDS epidemic by reducing new
incidence; treating those who live with HIV/AIDS virus; and providing reproductive
healthcare and education for women (Ministry of Heath, 2010)
Brief Overview of the Education Sector in Ethiopia
Education is one of the most important elements of a country’s development
(Education and Training Policy, 1994). High illiteracy rate in Ethiopia (36%) is a reflection
of high level of poverty in the country (Action Aid Annual Report, 2010). In 1994 the
current government laid out a long term Education and Training Policy which became a
source of subsequent Education Sector Development Programs (ESDPs) which are
synchronized with the millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The latter require states
to provide universal access of primary education to all citizens by 2015 (MDG, 2002).
ESDP has four parts, ESDP I (1996/97-2001/02); ESDP II (2002/03-2005/06); ESDP
III (2005/06 to 2010/11); and ESDP IV (2010/11-2014/2015). Ethiopia’s high population
growth (2.7% per annum) with most of the population (85%) living in the rural
underdeveloped areas, brought a constraint on access to primary education (ESDP,
2012). The Education and Training Policy planned to improve the education system by
“… changing curriculum preparation of learning materials giving due attention for career
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development of teachers and changing the organizational structure” (PASDEP, 2006,
P.P)
AccessMajority of the country’s population (85%) is located in the rural areas where
infrastructure and school system has been at its lowest growth stage. Many households
in the rural areas were not able to send their kids to school because there were no
schools close to them. When the current government took power in May 1991, the
enrollment of children in primary education was less than 22 % of the primary school
age children and even among those enrolled many received poor quality education or
dropped out (Education and Training Policy, 1994). The education system showed
disparity in age group, location and gender (Education and Training Policy, 1994).The
poor level of access to education in the country can be seen from the rate of enrollment
in different years.
In 1999/2000 out of the total of 5,396,040 children aged 4-6 only 99,710 (1.85%)
were enrolled in 834 kindergarten classes (Ministry of education, 2000). In 2000/01 only
2% of the kids in the 4-6 age group received preschool education whereas the
enrollment of students in elementary and middle grades (1-8) increased by 60.37% from
4,468,294 in 1996/97to 7,401,473 in 2000/01 (Ministry of Education, 2000).
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The following table shows the gross enrollment rate of Kindergarten and primary
level education from 2000/01 to 2009/108.
Table 4:4- Rate of Gross Enrollment of Kindergarten and Primary Level Education in
Ethiopia
Year

Preschool Gross

Primary school

Primary school

Difference

Enrollment Ratio

Gross Enrollment

Net Enrollment

between Primary

Ratio (GER)

Ratio (NER)

GER and NER

2000/01

2%

57.4%

-

-

2001/02

2.11%

61.6%

-

-

2002/03

2%

64.4%

54%

10.4%

2003/04

2.2%

68.4%

57.4%

11.0%

2004/05

2.3%

79.8%

68.5%

11.3%

2005/06

2.7%

85.8%

77.5%

8.3%

2006/07

3.1%

91.7%

79.1%

12.6%

2007/08

3.9%

95.6%

83.4%

12.2%

2008/09

4.2%

94.2%

83%

11.2%

2009/10

4.8%

93.2%

82.1%

11.1%

Source- Ministry of Education 2001-2010

8

Gross enrollment rate shows the rate of enrollment in primary schools (1-8) grades regardless of age
limits compared to the size of the population in the primary school age (7-14). This clarification has been
added to account for many children who were enrolled at a higher age than kindergarten ages (4-6) and
primary school age (7-14) because they had no access to kindergarten and primary education previously.
The net enrollment rate shows the rate of enrollment of only primary education age children in primary
education (Ministry of Education, 2000).
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The table shows that Kindergarten education enrollment which is mostly
expected to be provided by private and non-governmental organizations has been very
low and the increase in the coverage over a ten years period has been very slow. The
researcher can draw two observations from this data regarding primary education. First,
GER and NER in primary education enrollment coverage showed significant growth until
2007/08 and slightly declined in the next two years (2008/10).
Why enrollment showed a decline is unclear as research has not yet been
conducted in that respect (Ministry of Education, 2010).The difference between GER
and NER for the period 2002/03 to 2009/10 however showed slight growth with a sharp
decline in 2005/06 and slight decline in the last two years (2008/10).The government
believes that NER has grown faster than GER because the age structure has shown more
adjustment towards the appropriate primary school age (Ministry of Education, PAP,
2005). 9
Building more schools or providing access to primary education (the supply side)
alone may not result in an increase in enrollment (Ministry of Education, 2000-2010). In
addition to building the educational infrastructure, the demand to have education (the
demand side) should also be created in the population (Ministry of Education, 20002010).
9

Even though research was not available to indicate the cause of the increase in variance between GER
and NER it may however be possible to argue that the variance indicates one of two opposing things. One
is increase in the enrollment of above primary school age children in to the primary school education
system when they have access to education (Ministry of Education, 2000) and the second is the decline in
the enrollment of primary school age children in the primary education system. In the absence of clear
evidence to select one of these reasons it may also be reasonable to think that the decline was caused by
a combination of both factors
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Second, in an effort to provide education to all primary school aged children by
2015, the government focused most of its resources on expanding access to the first
cycle of primary education (1-4) grades rather than other cycles of the education
hierarchy (Education Sector Development Program, 2010). The following table shows
this discrepancy in government resources.
Table 4:5- Growth of Access to Primary and Secondary Education in Ethiopia
Year

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

2005/06

2006/07

2007/08

2008/09

2009/10

Primary

Primary

1-4

5-8

GER

84.2%

42.4%

NER

-

GER

Total

Secondary Secondary Total
9-10

11-12

64.4%

19.3%

2.6%

11.4%

-

54%

8.4%

-

-

86.9%

47.1%

68.4%

9.8%

-

-

NER

-

-

57.4%

-

-

-

GER

102.7%

52.5%

79.8%

27.3%

3.0%

15.6%

NER

-

-

68.5%

11.8%

-

-

GER

117.6%

58.8%

91.3%

33.2%

3.9%

19.1%

NER

73.0%

37.6%

77.5%

13.2%

2.3%

-

GER

117.1%

61.1%

91.7%

37.3%

5.5%

22.0 %

NER

79.9%

39.4%

79.1%

14.7%

3.0%

-

GER

127.8%

60.2%

95.6%

37.1%

5.8%

-

NER

90.10%

39.9%

83.4%

13.8%

2.9%

-

GER

122.9%

63.2%

94.4%

38.1%

6.0%

22.6%

NER

88.7%

46.0%

83.0%

13.5%

2.8%

-

GER

118.8%

65.5%

93.4%

39.1%

7.0%

22.6%

NER

86.6%

46.4%

82.1%

16.4%

2.4%

-

Source- Ministry of Education document (2000-2010).
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The above table shows that GER for the first cycle of primary education showed a
high increase compared to GER of the second cycle of both primary education and
secondary education. It is interesting to observe that the GER for the first cycle of
primary education started slowing down in 2008/10 after picking up in 2007/08 whereas
the same for the second cycle of primary education kept growing. Although it is not
clear why the slowdown of GER in the first cycle occurred, the government believed that
it is the result of enrollment of more primary age children compared to over age
children (Ministry of Education, 2000). In the second cycle of primary education GER has
been closer to NER than at the time of the first cycle. Enrollment declines in the
secondary education.

EquityThe government’s education sector development plan considers creating equity in
education as “affirmative actions to ensure equity of female participation, pastoral and
agro pastoral and those with special needs in all education and training programs …”
(ESDP III, 2006). In addition the ESDPs also want to bring equity in the education system
by reducing the disparities between urban and rural enrollment; girls and boys
enrollment; the enrollment between pastoral and agro pastoral people and other
people. The disparity in enrollment of girls and boys has cultural, religious and
traditional roots (Mekoneen & Feye, 2010). Women have traditionally been considered
as not equals to men for a long time and they were confined to doing household chores
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including child bearing and raising kids (Mekoneen & Feye, 2010). The following table
shows the Gross Enrollment ratios (GER) of girls and boys in ten years period.
Table 4:6- Comparison of Student Enrollment in Gender and Urban vs. Rural
Settlement.
URBAN ENROLLMENT

RURAL ENROLLMENT

FEMALE (%)

MALE (%)

FEMALE (%)

MALE (%)

Primary

45

55

36

64

Secondary

41

59

35

65

Primary

45.4

54.6

37.9

62.1

Secondary

41.6

58.4

36.9

64.1

Primary

45.4

54.6

38.8

61.2

Secondary

39.4

60.6

35.5

64.5

Primary

45.3

54.7

39.2

60.8

Secondary

36.9

63.1

29.9

70.0

Primary

46.1

53.9

41.0

59.0

Secondary (9-10)

35.6

64.4

29.9

70.1

Secondary (11-12)

26.9

73.1

31.0

69.0

Primary

50.3

49.7

46.4

53.6

Secondary (9-10)

42.4

57.6

37.3

62.7

Secondary (11-12)

33.4

66.6

24.5

75.5

Source- Ministry of Education (2000-2004)
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PERIOD

1999/00

2000/01

2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

2008/09

The data shows that there is a consistent gender disparity in all the six years
surveyed. It also shows that the disparity between female and male enrollment is higher
in the rural areas where 85% of the total population lives than in the urban areas. In
some of the years covered by the data, female enrollment drops or stays the same in
secondary level both in the rural and urban areas while male enrollment showed a
consistent increase.
Despite consistent education and encouragement of families to enroll girls in
schools the enrollment of girls is still trailing that of the boys. Early marriage through
family arrangement for girls as young as 5 years old; less value attached by the society
for children’s education; and the need to tap female children’s labor for household
chores were some of the reasons why female enrollment has been very low (Mekoneen
& Feye, 2010). 10 Disparities have also been seen in enrollment between rural and urban
areas with gap in GER reaching 88.6% in 2000/01 and 85.3% in 2004/05 (Ministry of
Education, 2005).
Disparity of enrollment has also been seen from region to region and when
compared to Addis Ababa City which achieved 125% GER in 2004/05, the two regions
that showed the lowest rate of GER are the Afar and the Somali regions with GER 20.9%
and 23.3% respectively. Most of the people in the Afar and Somali regions
predominantly lead nomadic life styles and girls are traditionally discouraged from
10

ESDP III laid out a strategy to reduce the gender gap by building a number of schools in the rural areas
and making these schools friendlier to enrollment of girls (Ministry of Education, 2005). In addition to
building more schools the strategy used by the government to encourage participation of girls and reduce
the gender gap include: hiring female teachers to be role models; providing separate lavatories for girls;
and arranging tutorial support and supportive counseling for girls (Ministry of Education, 2005).
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attending schools (Ministry of Education, 2005). The resilience of enrollment deficiency
in Afar and Somali regions can be seen in 2008/09 survey which showed that in Afar
region GER for primary education was only 31.2% compared to its target of 80%
whereas in Somali region it was only 35% compared to its target of 80% (Ministry of
Education, 2005).
Quality and relevance of education
In ESDPs the quality and relevance of education has been measured in terms of having
trained or qualified teachers; revising and reorganizing curriculums; reducing the size of
classes to improve teachers/ students ratio; increasing the number of text books
compared to number of students; and introducing web nets programs to make
education delivery system more efficient (Ministry of Education, 2005).
Regarding training teachers the national education standard requires teachers of
the first cycle of primary education (1-4) to have a certificate from the teachers’ training
institute; teachers of the second cycle of primary education (5-8) to have a college
diploma; and teachers of secondary education to have a college degree (Ministry of
Education, 2005)11. Government record shows that in 2003/04 about 97% of the
teachers in the first cycle of primary schools have certificate whereas the percentage in
the second cycle drops to 54.8% (Ministry of Education, 2005). Another government
study recorded the size of certified teachers in the first and second cycles of primary

11

In Ethiopian higher education system college diploma is awarded when a student completes a two year
college program while a college degree is awarded when student completes a four year college program.
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education as 96.5 % and 32.1% respectively (Ministry of Education Educational
Management Information Systems, 2005).
In secondary education the percentage of qualified teachers in 2003/04 on a
national scale was 44.5%. In 2008/09 however the percentage of qualified teachers for
the first cycle of primary education dropped to 90% where as for the second cycle of
primary education and for secondary education it increased to 71.6% and 75.2 %
respectively (Educational Management Information systems, 2005). To increase the
number of certified teachers at each level and reduce the gap, education opportunities
were prepared for teachers through distance learning; after hour’s classes and summer
in service programs (Ministry of Education, 2005).
In the second measurement of quality which is student/teacher ratio the figure
for primary level (1-8) in fact got worse by increasing from 42 in 1996/97 to 66 in
2004/05 (Ministry of Education, 2005).In a more updated government statistics of 2008
/09 the high student/section ratio exhibited little improvement compared to the base
line data taken in 2004/05 as follows: primary education of the first cycle 65 compared
to a baseline of 71; primary education of the second cycle 59 compared to a baseline of
68.4; secondary education 68 compared to a base line of 78; (Education Management
Information systems, 2005).
Regarding student/ book ratio that is considered as the third measurement of
quality of education in the country the ratio for primary level education in 2008/09 was
1:5 compared to the base line data of 2:1 in 2004/05 whereas for secondary level
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education the ratio stayed 1:1 in 2008/09 just as it was in the base line data of 2004/05.
Efficiency of education which is another measurement of quality is seen by the dropout
rate and grade repetition rate. The following table shows the dropout rate and grade
repetition rate percentage for primary level education (1-8) in the five years between
2003/04- 2007/08.
Table 4:7- Dropout and Repeating Rates in Primary Education in Ethiopia
Year

Dropout Rate in Percentage

Repeating Rate in Percentage

2003/04

14.4

3.7

2004/05

11.8

3.8

2005/06

12.4

6.1

2006/07

12.4

6.1

2007/08

14.6

6.7

Source- (Education Management Information System, 2005)
The data show that while girls are less often enrolled boys have a higher drop out and
repetition rate than girls as indicated in table 4:8 below.
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Table 4:8- Comparison of Dropout and Repeating Rates in Gender in Ethiopia.
Repeating Rate

Dropout Rate

Year

Boys (%)

Girls (%)

Boys (%)

Girls (%)

2003/04

3.6

4.0

14.9

13.6

2004/05

3.8

3.7

12.3

11.3

2005/06

6.4

5.7

12.6

12.1

2006/07

6.6

5.7

13.1

11.6

2007/08

7.0

6.3

15.9

13.2

Source- Educational Information System (2005)
It is important to note that dropout rate may not account for those students that
reenter education at a future time or through other modes of education delivery system
(Educational Management Information System, 2005).
Relevance
The Education and Training Policy laid out a plan to reform the education system
by making it more relevant and applicable to the levels of the people in the rural and
underserved areas (Education and Training Policy, 1994). The following five ways are
examples of how the Education Sector Development Programs (I-IV) planned to bring
relevance to the education system.
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Making the language of communication for the curriculum more flexible and
adoptable to the mother tongues of different communities, for example in 2003/04
more than 22 languages have been used to publish text books which has made
education more relevant to rural people and increased their access to education
(Ministry of Education, 2005). Reforming the curriculum so that it would reflect and
inform the specific ways of life’s of communities. For example, pastoral communities
and agricultural communities will not have the same curriculum as each would benefit
more from a curriculum that is designed to inform its way of life and challenges.
Reforming curriculums by making them sensitive to gender, culture and
traditions. Communities would be more inclined to enroll and stay engaged in education
if the curriculum is designed to respect their cultures and traditions. The curriculum and
text books have also been designed in a way that promotes gender equality and
educates about the damages caused by harmful traditional practices and superstitious
beliefs (Ministry of Education, 2000-2010). The newly revamped curriculum has also
become a powerful instrument for teaching about major health risks or epidemics like
HIV/AIDS, other sexually transmitted diseases, prenatal or neonatal care, immunization
and hygiene (Education Sector Development Program, 2010).
Major reform was made on the curriculum of secondary education. Previously all
high school students will go through four years of academic trainings (9-12 grades) and
those who pass college entrance exams attend college while the others would be
subject to minimum salary labor jobs as they do not have any marketable trade
(Ministry of Education, 2005). The government reformed this system and prepared two
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tracks; Technical and Vocational Educational Track (TVET) and Academic track. All high
school students take a national exam when they are at the end of their tenth grade
education to find out which student would go in to academic track and towards college
education and which students pursue TVET programs that would prepare them with
different trades of their interests and help them join the labor market or pursue further
training in their line of trade when they graduate (Ministry of Education, 2005).
Introducing internet based curriculum which widened the flexibility and content of
mainly secondary and higher education. The addition of web based education and
government’s encouragement of private and Non-Governmental Organizations to open
colleges helped web based higher education to grow faster and become important
instruments of sharing knowledge and conducting research. All interviewed officials of
INGOs, networks, government, donors and their relevant documents identified one or
many of the following factors as reasons for INGOs’ effectiveness in the education
sector in Ethiopia.
Commonly Perceived Factors of INGO Effectiveness in all the three sectors
Community participationThe theoretical model developed in this research indicated that a strong positive
relationship between INGOs and their stake holders leads to INGO effectiveness.
Many of the respondents believed community participation helps INGOs be effective
in the following ways: First, the contributions of community members to INGO
projects can reduce the cost of completing projects. When project costs are reduced
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it makes donors, domestic units, and INGOs more satisfied with the project and
leads to sustainability. The government’s desire to see lower costs of INGOs projects
is reflected in CSP which requires INGOs to use only up to 30% of their budget for
project cost. The government also provides incentives for INGOs that reduce their
cost below the legal 30% rate allowed by CSP article 88 although the incentive is
unspecified. Donors are also interested in seeing projects completed at a lower cost
through community participation because they believe lower costs signal efficient
utilization of funds (Personal communication with several officials of INGOs and
donors, 2011). One INGO official in the Food Security sector expressed the
important role community participation may have in the following way.
First, we are community based and involve the participation of the
population in the rural areas in our projects. The fact that people feel
they own the project makes the project effective. It makes it effective
because the people will Support the project by providing donation in
kind, money or labor and oversee the execution of the project day by day.
When INGOs have less community support for their project, the cost of the
project increases and the chance for sustainability is lowered, (Interview with Focus
Group, 2011). Reduced community participation means a weak relationship between
INGOs and domestic units and as indicated in Model type IV and VI, It is a recipe for
INGO ineffectiveness. One national NGO official in the education sector who is close to
the community described an example of a weak relation between an INGO and its
community regarding cost and sustainability in the following way.
They brought four million Ethiopian birr (415,800 USD) and asked us to assess
the cost of building primary schools and how efficiently they can use their money
to build primary school in the area. We advised them the cost of Building one
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primary school is $750,000 Ethiopian birr (72,765 USD12) and we can build three
schools with the money they brought. The advantage we have in this regard is
that our projects are more community based than them. We could mobilize the
local people in to believing that it is their project and facilitate for them to
contribute up to a third of the cost of building a school with cash in kind or in
their labor.
The government’s land tenure system is a source of tension between the
domestic unit, international donors and INGOs and threatens their positive
collaboration needed to make INGOs effective (DAG, 2006). But the course of action
donors and INGOs take to resolve these differences with domestic units determines
whether or not INGOs projects are effective in the Food Security sector. Prior to the
proclamation of CSP 621/09 INGOs and international donors engaged in policy
discussions with the domestic unit on behalf of their communities and they encouraged
community members to demand privatization of land ownership from the government
(Personal communication with officials of CCRDA and PANE, 2011).
But CSP 621/09 made it unlawful for INGOs to engage in such activities. Those
INGOs which challenged the law and decided to confront the domestic unit lost their
registration bids and were forced to close their operations (Personal communication
with CSA official, 2011). This situation shows the extreme consequences of lack of
positive collaboration between domestic units and INGOs. INGOs that chose to amend
their missions and stay in the country were forced to use the indirect route of NGO
networks or international donors to continue policy discussions with government offices

12

The exchange rate is calculated at the rate prevalent in the year2008 which was 1USD equivalent to
9.62 ETB.
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(CCRDA, 2005, 2011; Personal communication with CCRDA and PANE officials, 2011). An
official of INGO network noted
We prepare workshops and other forms of training across woredas based on
questionnaires and qualitative study. We bridge the gaps between our members
and the government. We provide a forum for discussion for members and other
Stakeholders. We also provide representation.
INGOs in the Healthcare sector also require community participation to
share the project costs. Some INGOs like Water Aid require communities to contribute
5-10% while some NGO partners like ADA or TDA, require communities to contribute up
to a third of the project cost (Personal communications with officials of Water Aid, ADA,
TDA, 2011). Domestic NGOs like ADA, TDA, or ODA which some officials of INGOs and
NGO partners refer as political NGOs have stronger ties with domestic units because
they were originally established with the support of regional government offices
(Mulata, 2010). The capacity and the size of projects these domestic NGOs have
completed since they were established are much larger than those completed by most
INGOs or other domestic NGOs (Mulata, 2010). For example, in 2009 World Vision
International which is one of the largest and oldest INGOs in the country constructed 16
health posts while ADA constructed 84 health posts and clinics during the same period
(World Vision, 2009; Amhara Development Association, 2010). This indicates INGOs
partnering domestic NGOs which have closer ties to domestic units as described in
model types I, II, V and VII have a better chance of effectiveness than those with more
distant relationships. INGOs who have a relationship type that is defined by model type I
and VII are likely to have an even better chance of effectiveness because they have
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stronger ties not only with the domestic units but also with their donors. Interviewed
officials of domestic unit, INGOs and donors in the healthcare sector said they see more
positive collaboration between these three stakeholders in the healthcare sector than
any other sector and one evidence for this is INGOs’ ability to raise some funds
internally which is not available to INGOs in the other sectors. One INGO official in the
health care sector indicated that
To make the program sustainable we charge a small fee for our services from
those who can afford to pay and give it free for those who do not afford to pay
for the service. In certain cases when supplies are not available in the country
and the cost of importing them is high the government helps us by supplying
the equipment for free
The second evidence is the increase in access to healthcare (See table # 4:9
below).
Table 4:9- Comparison of Primary Healthcare Access with Health Service Utilization
and Contraception Use in Ethiopia.

Total population

2005/06

2006/07

2007/08

2008/09

72.05

73.9

75.8

77.8

76.96

86.7

89.6

90

0.33

0.325

0.24

0.3

37.9

34.8

53.9

56.2

in millions
primary health
coverage in %
Health Service
Utilization in %
Contraception
use rate in %
Source- Ministry of Health, 2008
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As the table shows primary healthcare access and contraception acceptance rate
increased from year to year. But the percentage of the public that uses primary health
service has been very low. To increase the rate of healthcare needs (demand side) in an
equivalent step with the increase in access to healthcare services (supply side), the
domestic unit formed a close cooperation with donors and INGOs to launch the Health
Extension Program (HEP) which trained 35,000 Health Extension Workers (HEAs)
(Ministry of Health, 2009) .
The HEWs were trained for one year in disease control and prevention,
administration of certain medications and referral of patients to appropriate healthcare
facilities. The HEP is similar to the Community Healthcare Workers’ (CHW)program that
has been launched in many other developing countries to increase healthcare access in
rural communities and reduce child and maternal mortality to the level required by
MDG (The Earth Institute, 2010).
But there is a difference in the kind of service these workers provide, their
employment status, the minimum education level required and the percentage of their
time spent in the community (The Earth Institute, 2010). Table 4:10 shows the
difference in these functions in six African sub-Saharan countries.
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Table 4:10- Comparison of Ethiopian Health Extension Program with Community
Healthcare Workers’ Program in Other African Countries.
Country

Employed full time

Minimum

% of time spent in

by government

Education

the community Vs.
office

Kenya

Employed full time

High school

by government

90%
community/10%
health facility

Tanzania

Voluntary

Primary school

90%
community/10%
health facility

Uganda

Voluntary

Primary School

90% community/
10% health facility

Rwanda

Voluntary

Primary School

100% community
level

Malawi

Ethiopia

Employed full time

One year training

by government

after high school

Employed full time

One year training

75% community /

by government

after high school

25% health facility

Source, the Earth Institute, 2010
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100% community

In all these countries HEW’s services include: Monitoring and controlling preventable
diseases like malaria, pneumonia and diarrhea; educating community members about
family planning and the HIV epidemic and how to use condoms and birth control
measures; monitoring proper immunization, promotion of health needs and providing
counseling support (Ministry of Health, 2010).
INGOs build capacity by training HEWs and supplying them with the necessary
equipment because they believe HEWs can bring about cultural change in the
community by helping individuals acquire healthcare seeking behavior or the demand
side (USAID, 2010, 2011). The above table shows Ethiopia’s Health Extension Program
(HEP) is based on relatively better trained HEWs who are full time employees of the
government and are part of the healthcare system. The political will of the government
to invest so much of its own budget to employ 35,000 HEW on a full time basis; the
positive collaboration of International donors in providing substantial financial support
for the program; and INGOs direct involvement in training HEAs. These factors reflected
a strong relationship between all the stakeholders as described in type VII of the model
and made the project effective and sustainable. One INGO official in the healthcare
sector said
The government trained 35,000 heath extension agents for one year with the
financial assistance from international donors. Every Kebele has one health post
and two health extension workers. We educated them and they administer pills
and contraceptives that prevent pregnancy for three months or three years.
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However compared to the six other sub-Saharan African countries Ethiopian
HEWs spend less time in their communities (75%) and this is likely to have impact on the
effectiveness of their field activities. The reduced community time can be related to the
added responsibilities HEWs are given by the Ethiopian government (SDPRP, 2002,
PASDEP, 2006). One INGO official noted that
Health extension workers are given all kinds of duties. Are we giving them too
many responsibilities? INGOs are blamed because government already gave
them its share of duties. We are burdening them and causing them to be
ineffective.
The majority of the HEWs are female and at least one of them is an elected
official in their local government unit (Kebele) office. One INGO official in the health
sector explained
HEWs are mostly female. So it is easier for them to council women, work with
women and children. One of the two HEWs is a member of kebelle cabinet. It is
easier to advance plans through the kebelle to mobilize the community members
for some program.
One exception to this pattern is found in the regions of Afar and Somalia where
cultural and traditional barriers do not allow the empowerment of females and their
appointment as HEWs (Personal communication with official of Save the children INGO,
2011). Reaching communities and changing their cultural behavior about healthcare
however cannot be solved by HEWs alone. Training and deploying volunteers that go
door to door in their communities and provide outreach education about health care
was a strategy that has been adopted with the positive cooperation of donors, INGOs
and domestic units (Personal Communication with Minister of Health conducted by
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USAID, 2012). One INGO official in the healthcare sector demonstrated an innovative
volunteer program as follows
Mother care givers program is a new approach and is very effective. We can
reach those females who cannot come to us very easily and using a picture in a
flipchart educates them about family planning and reproductive health in their
language when they are illiterate.
But there was disagreement between the government and some INGOs in regard
to using volunteers. The government did not have the resources to pay stipends to
volunteers like INGOs and this created a double standard that threatened the
effectiveness of projects. In this regard one INGO official said
We provide training allowance for volunteers. We had about 10,000 volunteers
in the past who received some payment for travel and perdiem. But now we
stopped that service because government wanted us to stop as this would have
created double standard between the volunteers which are recruited by the
government and by our organization. Government does not want to pay money
to volunteers and wants them to be selected by the people to work without any
payment. That is how their service can be sustainable when we leave.
In the healthcare sector, the benefit of volunteers has also been seen in the fight to
stop the spread of HIV/AIDS. Volunteers who have been diagnosed with the HIV virus
have been encouraged to go in to communities and educate people about prevention
and treatment of the HIV AIDS epidemic (Action Aid, 2010). INGOs who work on
prevention and treatment of the disease indicated that in coordination with
government health bureaus and donors they opened voluntary counseling and testing
centers (VCTs) in accessible places across the country to provide free testing and referral
services (Personal Communication with Integrated Family Services, 2011).
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Stable sources of funding
INGOs which have predictably stable sources of funding have an opportunity to
focus their energy on their projects rather than on searching for funds. INGOs are
organizations that have been established under the laws of foreign countries and as
such are generally expected to obtain funding from international donors (CSP, 621/09).
Neither CSP 621/09 nor any other laws in Ethiopia specifically prevent INGOs from
raising funds or receiving donations from international sources. Any form of internal
funding or donation is subject to the specific approval of the federal government
Charities and Societies Agency (CSA) (Art98, CSP 621/09). In regard to funding the
relationship of the stakeholders in the seven types of the INGO effectiveness models has
an impact in the following way.
Model Type I
When the relationship is positive between INGOs and donors and between
INGOs and domestic units; but is negative between donors and domestic units, the
evidence shows that the effectiveness of INGO projects is unaffected so long as there is
not a total breakdown in the relationship between donors and domestic units. A typical
example of this is the relationship between donors and the government after the 2005
government crackdown on political opponents followed by the enactment of CSP
621/09. This crack down and new legislation practically stopped all INGOs from
conducting any civil society promotion activities. The World Bank’s response to the
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government’s crackdown on opposition political parties and civil society organizations,
can be characterized by the comments of one donor official
In Ethiopia World Bank’s involvement at the beginning was by providing direct
budget support to the federal government in the amount of 750 million ETB
(77.9 million USD) to 1 billion (103.9 million USD) annually. But after the 2005
election the bank changed its policy and provided it’s funding through the
Protection of basic services (PBS) program and social accountability
program that goes directly to the 600 woredas in the country.
The PBS is an innovative program that pooled funds from donors and the
government to protect basic services like access to education, healthcare immunization,
agricultural extension services and building access roads (World Bank, 2009).The
government’s share of the pool of funds was two third and the donors’ share is one
third. Since the government’s violent suppression of political opponents and civil society
organizations during the 2005 election period, many major donors lost their trust in the
government and stopped direct budget funding.
However the donors’ negative relation with the domestic unit did not stop them
from funding the improvement of basic services in each of the 600 woredas in the
country. Many of the donors thought that PBS’ three components: decentralization of
funding; requiring government spending by a 2:1 ratio; and social accountability have
made it a successful program. Regarding this one donor official in the PBS program
stated that:
PBS is considered as the most innovative and successful program World Bank
conducted in African countries. Under PBS education became accessible to most
of the countryside and remote areas of Ethiopia, Health clinics and stations were
widespread and access to healthcare for the remote areas was facilitated.
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The Social Accountability component of PBS has been managed by an INGO
named GIZ and aimed at creating transparency and accountability of local government
bureaus or agencies providing direct services to people (World Bank, 2009). GIZ
managed 12 domestic NGOs and instituted accountability measurement tools like
community score cards (GIZ, 2009)13. However it is not reasonable to expect in this
circumstance that the domestic unit will allow donors’ money to be used for purposes
that are not considered priorities in the domestic unit’s development strategy. As per
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, art. 3(ii) donors should work on “increasing
alignment of aid with partner country priorities, systems and procedures and helping to
strengthen their countries”. According to the government those INGOs which came to
support the food security program would be violating their mandate if they start
reporting about human right abuses (Personal communication with CSA official, 2011).
Another way donors tried to bolster their influence on domestic units has been
by forming a group called The Donor Assistance Group (DAG) to unify their effort. The
DAG has 27 donor members and coordinates a pool of funds designated by their
members for different focus sectors. 14By coordinating and unifying their effort through
the DAG, donors found a way to manage their relationship with the domestic unit and
influence the policy decisions of the government (DAG Annual Report, 2008). For
13

The community Score Card (CSC) is a way of monitoring of the effectiveness of INGO projects and
government services. It has been first created by Care INGO Malawi office and used in many African
countries including Ethiopia, Tanzania, Malawi and Egypt. The government of Ethiopia has also adopted
CSC as a way of monitoring the performance of its services in communities and making its departments
accountable to the public (Care, 2011)
14
In 2008 the DAG has a total of 3.8 million dollars in its pool of funds. It has four pools of funds. The
general pool had 268.7 thousand USD, The Education pool had 1.7 million USD, The Gender pool had 474
thousand USD and the Monitoring and Evaluation pool had 1.3 million USD (DAG Annual Report, 2008).
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example, despite the government’s move to block any international funds from
conducting rights advocacy services to the poor; the DAG managed to support certain
level of rights advocacy services under a tacit agreement from the government
(Personal Communication with an NGO coalition, 2011). In this regard one NGO coalition
official commented about how the EU got concession from the government in regard to
supporting limited civil society activities.
Per the Cotonou Agreement, the federal government has agreed with EU
delegation to consider some CSO funds as domestic funds and allow any NGO to
apply and qualify to receive grants even for rights based activities.
Model type II
When the relationship is weak or negative between INGOs and international
donors, but is strong between INGOs and domestic unit; and the relationship is strong
between domestic unit and donors the evidence shows that there is a minimal chance
for INGOs to find an alternative source of funding from domestic sources and be
sustainable (interview with officials of various INGOs and donors, 2011). In contrast to
INGOs, those domestic ethnic based NGOs that have strong link and relief work
experience like ADA, TDA, and RIST have a better chance of self-sustaining. The strong
symbiotic link these INGOs have with the domestic unit created a favorable
environment for them to get approval from the government and develop sound
domestic source of funding. In regard to growing domestic source of funding one
national ethnic based NGO said the following:
We have three source of funding. The first one is members’ contribution from
inside and outside the country that made up 12.4% of the total. The second
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source of income is international donor’s contribution which is 30.56% of the
total. The third source of income is special events and fund raising telethons.
This category also adds other forms of self-income generation like renting a
building, selling scrap items, horticulture and maintaining cow farm to produce
and sell cow milk. The total for this category was 57% of the total income.
These ethnic domestic NGOs have diversified their income sources to the point
that they are less dependent on international donors for funding and have a stable
source of domestic financing. Further evidence to this fact can also be obtained from the
perception of another national ethnic based NGO who said the following:
The main sources of funding for most of our history were international donors
including Intergovernmental organizations and INGOs. Over the last 18 years we
got a total of 500 million ETB (51.9 million USD) from international donors. But
this year we raised a total of 1.1 billion ETB (114.34 million USD) from internal
sources. This marks a departure in the method of the organizations fund raising
strategy. The organization is currently on a transition to making internal source
of funding its number one source of funding. Next to internal source will be the
income generating activities of the organization and the third source will be
international donors 15
Although INGOs cannot engage in such large scale of domestic fund raising
activities some of them which are mainly in the Healthcare sector were given permission
by the government to raise domestic funds in a form of fees and cost subsidization paid
by the government. But in relation to the massive programs INGOs usually conduct in
the health care sector, such small scale internal funding is not sufficient. To show how
far INGOs in the healthcare sector can be dependent on international funding one INGO
official said
Our organization has a 12 million dollar budget per year. Our government cannot
allocate that kind of money for the work we are doing every year. We will not be
able to find such sort of investment from internal sources and thus we will
15

The exchange rate used was for 2009 which is 1USD is for 9.62 ETB.
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continue seek foreign aid in relief and development at least for the next 30
or 40 years.

Model Type III
When relationship is strong or positive between INGOs and donors ; and
between donors and the domestic unit but is weak between INGOs and the domestic
unit, the chance of having an effective INGOs is small in the current environment where
the government seeks to control over INGOs and weeds out those that are
confrontational. INGOs which maintained a strong support of donors but have been
considered enemies by the domestic unit lost their operational permit. For example in
July 2009, 42 INGOs lost their operational license because the government determined
that they violated their mandate when they reported human right abuses in the country
(Pereira, 2009). One government official in Ethiopia stated that
Before the CSP was enacted more than 3000 INGOs and domestic NGOs were
registered by the Ministry of Justice and operating in the country. But half of
them failed to re-register under the new law because the government does not
allow them to be engaged in any form of right based activities. But since the
relationship between the domestic unit and the donors is strong they can
negotiate and select another INGO acceptable to both to carry out various
projects in the future.

But since the relationship between the domestic unit and the donors is strong
they can negotiate and select another INGO acceptable to both to carry out various
projects in the future. For example some INGOs and domestic NGOs were selected to
receive strictly supervised civil society funding from the EU delegation. One INGO
network official described the INGO selection process as follows
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Per the Cotonou agreement the federal government agreed with EU
delegation to consider some CSO fund as domestic fund and allow any NSA
to apply and qualify to take a grant even for right based activities. The
tripartite committee has a steering committee which announces call for
applying. The proposal from NSAs will be evaluated by external body and
will be presented to the tripartite committee. The procedure is too strict
for Ethiopian civil society organizations
Model Type IV
When relationship is negative between INGOs and donors; and between INGOs
and domestic units but is positive between donors and domestic units the chance of
effectiveness for the specific INGO is minimal because it is not getting funds from
international donors and has no probable chance of receiving government approval to
raise funds from internal sources. A government official who commented on how INGOs
or their NGO partners could lose the support of both donors and the domestic unit said
75% of the local NGOs seem to have been established for the purpose of
receiving foreign donation and not with a real motivation to help needy
people. Some INGOs Or local NGOs go out of the government’s development
goal, follow their own objective Conduct embezzlement of money and as a
result lose government and donor support
As relationship between domestic units and donors is positive, the two may
negotiate to find a mutually likable INGO to accomplish projects in the future.
Model Type V
When relationship is negative between INGOs and donors or between donors
and domestic units; but is positive between INGOs and domestic units, the evidence
shows that INGOs lose their funding from international donors and have no hope of
getting any sort of international funding in the future because of the negative
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relationship between the government and international donors. These INGOs have little
or no chance of continuing operations because of their depndence on international
funding. Some of the rational given for Scenario III is applicable here. But the difference
is that in model type V the relationship of donors is negative with both INGOs and
domestic units. Donors are happy with neither the government’s policy nor the capacity
of the INGOs to accomplish the project. The only way INGOs can stay active is if they get
permission from the domestic unit to receive funding from internal sources. But this
researcher did not find any information that showed INGOs survived and became
effective solely on funds raised from internal sources. Najam, however (2000) believes
that when the government does not support the democratic system of governance a
close relation between the domestic unit and INGOs can potentially cause these INGOs
to be coopted or controlled by the government.16
Model Type VI
When there is a strong or positive relationship between INGOs and donors but
weak relationship between INGOs and the domestic unit or between donors and the
domestic unit, it is unlikely for the INGO will be effective. In the current period when the
government enacted the CSP and seeks to over control the actions of INGOs in the
country, it is hard to imagine that INGOs which have confrontational relation with the
domestic unit can be active and effective even if they have strong financial support from
their international donors. The example given for Model Type III would also be
16

Cooptation comes when the government and INGOs have different goals but have similar strategies of
achieving these goals. Such circumstances may lead both INGOs and the government to follow a similar
kind of interest and actions (Najam, 2000).
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applicable here. The difference with Model Type III is that in this model the relationship
between donors and the domestic unit is weak or negative and there may not be any
chance of negotiation between donors and the domestic unit to select a different INGO
to carry out the project. An example of this is the eviction of several INGOs that were
active in human rights and democratic governance activities by the domestic unit and
the closing of their projects after the 2005 government’s suppression of political
opponents and the enactment of CSP.
Model Type VII
The ideal scenario for INGO effectiveness is where the relationship between
INGOs, donors and the domestic units are positive and marked by trust and
collaboration. But to achieve this, the goals of these stakeholders should be as close as
possible and their strategy of achieving these goals should complement each other
(Najam, 2000). It can be argued that in Ethiopia the relationship between these three
stakeholders was on the path of strong collaboration until the government persecuted
opposition forces in 2005 and enacted the CSP
Most of the donors who were supporting the government with direct budget
assistance trusted the government’s structure to manage donors’ funds and complete
their projects. But that trust was broken for many of the donors and INGOs when the
government enacted the CSP which essentially prevented donors and INGOs from
conducting any rights based activities side by side with relief and development projects.
Even before the enactment of this proclamation, the government had frozen the assets
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of prominent domestic human right NGOs such as The Ethiopian Human Right Council
(EHRO) and The Ethiopian Women’s Lawyers’ Association (EWLA) (Human Rights Watch,
2012).
The latest INGO to close its office in protest of the restrictions imposed by the
CSP was the Heinrich Boll Foundation of Germany. The Foundation’s official stated that
“it has become impossible for the organization to work for democracy, gender equality
and sustainable development under existing circumstances” (The Gulele Post, 2012, Par.
3).
Developing capacity of INGOs, partner domestic NGOs and local government offices
INGOs which operate in all sectors need to keep building not only their own
organizational capacity but also the capacity of their NGO partners and government
offices, (USAID, 2012, PANE, 2011). For example in the case of PSNP the donors evaluate
the organizational capacity and financial accountability of their NGO partners before
they accept them as partners (Interview with several INGO and donor officials, 2011).
INGOs which have projects in the healthcare and education sectors also make sure their
NGO partners have the necessary trained professionals, equipment, and technical skills
to implement their projects or conduct monitoring and evaluation of their progress.
One INGO official noted that to be effective
We need to build the capacity of our partner organizations, build managerial
Capacity By training, sharing their experience and establishing learning forums.
We encourage initiatives between our partners and other NGOs/ private/
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government institutions in woreda or kebelle level, example Rudolf Lake fishing
between community, private and government institutions.
INGOs need to have sufficient budget to build the capacity of their NGO partners.
But building the capacity of NGO partners in project areas alone is not sufficient unless it
is complemented by building the capacity of local government offices through the
provision of equipment and training (Interview with several INGO, donor and
government officials, 2011). There seems to be a wide range of agreement among the
three stakeholder groups about the necessity of INGO’s partnering with domestic NGO
to increase cultural competence and sustainability of programs offered. But there are
differences in the way each stakeholder wants to build the capacity of their partner
INGOs and the local government offices. This brings back the issue of administrative cost
in to the picture. INGOs want to spend more in administrative costs to improve the
effectiveness of their NGO partners whereas donors and the domestic unit want most of
the project money to be spent on the projects (Interview with several INGO, donor and
government officials, 2011). The domestic unit in Ethiopia would want INGOs to build
more infrastructure projects rather than using their funds for training and buying
equipment for their NGO partners or government offices. Those INGOs which focus on
training staff of NGO partners and local government offices rather than building physical
infrastructure are likely to be perceived negatively by the domestic unit (Interview with
several INGO, donor and government officials, 2011)
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Different Factors of INGO Effectiveness in the three sectors
Avoidance of aid dependency in food security sector vs. Encouraging free use of
services in health and education sectors
Aid Dependency culture in the food security sector
A major difference the researcher observed between the Food Security sector and
the healthcare and education sectors is the need to make a change in the mentality of
people receiving aid. In the food security sector, the people who live in the chronically
food insecure areas have been receiving free food aid since the early 1970s from the
government and donors. In the 1990s, the newly established government of Ethiopia
realized that provision of free aid for such a long time has created an aid dependency
culture among the poor people (PRSP, 2000, SDPRP, 2002, PASDEP, 2006). So the
Poverty Reduction Paper and subsequent poverty reduction programs of the
government clearly spelled out the need to get rid of aid dependency culture among the
people that are able to work (PRSP, 2000, SDPRP, 2002, PASDEP, 2006). As SDPRP (2002)
indicated through the PSNP the government was determined to bring
A major shift from relief aid to a combination of productive safety net transfers
(for example by employment of the poor on labor intensive works and
unconditional transfers to those such as the elderly, disabled or orphans who
are unable to work. It also represents a significant shift from food to cash
transfers and embodies an emphasis on promoting productive behavior
(SDPRP, 2005, pp. 27).
The government’s budget for changing the public culture from aid dependency
to employment through the Food Security Program jumped to 1 billion ETB (119.1
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million USD)17 in 2003/04 from a mere 150 million ETB (17.8 million USD) in previous
years (SDPRP, 2002). In 2004/05, the budget doubled to 2 billion ETB (238.3 million USD)
(SDPRP, 2002). With its budget allocation the government aimed to discourage free aid
handouts and instead invested in better farming techniques, diversifying income sources
and resettling farmers to more fertile land (Personal communication with official of
Food Security Administration, 2011). Donors also supported the cultural change from
free aid to employment and structured their aid along that line. For example, the DAG
which represents a majority of the donors in the country agreed with the government’s
plan of diversifying farmers’ income and improving their productiveness by stating the
following.
The overall thrust of the PASDEP is accepted. The document presents a logical
and consistent formation of strategy. It reflects new thinking with respect to
greater emphasis on growth, market orientation, private sector involvement
and diversification of the agricultural sector, especially in terms of the roles of
agriculture, the rural Non- farm sector and urban sector (DAG, 2006, P.4)
INGOs also adopted this approach and structured their projects towards
eliminating the aid dependency culture that has been a norm in the chronically food
insecure areas. Those community members who have been selected for the program
are required to work in their slack time at least for six months of the year and a
minimum of five days a week on a community project like irrigation canals, water point
development, and road construction along with their own farm work. Those who
worked on long term community projects were paid in cash or in grains and built their
household assets while simultaneously building their community assets (Personal
17

The exchange rate was from2004 which is 8.39 ETB equivalents to 1USD.
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communication with officials of Food Security Administration and USAID, 2011).
Regarding the success of the PSNP one donor official said
80-90 percent of participants in the program are expected to graduate by
building their community asset and getting rid of the food gap. 20 percent are
not expected to graduate as they are not able to Work and build their asset
because of old age, permanent disability or other reasons. These later ones will
continue getting assistance from a government social scheme at the end of the
program.
Many of the INGOs and NGO partners supported projects that increased
agricultural productivity and built household assets by providing different means for
livelihoods geared towards breaking the cycle of aid dependency. For example, one
INGO official noted
We also provide youth skill development like carpentry computer, catering,
dressing, development of vocational skill that goes to small trade. There was a
saying that poor people do not save. But that is changing now and poor people
are forming cooperatives to save money and borrow money with interest.
Another INGO official suggested the following
Unlike others we use market based approaches to help farmers create their own
wealth. We do not give credit ourselves or we do not build the technical
equipment on our own we do not have the expertise and we do not want
to give the impression that INGOS give out free assistance or hand out.

Encouraging free use of Services in healthcare and education sectors
In contrast to Food Security Program the domestic unit, donors and INGOs need
to encourage free utilization behavior among the population in regard to the Healthcare
and Education sectors. People’s tendency to use healthcare services in the rural areas
has been very low since the current government came in to office in the early 1990s.
Infant mortality was very high with 110 deaths out of 1000 live births in 1993 (The
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World Bank, 2013). The percentage of people who go to healthcare centers to use
health care services has also been low with only 40 % receiving services in 1997
(Minister of Finance and Economic Development, 2005).
In an effort to meet the healthcare MDGs the government sought collaboration
with donors and INGOs to undertake a campaign that would change people’s culture of
indifference or aversion towards accessing healthcare and encourage them to use it
(PRSP, 2000, SDPRP, 2002, PASDEP, 2006). Since this culture of indifference or aversion
to healthcare service has been implanted by cultural, traditional or religious beliefs in to
the minds of people, all the three stakeholders agreed to use the following three
strategies to help break this cycle and develop a new culture in which people seek the
freely available healthcare service.
The first strategy has been training and deploying HEWs who would go house to
house and educate people regularly to practice disease prevention methods and seeking
treatment for their illnesses. In addition to HEWs the availability of several trained
midwives helped change the behavior of women to seek clinical assistance upon giving
birth. To show the increase in reproductive healthcare seeking behavior one INGO
official noted that
Family planning is not well accustomed in the country. Ages 15-49 can give birth
and out of this group only 8% (6% traditional and 2% modern way) use family
planning on a 2000 survey. On 2005 survey 15% (14% modern and 1%
traditional) are using family planning. New preliminary survey shows that 32%
use family planning.
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The second strategy was using cultural, tribal and religious leaders to educate
and convince their followers to use free healthcare and education services. There are
various superstitious beliefs common in the population that could have negative
implications for changing people’s behavior about using healthcare or education
services. For example one INGO official stated that
Hand washing technique was not accepted well because of the norm and
expensiveness of soap. On the border between Wello and Gojam they prefer to
wash their hands with ash or in other places they prefer to purify their hands
with sand through traditional means.
Other examples are various harmful traditional practices like women’s
circumcision, taking out tonsils in children and avoiding child immunization vaccines
(Save the Children, 2008). In the Afar and Somali regions parents were reluctant to send
girls to school for cultural reasons. In this case educating religious and tribal leaders and
using them as change agents became an effective strategy (Personal communication
with officials of Path Finder, ACRD, 2011). Many government officials and INGOs
facilitated their projects by causing a behavioral change in people’s perception towards
accessing free healthcare or educational services through religious or tribal leaders
(Personal communication with officials of Ministry of Youth and Women Affairs,
Norwegian Church Aid, 2011). INGOs which are culturally sensitive and count on the
support of religious or tribal leaders to advocate a change of long held belief have better
chance of success than INGOs that do not (Personal Communication with Officials of
MOFED, DICAC, 2011).
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The third strategy is training and deploying volunteers recruited from the same
community to facilitate behavioral change. Volunteers who work with INGOs or
government offices in the healthcare or education sector focus on educating their
community members to use the benefit of free healthcare or education services that
were made available in their localities.
Enabling or disabling government policies towards INGO activities in the three
sectors.
In the case of Food Security sector the government’s policy on land proprietorship
and price control has been a source of contention between the three stakeholders. The
government is the sole owner of all land in the country and refused to privatize it
(Ethiopian Constitution, 1997). International donors and INGOs believe that the absence
of private ownership of land does not encourage farmers to improve the productivity of
their land, and does not give freedom to farmers to buy, sell or use land as collateral to
borrow money (Personal Communication with several donors, CCRDA, PANE, 2011).
They also think high population growth and the current policy of state monopoly of land
ownership has caused land fragmentation that reduced average land holding from 2
hectares to 0.3 hectares per household (Personal Communication with various INGOs,
NGO Networks, and donors, 2011). Donors and INGOs also consider the government’s
price capping on certain grain products as harmful to free market (Personal
communication with officials of ACDI-VOCA, PANE, 2011). When the government agreed
to form market exchange support where farmers can sell their products at a competitive
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price in the market, there was a positive support from donors and INGOs. For example
USAID has been supporting the market exchange services with its PSNP PLUS project 18
and the activities of INGOs that were involved in the PSNP project showed effectiveness
in meeting its goals. But when the government deviates from its undertaking of
allowing the market to fix the price and started fixing the prices of grains artificially,
INGO activities fell short of meeting their objectives. Unlike some African countries like
Kenya which led the western model of liberalized economic systems, the Ethiopian
government chose a state led economy with land proprietary rights and all major
economic sectors under the ownership of the state (The Economist, 2013). When the
government artificially fixed the market prices of some grains it eventually led to
shortages of these grains in the market because sellers were not encouraged to put
them out for sale (The Economist, 2013).
The country’s latest five year growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) foresees
more state led growth that requires huge public finance outlays in ambitious projects
like the Grand Renaissance Dam19. In regard to the government’s plan of funding the

PSNP PLUS is a program designed to assist poor households build household assets by linking them to
microfinance services and effective market system that are both necessary to graduate them from the
regular PSNP. The program has been created by USAID to assist the graduation of people from PSNP and it
was in partnership with Care international, Catholic Relief Services, REST, AND Save the Children UK with
technical support by SNV and Feinstein center of Tuft University. It was a three years long program
launched in 2009 in honey; hair coat beans; livestock fattening; and cereal production. Use of
microfinance and market connection system has also been increasing in other African countries with the
support of Care and other INGOs and brought a lot of success in improving the financial and household
asset of people in many African countries like Malawi, UGANDA and Tanzania (CARE, 2011).
19

The Grand Renaissance Dam is a dam constructed by Ethiopia on the Blue Nile River at a cost of 4.8
billion US dollars. When it is completed in 2017 it will be the largest hydroelectric power generating dam
in Africa (All Africa, 2013).
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current five year economic plan with a loan of 23.6 billion dollars, the then World Bank
country director commented as follows
I can’t see it is sustainable short of discovering huge oil reserve essentially an
unexpected windfall. I don’t see how they can sustain such an aggressive
investment plan without getting in to serious problem. On debt there is
danger. If this public investment led growth at some point really stumbles or
stagnates for a while then all these debt equations could unravel. I do worry that
without the private sector expanding much more vigorously then rapid growth
is not likely to be sustainable and if that is the case then all these debt
balances could go out of control (Davison, 2011).
Majority of the donors in Ethiopia represented by DAG urge the government to
scale down state control in the economic sector and liberalize land ownership rights and
the market system. In this respect, the collaboration between donors and domestic
units seems to be less than complete and this has a negative impact on the effectiveness
of INGOs in the food security sector. In contrast to the food security sector there is no
any major policy issue that creates contention between donors and, INGOs and
domestic units in the healthcare and education sectors. The government’s willingness to
work more positively with donors and INGOs in the healthcare and education sectors to
achieve MDG goals produced an enabling environment for INGOs to be effective in their
operations. The classic examples in the Healthcare sector where achievement has been
recorded through positive collaboration between the three stakeholders are: the HEW
programs; the HIV/ AIDS epidemics control and prevention programs; Family Planning
and Reproductive Health Programs and; Prevention of Common Infectious diseases.
In the education sector, the three stakeholders ‘positive collaboration without
any condition helped INGOs, be effective in increasing access of primary education
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through novel programs like alternative basic education, mobile school for nomadic
people and functional literacy for adults. These programs were scaled up and offered
across the country. In the education and healthcare sectors, the more restrictive
elements were cultural or traditional beliefs and practices rather than government
policies. To overcome these cultural and traditional barriers, INGOs and government
officials educated the people and used the influences of religious and tribal leaders.
Graduation vs. Expansion
A third difference INGOs in the Food Security Sector have from the Health and
Education sector INGOs is the goal of graduating beneficiaries and cutting resources
from those who graduated. There is no such goal of cutting resources to healthcare and
education service recipients. Graduation of community members in the Food Security
Program has not been defined by the government or by any of the other stakeholders. A
major donor official noted the following in regard to graduation from the PSNP
Under this program the beneficiaries are needed to graduate from the program
by creating community assets and protecting their assets so that they have a
viable form of income generation. The people who qualify for this program are
those that cannot feed themselves after 3, 6 or 9 months. Those people who
need to sell their assets to buy food after this period are also included in the
program. The community will select the beneficiaries among its ranks and
the same community will also have an opportunity to evaluate and approve
the graduation of the participant community members from the program.
However 20 % of the beneficiary members are not expected to graduate because
of old age, disability and sickness and they will stay on regular government financial
assistance. But defining what graduation is and determining its expected time and size
has become a complex subject (Personal communication with official of USAID, 2011).
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The government had an ambitious plan of graduating 5 million people between the
years 2005-2009. But graduating from Food security Program requires a coordinated
intervention of PSNP, Other Food Security Programs (OFSP), and Macroeconomic
environment (PASDEP, 2006; Rahmato, Bantirgu, and Endeshaw, 2008). The government
and international donors realized that emergency food assistance is good to solve lives
and address only the transitory food insecurity but does not help to address chronic
food insecurity of people or manage risks of future humanitarian crisis (Hobson, 2013).
People who received humanitarian food assistance in the last three years and do not
have more than a food reserve of nine months are considered as chronically food
insecure (Personal communication with official of USAID, 2011).
But even in the time when people improved their household asset and have
managed to close the food gap, natural disasters occurred too frequently and ended up
rolling back the gains achieved thus far (Hobson, 2013). PSNP has a contingency fund to
help the households avoid selling their assets and weather the shock (Hobson &
Campbell, 2012). In a case when the crisis is beyond the capacity of the PSNP
contingency fund PSNP has also a Risk Financing Mechanism (RFM) that would make an
increased level of financial assistance available in the affected areas for a short time
(Hobson & Campbell, 2012). To make the PSNP package effective the three stakeholders
agreed to establish four factors: Early Warning System; Contingency Planning;
Contingency Financing; and Developing Capacity (Hobson, 2013). These conditions help
detect the 2011 drought caused humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia, mobilize the RFM and
succeed in lessening the negative impact of the crisis (Hobson, 2013).
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Social protection policies like PSNP are not unique to Ethiopia. For example
Barrientos, Hulme &Nino – Zarazua (2008) noted that social protection plans in Africa
have three elements: protective or guarding former external shocks; Supportive or
ensuring of people’s basic functioning and Promoting or facilitating structural change to
reduce poverty. Social protection policies became popular in Africa because
governments realized that a strategy based on emergency aid in times of crisis alone
does not change the structural problems of poverty. The same authors identified two
social protection model; the South African model which is mainly characterized by direct
money transfer to elderly indigent people and child support to vulnerable children; the
middle African model which is characterized by direct income transfer for people
exempted from work and income transfers dependent on services. In the South African
model practiced by countries like South Africa, Lesotho and Namibia the social
protection program is funded by public finance or taxes whereas in the middle African
model practiced by countries like Ethiopia, Malawi, Tanzania and Kenya it is dependent
on international donation and is usually involves active participation of INGOs and
donors (Barrientos, Hulme & Nino – Zarazua, 2008). But in all these countries except
Ethiopia, the Social Protection Programs were conducted as little pilot programs and
they were dependent on international donations and design with little or no
government investment (Barrientos, Hulme & Nino – Zarazua, 2008).
Ethiopia’s PSNP as social protection policy stands out from all the other African
policies because it was rolled out on a massive scale with significant level of government
investment and a coordinated support of other programs like PSNP, OFSP, voluntary
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resettlement which made it more effective than the others. Some donors and INGOs
however think that the massive scale up of the PSNP does not make it a sustainable
program for the country as it is too expensive to be carried out on only the
government’s budget (Personal communication with officials of Canadian Food Bank,
World Bank, 2011). In contrast to the Food Security Program the Health and Education
sectors were not subject to any resource limitation connected to a graduation period of
beneficiaries from these programs. In its HSDPS and ESDPs the government indicated
health and MDG goals as bench marks for measuring its success. But this was considered
as graduation thresholds.
Conclusion
This chapter provided an overview of the Food Security, Healthcare and
Education sectors in Ethiopia and how the development goals of the domestic unit are
structured. INGOs are development partners in all the sector goals and the poverty
reduction strategy of the domestic unit. Ethiopia has completed the first two poverty
reduction plans, SDPRP and PASDEP, and has embarked on the current one, GTP. This
chapter showed the positive impact these programs brought to the lives of the poor
people and how INGOs contributed to those results. Based on the analysis of the data
this chapter also mapped out the factors that were perceived as common to all INGOs
across all sectors and the factors that were found to be unique to INGOs operating in a
specific sector. Accordingly community participation; stable source of funding; and the
capacity of INGOs, NGO partners and local government offices were commonly
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perceived as factors impacting the effectiveness of INGOs by stakeholders across all
sectors while removal of aid dependency culture in the food security sector vs.
encouraging free utilization of service behavior; and status of favorable environment
have been perceived as factors that are different for INGOs operating in different
sectors. The next chapter will discuss the factors perceived by most stakeholders as
challenges to INGO effectiveness and what needs to be done to overcome them.
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CHAPTER 5
CHALLENGES INGOs IN ETHIOPIA NEED TO OVERCOME TO BE EFFECTIVE
The previous chapter discussed the common factors considered to impact the
effectiveness of INGOs by the stakeholders. It also showed the ways in which INGOs
operating in the three different sectors are required to function differently to be
effective. In this chapter we will examine the common perceptions of the stakeholders
with regard to the challenges INGOs face every day and how to address those
challenges.
Aid Dependency Culture in the Food Security Sector
A number of INGOs, domestic unit and donor officials who work in the Food
Security sector identified the aid dependency perpetuating culture of INGOs as a strong
reason for INGOs’ ineffectiveness. Especially those INGOs who have been in the country
for a long time have found it challenging to get rid of their culture of providing free aid
to communities. Part of the blame could also go to donors as they sometimes require
INGOs and NGO partners to facilitate free aid to communities. For example one INGOs
official said
Some of the foreign donor organizations want us to use the money in a way that
does not go along with the government’s development plan. For instance a
while ago Danish Aid gave us about seven million dollars in grant and asked
us to buy oxen and give it to the farmers in the rural areas in our region. But we
declined to do that and told them that would simply perpetuate aid dependency.
Instead we convinced them that it will be better to put the money in a revolving
fund and allow the farmers to borrow money and build their household and
community asset.
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Although government development goals (SDPRP, 2002;PACDEP,2006;
GTP,2010) need development partners (INGOs and Donors) to implement their aid
projects in the food security sector in a way that does not perpetuate aid dependency
there is no sanction on those INGOs that still resort to providing free aid to
communities. This situation seems to have created a double standard and made
community members in other areas demand free aid or default on their loans (Personal
Communication with official of The Hunger Project, 2011). For example one INGO
official said
In regard to our project of revolving fund for the use of improved seed,
equipment and fertilizer by loan the farmers do not return these products
because they are used to being given freely which caused aid dependency.
But the researcher thinks that each stakeholder has contributed to the aid
dependency culture in the food security sector. For instance the government may have
contributed to this culture by allowing its woreda offices to administer its Community
Asset Building Budget in the way they want without setting up any mechanism of
recirculating the money. A senior government official of Food Security Department said
The two billion ETB (208.3 million USD)20 allocated by the government for
community asset building was originally run by woreda, regional and federal
government finance offices. But this kind of management was not effective as
the money was also used for direct aid and other purposes in the hands of the
different levels of finance offices. The government now decided to let
regional micro financing organizations like the Amhara loan and saving
association administer the funds. The money will serve as a revolving fund
and be given to community members by way of repayable loan.

20

Exchange rate is taken from 2008 in which 1 USD was equivalent to 9.60 Ethiopian Birr (ETB).
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The government also seems to be of the opinion that some donors like USAID did
not help the removal of free aid receiving culture in the food security by restricting their
funding to a handful of INGOs that can carry out their financial accountability reporting
through their head office in the USA. USAID which funds a third of the PSNP qualified
only six INGOs and one domestic NGO to receive funding for its PSNP21. PSNP PLUS
which is another program created by USAID also uses only three INGOs and one
domestic NGO. Funding and building the capacity of only few INGOs and one domestic
NGO contributes less to remove the aid dependency culture in the food security sector
for the following reasons. Other INGOs and domestic NGOs do not have the opportunity
to get their staff trained to gradually weed away aid dependency culture in
communities; and other INGOs and domestic NGOs miss the opportunity of improving
their capacity through funding and technical support that helps them establish the
ground work for weeding out aid dependency culture in communities. Such ground
work includes systems of micro- credit, non-farm activities, market information and
providing product storage facilities.
A senior government official who supported this view said “USAID need to
change its technical qualification procedure for selecting INGOs and partner domestic

21

In the African context PSNP holds the second largest public safety net next to South Africa. It was a
scheme designed to change the living condition of people and manage risk of humanitarian crisis that was
occurring in Ethiopia more frequently (Hobson, 2013). PSNP provides a stable source of income through
continuous period of work and direct financial assistance and ensures that households do not sell their
assets like cattle.
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NGOs that implement the PSNP with its funds to give a chance to as many INGOs and
NGO partners as possible change the public culture of aid dependency”.
Lack of Coordination in the Activities of INGOS, Donors and Domestic Units
The theoretical framework of this research argues that INGO effectiveness can
be ensured with the existence of strong or positive collaboration between three
stakeholders. But positive collaboration cannot be realized unless there is a sustained
level of coordination in the activities of these stakeholders. Representatives of each of
the three stakeholders described in their interview how they try to coordinate their
activities so that they can complete INGO projects with in the scheduled time period
and without duplicating resources (personal communication with various INGO, donors,
domestic unit’s officials, 2011). There is an NGO Interaction Counsel in each woreda for
this purpose which is attended by representatives of the three stakeholders. These
counsels discuss the status of projects, problems encountered and how to use resources
in an efficient manner (CRDA, PANE, 2011).
Despite this effort a number of interviewed INGOs government and donor
officials explained that the lack of service coordination is limiting the effectiveness of
INGOs. In regard to overlapping of resources, one INGO official who builds healthcare
centers said “government plan overlaps our plan. Government built a bigger health
center about 500 meters from our epicenter which created a duplication of resources”.
Another INGO official in the Healthcare Sector also discussed in the following way a case
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where lack of coordination originating from government offices caused duplication and
ineffectiveness.
Duplication of INGO projects is seen in some areas because the government did
not organize allocation of INGOs very well. When our INGO and partner INGOs
finds out that another INGOs or national NGO with similar purpose is operating
in the area it will have to stop its service and ask the government to lead it to a
different area where there is no duplication
The above referred two cases are examples of lack of coordination attributed to
action or inaction of government offices. But there are also other cases where it is
difficult to put the blame of lack of coordination on the government despite the same
claim by INGOs or donors. For example examining the following statement an INGO
official made in regard to lack of cooperation can help understand this point.
Our ultimate goal is to raise these children, put them through schools, colleges
and help them get a job. But the cooperation of the government or the
community in providing employment for these kids is not sufficient. As the kids
do not have any other support they need support in finding a job.
In a similar way a donor official who funds INGOs that have projects of taking
urban slum dwellers out of poverty expressed lack of cooperation from the government
in the following way.
The other project that was effective was the projects to change the urban slum
areas and create a self-income generating mechanism for residents of urban
slum areas .The INGOs who are working in these areas assessed a trade in
which these residents can work and change their lives. Then they train them
with such skill and provide them with seed money to start their work in places
like Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. But When they need to bring their
products to sell it on a street side or open market government officials do not
allow them to do so.
This researcher thinks both cases go further than government’s responsibility as
a key stakeholder in INGO activities and reflect its legal, taxation and economic
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authority. In the first case the government needs to balance its responsibility of creating
employment for all its citizens with a pledge to give preferential employment benefit to
orphan children. Such would be a policy or legal decision the government needs to make
by taking in to account the interests of all its constituents.
In the second case, also the government needs to make an exception to its
taxation and regulatory laws that prohibit traders from engaging in any kind of business
without obtaining appropriate business license and paying the required taxes. Traders
who normally sell commodities on the street do not have a business license and they do
not pay any taxes. It is also difficult for the government to track them and assess them
tax because they do not stay at one specific area. In this sense government may not be
willing to create a double standard and turn a blind eye for INGO’s supported traders
who sell commodities on the street. It is not reasonable for donors and INGOs to expect
the government not to enforce laws on their beneficiary communities. Lack of
coordination of INGOs’ projects has also been reported in cases where donors and
government officials follow a different time table about completing INGO projects. For
example one INGO official said
Woreda government officials could be busy because of their busy political job.
Sometimes they could be out of office for a long time. This delays the project.
Donors on the other hand have their own time table and ask us why we cannot
do it in time. They do not understand when we tell them that we cannot
proceed with our project without the approval of the government officials.
Slowness of government officials in approving project proposals, mobilizing
community members to contribute their share in INGO projects in their area or other
functions have also been characterized as government bureaucracy by many INGO and
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donor officials. But the researcher argues that such a delay from the government’s side
occurred because of legal, political and capacity reasons.
Legal reasons
The legal reasons are lack of clarity on the CSP and its enforcement in relation to
the different priorities of the domestic unit, INGOs and donors. The proclamation has
several regulations that changed the relationship between INGOs, donors and domestic
units. Some of the rules have been interpreted differently in the various regions of the
country. For example one INGO official mentioned that
In Amhara region projects worth up to two million will be signed by the woreda
office, up to five million will be signed by the zone office and over five million
will be signed by region office. In Oromia up to two million will be signed by
the zone office and over that amount will be signed by the region office.
Woredas have not been given mandates to sign any project yet.
The researcher could not find any research or policy document showing why this
difference in execution of the same government rule occurred. INGOs which have
projects of same nature in both the Amhara and Oromo regions will have to go through
different process and time table to get government approval of their projects. Their
projects in the Amahara region has a chance of moving faster than the same kind of
projects in the Oromia region because woreda government tend to be less bureaucratic
and move faster than zone or region offices in approving projects (Personal
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Communication with various officials of INGOs, NGO partners and CCRDA, PANE,
2011)22.
Another example for disparities in legal treatment by government offices in
different regions is related to enforcement of sharing of administrative costs of INGOs
and partner domestic NGOs. CSP Art.88 Provided those INGOs should not use more than
30% of their project funding for administrative cost. But majority of the interviewed
INGOs and donor officials noted that there is not any definitive interpretation or
direction of the law as far as the salary and benefits of project staff is concerned. In an
interview conducted with officials of the newly established Federal Civil Society office,
the researcher was notified that the office is in the process of preparing a directive that
defines project cost and administrative cost. But in the absence of the directive the
researcher observed a regional diversity in regard to enforcing the law. In this regard
one INGO official stated that
The Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s region (SNNPR) are very strict
on the 70%-30% project and administrative cost rule. They consider all staff
salary as administrative cost. The agency is preparing a directive to clarify what
kinds of costs are included in the project or administrative cost. But this is not
practical as we cannot hire any professional staff at that rate. Most INGOs
consider project staff cost as project cost and that is acceptable to donors.
The administrative cost in this consideration includes cost for utilities, gas
and other small expenses. They consider project staff cost as project cost
because the project staff spends most of their time on the project.

22

The literature about decentralization of government power in Africa seems to indicate that in many
African countries decentralization did not bring the desired effectiveness in engagement of the people in
the political process as it lacks functioning grass root level, adequate information flow and authority
(Wunsch, 2010; Kiwanuka, 2012)
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Research on administrative cost does not necessarily support the widely held
government or donor perception that INGOs with lower administrative cost tend to be
more effective than those with higher administrative cost. Writers like Jose (2000),
Nunnemekams, Ohler (2012), Hughes (2012), Smillie (1997) argue that the level of
INGOs administrative cost is not indication of their effectiveness, while some others like
(BBS Wise Giving Alliance, 2013, Charity Watch, 2013, Chen, 2009, Sargeant, Lee & Jay,
2009) insist that effective INGOs maintain a lower administrative costs in order to make
fund raising and administrative operations more efficient. From the view point of the
Ethiopian INGO experience this researcher believes allocating a specific maximum limit
in administrative cost across the board as in the case of CSP could have negative
consequences in the survival and effectiveness of these organizations for the following
reasons:
INGOs in Ethiopia currently conduct their operation through partnership with
domestic NGOs. In addition to managing the funds, evaluating the projects periodically
INGOs need to build the capacity of theses partner NGOs and provide technical support
whenever necessary. Unless all their expenses are considered as project expenses
INGOs need a flexible administrative plan
INGOs also need to build the capacity of local government offices and their staff
where it is necessary to do so and for this needs additional administrative expense
unless it is an expense that is considered as project cost.
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INGOs may also need sufficient administrative budget that allows them to
mobilize their staff and equipment when they are requested to provide assistance by
communities or government offices.
Without sufficient administrative budget INGOs may be forced to cut important
services or provide low quality of service that has less chance of improving the lives of
their community members.
Regarding the issue of correlation between high administrative cost and heavy
competition of INGOs, Nunnen Kams & Ohler (2010) concluded that despite previous
theoretical models showing that INGOs engaged in fierce competition for funding have
higher administrative cost, they tend to have relatively lower cost. The same authors
also found out that INGOs that receive funds from official sources tend to spend more of
their funds on their project because they do not have to spend money to raise funds
from private sources.
Political reasons
The second reason why there can be lack of coordination between the domestic
unit and donors/ INGOs is the government’s paranoid effort to maintain its political
domination and blocking any INGO or donor activities that may have political
implications. A typical example is CSP which forbade participation of INGOs and their
NGO partners in any rights advocacy or democratic governance activities. Several INGOs
and NGO partners which prepared voter education classes or observed the authenticity
of elections in the 2005 election encountered a heavy handed reprisal from the
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government (Human Right Watch, 2005, EHRCO, 2005, Rahmato, Bantirgu, Endeshaw,
2008).
Following that period the government created CSP legislation to push INGOs and
their partner domestic NGOs out of any political oriented activities. Some INGOs which
had been reporting civil right violations lost their permit because they were allegedly
found to have been operating outside of their mandates (Personal communication with
official of CSU). CSP seems to have originated from the 2004 Civil Society law of
Zimbabwe which has similar rules (Human Rights Watch, 2008). But Zimbabwe’s law
never went in to enforcement and even if it did it would have been less restrictive than
CSP (Human Rights Watch, 2008). So even by Sub-Saharan African standards CSP is a
repressive law which alienated civil society organizations from the political process.
The evidence for the political alienation of civil society and opposition groups is
the government’s winning 99% of all the votes in the 2010 election (Nazreth.com, 2010,
Sudan Tribune, 2013). In identifying how INGOs can work effectively with the domestic
unit one INGO official said
Be politically neutral. You have to create understanding with all levels of
government Channels. Personal and organizational opinions are different. We
work with the Federal Environmental Protection Authority and we have prepared
their first policy draft on this issue and gave it to them and it will be presented
to parliament next year.
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A majority of the donors have negotiated with the government to scale down the
restrictive impact of CSP 621/09 and in general remind the government to pursue the
avenue of democratic governance.
Underdeveloped Capacity of domestic units
Government and community offices in regional and woreda levels are not well
developed or equipped to serve their fast growing communities. Problems with in
capacity can be classified in three broad categories: lack of a developed organizational
culture, staff turnover, and lack of coordination.
Lack of well-developed organizational culture
As Obiyan (2005) indicated state structures in African countries do not have a
strong network capable of serving their communities in their peripheral regions. This is
also true of Ethiopia which has decentralized all its government services on the basis of
ethnic based regional administrations that have three hierarchies (regional, zonal and
woredas). These local offices do not have a well-organized structure and it takes time to
build (Personal communication with official of government Food Security department,
2011). Local government structures also lack consistency and stability because of the
frequent change made by central government authorities. For example, when CSP
established the Civil Society Agency it became the sole government office that can sign
project operation agreement with INGOs and their NGO partners. But the new agency
was given a mandate of overseeing the enforcement of the CSP which became too big to
complete with its existing structure. A Food Security Department official stated
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Operational agreements used to be signed by Disaster Prevention and
Preparedness Commission (DPPC) in the past. The later has a structure as the
way to the woredas. Currently the new Charity and Society Agency gives
registration Documents and sign operational agreements with INGOs. Since
the agency does not have a well-developed structure up to the woredas it
created a loophole in the accountability structure of the INGOs and regions may
not have any say on what is coming to their area.
Lack of a strong government structure also means the government’s inability to
conduct monitoring and evaluation of INGO projects or to maintain proper
documentation for research purposes. Local government officials do not have the
culture and training to document their work and pass the necessary information to
successors. One INGO official showed his frustration about this problem in government
structure as follows
Another major problem that reduces effectiveness of INGOs is the frequent
reshuffling of government officials and office structures that are authorized
to license and supervise the activities of INGOs. Such reshuffling and lack of
continuity of office structures or personnel shows that office positions in
government are more individualized than institutionalized. Individuals do not
follow a tradition of passing information regarding their experience to other
future appointees or subordinates which puts the organization at a
disadvantage.
Government staff turnover
The second capacity problem government offices encounter often is their staff
turnover. Majority of interviewed INGOs and donor officials mentioned government
staff turnover as a critical problem for effectiveness of INGOs. One INGO official noted
that
The capacity of local government institutions is low. Those who are trained at
the woreda level government will leave for a better job opportunity and so
there is a high turnover of manpower.
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The staff turnover can occur either when government transfers trained or
experienced staff to a higher position on a different area or when the staff member
wants to move to another job that gives him or her better compensation. Although
government staff turnover is a common problem across all sectors some INGO officials
in the Healthcare sector indicated that there is a relatively low level of turnover in HEWs
which needs to be supported by the government putting in place a career development
program for them. In the healthcare sector the government employed a strategy of
flooding the sector with a great number of professionals like HEWs and medical doctors
(Irin, 2012).
The Minister of Health in Ethiopia indicated that the enrollment of medical
schools in the country has grown from 300 per year in 2005 to 3100 per year in 2012
which is a tenfold increase (Irin, 2012). But turnover of government staff was not the
only problem. Most INGOs and donor officials noted that there are times when local
government officials are unavailable for an extended period of time because of various
political assignments handed down to them from their superiors in the regional or
federal offices. INGO projects that need government approval and coordination will
have to wait in the backburner until government officials complete their priority
assignment. In this regard one INGO official observed the following:
Woreda governments may have other priorities like conducting trainings,
meetings in relation to elections periods which last for almost six months,
political works and emergency orders like recruiting soldier trainees. These
situations will delay our effectiveness because it is the woreda governments that
coordinate the community to dig trenches provide labor service and bring
building materials like sand or rocks.
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Noting that such delays can be either alleviated or aggravated by the kind of
relationship INGOs have with government offices some INGOs tried to maneuvers a
closer relationship with government by using government structure for their project or
forming partnership with domestic NGOs that are very close to government (Personal
communication with officials of CCRDA, PANE, 2011).
Lack of coordination between local government offices and their stakeholders
Due to decentralization of the government structure each woreda has different
sector offices like health education, finance, agriculture, Water etc. Delay in carrying out
INGO projects have occurred when the government approval or oversight process
involves more of these sector offices and coordination of their activities becomes
complex. For example one INGO official explained how delay can occur when INGO
projects are subject to the approval of several sector government offices and the effect
of such a delay:
Our project on water development can touch up on offices of health, water
development, cultural, Youth, women and other sectors. All of them have to
approve the project agreement. With the delay may follow different problems
like losing some of the real value of the funds because of inflation, or change
in circumstances like change in community priorities?

Local governments play a key role in coordinating the activities of INGOs, donors,
communities and government offices. In the Food security sector some INGO officials
expressed their concern that their projects are not well coordinated with what
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government and communities do. For example an official of one INGO which maintains
a training project farm and shows better farming technique to farmers said
We are not successful on agriculture because farmers want to spend most of
their time and energy on their own farm rather than coming and working on
the project farm. In addition the time to cultivate seed and do other farm
works overlap for both the private farm and the project farm.
In the education sector government has to take a lead in coordinating its
education goals in different communities depending on their culture and traditions. In
rural areas where farming is the main source of livelihood, parents cannot send their
children to school during harvest season. In this case the school attendance period has
to be coordinated in a flexible way. A major challenge for INGOs in the education sector
has been providing access to primary education in the Afar and Somali regions of the
country (Martin, Oksanea & Takala, 2000).
The people in these regions do not stay at one location for a long time and thus
building a school facility may not be as useful as for people in other regions. Families in
these regions were not comfortable to send their female children for fear of abduction
or sexual abuse (Martin, Oksanea & Takala, 2000). A clear example of the positive
collaboration between the three stakeholders in the Education sector were seen when
Donors, INGOs and the Domestic Unit, coordinated their effort to create INGO projects
based on Alternative Basic Education (ABE) and mobile schools which succeeded in
increasing enrollment rate of students (Ministry of Education, 2011). But despite this
fact government coordination of resources has been low since access rate in the Afar
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and Somali regions are only 50% in 2011 compared to 90% in other regions (Ministry of
Education, 2011).
Lack of Rights Advocacy Activities
CSP 621/09 denied INGOs and their partner domestic NGOs from advocating
policy issues on behalf of their communities. CSP in particular does not want these
organizations to be involved in activities like: advancement of human and democratic
rights; promotion of the equality of nations, nationalities and peoples of different
genders and religions; promotion of the rights of the disabled and children, promotion
of conflict resolution or reconciliation; and promotion of the efficiency of justice and law
enforcement (Art. 14.2) This law is one of the most restrictive NGO laws in developing
countries and has been a flash point between the domestic units, donors and INGOs
(CCRDA2011). According to NGO scholars like Fowler (1991) and Obiyan (2005) one of
INGOs’ unique characters that makes them trustworthy to their communities is their
being close to the poor and articulating the interest of the poor.
But in the Ethiopian context INGOs cannot have that character because of the
government’s restriction imposed on them through CSP. Only domestic NGOs which
have less than 10% of their total budget coming from international sources have been
permitted to perform the rights advocacy activities (CSP, Art. 2.3). The government
required all existing and new INGOs to apply for a new license and made sure that all
INGOs delete the parts of their mission statement that refers to rights based services
(personal communication with official of CSA, 2011). The government closed and
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evicted some INGOs whom it said were conducting rights advocacy services that were
outside of their mandates (Personal communication with official of CSA, 2011).
But the CSP’s barring of INGOs and their partner Ethiopian Resident INGOs to
conduct rights based activities has serious problems at least from two viewpoints. The
first is from the view of the Ethiopian Constitution and the International Conventions
the country signed. The Ethiopian Constitution under Article 31 entitles any person in
the country to form association for any purpose as long as that association does not
break laws or contradicts the tenets of the constitution (Ethiopian Constitution, 1992).
Since the constitution does not make distinction between Ethiopian and foreign based
or foreign funded persons, the right to form associations is a right available to both
national and foreign individuals and organizations. In this way CSP looks contradictory to
the Supreme law of the land.
The constitution on its article 9(4) says “All international agreements ratified by
Ethiopia are an integral part of the law of the land”. The country has signed many
international covenants on human rights and civil liberties like the International
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and the international Covenants on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. For example the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) on its article 22 (I) state “Everyone shall have the right to
Freedom of Association with others including the right to form and join trade unions for
the protection of his interests “subject to restriction prescribed by law for purpose of
public safety, security, health, moral and protection of other peoples’ interests (United

157

Nations Human Rights, 2013). An important international convention that came in to
attention in context with CSP was the Cotonou Agreement that is signed by the
European Union and 79 African and Asia Pacific (ACP) countries which formed a
tripartite framework of the European Union , ACP countries’ states, and INGOS /NGO
partners referred in the convention as Non State Actors (Cotonou Agreement,2000).The
agreement required the Ethiopian government to pursue Economic development and
democratic governance in partnership with INGOs and the EU as a donor.
For this purpose, the EU allocated funds to develop capacities of civil society
organizations like INGOs and partner domestic NGOs. CSP 621/09 contradicts this
agreement when it restricted INGOs and partner domestic NGOs from conducting
political rights and advocacy services. Before the government enacted this legislation,
the collaboration and positivity in the relationship was at a level shown in Model type
VII. As positive relationship in model type VII created a strong trust between the
stakeholders, and donors like the EU and World Bank channeled significant amount of
funds in the form of direct budget support to encourage democratic reform.
But as soon as CSP was enacted the trust relationship between donors, the
domestic unit and INGOs deteriorated rapidly and the donors withdrew their direct
budget assistance in favor of directly funding and supervising the protection of basic
services projects in all woredas (Personal communication with official of World Bank,
2011). The relationship between the domestic unit, donors and INGOs has shown some
improvement in the cases where EU is involved as a donor because the government
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agreed to consider a limited amount of EU funds as a domestically originated funding
and make it available for rights based activities (Personal communication with officials
of NSA coalition, 2011). This Civil Society Fund however was administered by a tripartite
committee composed of representatives from the EU, Ministry of Finance and
representatives of Non State Actors (any non-governmental entities including INGOs
and domestic NGOs) (Personal communication with official of NSA Coalition, 2011).
Second, because of CSP 621/09 there is an alienation of growth in democratic
governance or protection of civil rights from economic growth (Tilahun, 2011). A
majority of the international donors that are partners in the government’s poverty
reduction program argued that real progress in poverty reduction cannot be achieved
without tackling the root causes of the problem which are linked to reforming the
power structure of the society and reducing the wealth gap between the rich and the
poor (Tilahun, 2011).
The government itself indicated in its poverty reduction documents, SDPRP
(2002), PASDEP (2006) and GTP (2010) that poverty is a multifaceted problem that
needs to be tackled with a multifaceted intervention including Healthcare, Food
Security, Education and Democratic governance. But in enacting the CSP the
government declined to pursue the holistic, multifaceted approach required to reduce
poverty and chose only relief and economic development assistance from donors and
INGOs. One INGO official said
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The rights based portion of INGOs work is important. As per the new
proclamation the government does not want INGOs or Ethiopian Resident
NGOs to do rights based work in the country. Without democracy and good
governance INGOs can never be effective in what they do. The government
interpreted rights based activities as political and relief and development
activities as economical. But economic development cannot come without
political development and the latter cannot come without good governance
and strong civil society institution.
Lack of stable Funding Source
The majority of INGOs and their partner domestic NGOs are dependent on
international funding for their survival and effectiveness. But international funding for
INGO activities have been dwindling and the priorities of donors have also been
changing over time. This fact has given international donors an opportunity to impose
their own priorities. Typical example in the Ethiopian context is the vast funding
available for INGOs and partner domestic NGOs engaged in rights advocacy, democratic
governance and human rights protection before CSP 621/09 came in to effect.
In developing countries like Ethiopia the proliferation of INGOs and partner
domestic NGOs has been reported in the 1990s and early 2000s. But as several NGO
scholars like Clark (1980), Carlton & May (1995), Parks (2008), Reiman (2006), Manji &
O’Coill (2002), Smillie (1997) stated the type of INGOs and domestic NGOs established
followed a pattern of project areas in which international funding has been easily
available. For example before the enactment of the CSP more INGOs and NGO partners
were established in the area of promoting civil society or rights based activities because
the funding in that line was easily available. But after the enactment of the CSP funding
in the line of civil society virtually stopped and the new donor priority became Orphan
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and Vulnerable children (OVC)23 (Personal communication with various officials of
INGOs and donors, 2011). Several interviewed INGOs and donor officials confirmed that
OVC has become a popular entry point for many new INGO s because international
funding in that line was easily accessible. But this has created duplication of resources
and allegiance of INGOs to donor priorities than community priorities (Personal
communication with Focus group members, 2011).
Internal source of funding
The literature on the issue of domestic source of funding seems to draw
consensus on the absence of national government support and lack of public culture to
donate to INGOs in developing countries (Obyan, 2005; Bratton, 1989). Although part of
the argument dealing with the absence of national government financial assistance for
INGOs seems to be true, lack of public culture to donate has been subject to a
controversy. In the Ethiopian context, an official of NGO coalition observed the
following:
Local donation culture or behavior is on a transition. ADA raised 1.1 billion birr
(66.1million USD) 24 in 2010 on a special telethon event. ODA has planned to
raise 3 billion ETB (176.9 million USD)25 in a similar way. The country has a
culture of giving. Typical example is Zeka in Muslim culture or Gudifecha26 in
Oromia culture. But this culture of donation is not well tapped. For example
there was a local HIV fund in work places where employees were Contributing
10 birr every month. Money from this pot will be given to families of HIV//AIDS
Victims. In Mojo there was a community aid effort where each farmer gives 20
23

Orphan and Vulnerable children (OVC), focuses on assisting children who have become orphans and
vulnerable because of HIV/AIDS infection on these children or their parents.
24

Exchange rate in 2010 was 1 USD for 16.63 ETB.
Exchange rate in 2011 was 1 USD for 16.95 ETB.
26
Gudifecha refers to adoption of mostly orphan children in Ethiopia
25
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kilo gram of cereals for the purpose of feeding 25 orphan children until these
Children get a permanent home.
In a country like Ethiopia where donating to the poor, the disabled and elderly
citizens are ordained by religion and tradition it is difficult to argue that there is no
public culture for donations. Government offices and religious or relief organizations like
Red Cross, Development and Interchurch Aid Commission (DICAC), received donations
of huge sums of money, food and clothing from the public during drought caused
humanitarian crisis (CCRDA, 2010). But in regard to finding a regular domestic source of
funding for INGOs or partner domestic NGOs specific government permit are required.
Art 98 of CSP states that INGOs and partner INGOs cannot raise funds or engage in any
sort of income generating activities without the specific permission of the Federal
government Agency. When it gave such discretionary power to the government, the law
did not define the guidelines the government would use to determine eligibility or
whether or not the government’s decision is appealable.
This law brings back the issue of domestic sources of funding to the test of INGO
effectiveness models and leads to an argument that INGOs or NGO partners close to the
domestic unit have a better chance of building domestic funding sources. An example is
the case of domestic NGOs, like ADA, which received more than 1.1. billion ETB (66.1
million USD) in 2010 through a telethon fund raising program and ODA which planned
to collect over 3 billion birr (176.9 million USD) in 2011. These domestic NGOs have
made domestic sources of funding their primary source of funding although they accept
more than 10% of their total funding from international donors.
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Although these domestic NGOs have been partners of several INGOs and are
considered as Ethiopian Resident per CSP they have not been denied either by written
law or in practice from conducting political advocacy activities on behalf of their
communities. For example they can lobby for policy change on behalf of their
communities or provide political education to their communities (Personal
communication with officials of ADA, TDA, 2011). This situation takes us back to our
model of INGO effectiveness type 7 where INGOs and partner domestic NGOs who have
a strong attachment to the domestic unit and to their donors have a greater chance of
effectiveness than other organizations that do not.
According to Najam’s (2000) model of NGO- government relation the character
of relationship between these domestic NGOs and the domestic unit can be considered
as complementariness because these organizations and the domestic unit use
somewhat dissimilar means to reach the same goal. Many interviewed INGO and donor
officials considered domestic NGOs like ADA, ODA, and TDA as political organizations
which were registered as INGOs for the purpose of attracting international donations.
Officials of these INGOs however do not accept this opinion and argue that their special
relationship with regional governments does not mean that they will have free ride in
their work (Personal communication with official of ADA, TDA, 2011).
Impact of competition on funding
Most INGO officials identified shortages of funds as one of the most daunting
challenges they face for survival. Shortage of funds leads to competition of INGOs for
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funding and only a portion of community needs being satisfied (Smillie, 1997, Harrison,
2002, Guler, 2008). Scarcity of international donations and competition for funding has
resulted in the trumping of community priorities in favor of donor’s priorities (Smillie,
1997; Szporluk, 2009). In the face of such competition INGOs managed to find their
niches and nurture that niche. For example INGOs like World Vision, Plan International
or SOS Children Village structured most of their funding on a long term child
sponsorship donations that provide them with a relatively stable funding source
(Personal communication with officials of World Vision, Plan International, and SOS
children Village, 2011).
Other INGOs like ACDI VOCA, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Path Finder
International get most of their funding from governmental or intergovernmental
sources like USAID (Personal communication with officials of ACDI VOCA, CRS and Path
Finder International, 2011). Faith based INGOs like Norwegian Church Aid, Protestant
Church of Germany and Karitas Belgium receive most of their funding from their
congregations in their home country (Personal communication with officials of
Norwegian Church Aid, Protestant Church of Germany and Karitas Belgium, 2011). Some
other INGOs like The Hunger Project, Water Aid and the Clinton Foundation receive
most of their funding through their head offices (Personal communication with officials
of Hunger Project, Water Aid and the Clinton Foundation, 2011). Those INGOs who do
not have opportunity for the referred kind of stable source of funding will have to go in
to competition for the remaining available funds.
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Regarding competition two views have emerged from the analysis of the
interview documents. Donors and the Domestic Unit believe that competition of INGOs
for funding will result in stronger and better organized INGOs benefitting with the
weaker INGOs being unable to qualify for funding. But strong competition has an effect
of excluding many INGOs and giving preferential treatment only to a few INGOs. For
example, an official of USAID observed
INGOs have to fulfill a very stringent financial regulation placed by the US
government. Because of this most of the INGOs that qualify for this job are
those that are found in the US. But they can sub-grant the fund to other
domestic NGOs and INGOs that can do the required job.
INGOs, however, seek less competition and more stability in funding so that they
can spend more time on helping their communities rather than hunting and qualifying
for funds (Smillie, 1999). These two points of views go in line with the literature which
also showed the two opposing views on competition of INGOs for funding. Those who
want INGOs to compete for funding like Coradie (1999) believe that we can have more
effective INGOs if they follow a businesslike approach to their work. Those who do not
like competition of INGOs, such as Johnsone and Prakash (2007,) argue that funding
competition will end up subjecting INGOs to compromise with their objectives of
standing for the poor and will make them subservient to donor priorities. Another point
that has to be mentioned in the discussion of finance is the limitation of administrative
cost to 30% and uncertainty about placing or not placing professional staff salary in
project cost rather than administrative cost. Art. 88 of the CSP does not allow INGOs to
use more than 30% of their budget for administrative cost. The literature on this issue
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seems to be divided in to two. One camp supports minimizing INGO overhead and fund
raising costs and spending most of the money on projects. This view is also popular
among donors and government officials (Personal communication with officials of the
CSA, 2011, World Bank, USAID, 2011).The second view however argues that minimizing
the administrative cost does not necessarily make INGOs effective or allow them to
provide good quality services ( Personal communication with several INGOs, 2011) .
INGOs under low administrative budget cannot have qualified staff to coordinate
and supervise projects or spend enough time to connect with their communities (Moore
& Stewart, 1998; Johnsone & Prakash, 2007). INGOs which are required to show a low
administrative budget by their donors will find a way to expand their administrative
expenses through accounting techniques or creative allocation of some administrative
expenses in to project expenses (Smillie, 1997; Szporluk, 2009). The debate over low vs.
high administrative cost in the Ethiopian context is also in line with the literature where
the domestic unit and donors believe low administrative cost is necessary for INGO
effectiveness (Personal Communication with various government and donor officials,
2011). INGOs or NGO partners also did not openly argue against cost limitation because
there is a huge negative public or government perception about INGOs using most of
their funds for personal gains (Personal communication with most of the interviewed
INGOs and NGO partners, 2011).
Regarding project staff salary, the proclamation did not specify if it is part of
administrative or project cost. But majority of interviewed INGO officials noted that 30%
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limitation on administrative cost can work only if professional staff salary is not included
in it. Without considering project staff salary as part of project cost INGOs cannot afford
to hire professional staff for their projects (Personal communication with various INGOs
and NGO partners, 2011). The literature on the issue of administrative cost seems to be
leaning towards considering project staff salary as a direct project cost whereas the
salary of administrative support staff like accountants or coordinators is considered as
indirect or administrative cost (Smillie, 1997; Szporluk, 2009).
Lack of Well Developed Capacity of INGOs and NGO Partners
Most interviewed INGO officials indicated that capacity underdevelopment of
INGOs and NGO partners are few of the most common reasons for INGOs’
ineffectiveness. But the kind of capacity problems these officials identified was
different. Many of the INGOs stressed that the continuous decline in international
funding compared to the ever increasing demand for services in their communities
exacerbated their financial capacity problems. The decline in international funding has
also affected the organizational capacity of these INGOs in terms of training and
supervising the work of their national NGO partners.
Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, INGOs adopted the strategy of working
with national NGO partners in lieu of working individually (Lewis, 1998; Parks, 2008). But
to make this strategy a reality INGOs have to select national NGO partners that have a
relatively well developed organizational and financial capacity and bring them up to
speed in training and technical support. Donors who provide funds to INGOs and allow
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the funds to be sub granted to national NGO partners hold INGOs responsible for the
proper utilization of the funds (Personal communication with official of USAID, 2011). So
it is in the interest and obligation of INGOs to build the capacity of their NGO partners
and monitor their effectiveness (Personal communication with various donors and
INGOs, 2011). But even when financial and organizational capacity was built, corruption
or mismanagement of funds was rampant among NGO partners’ staff (Personal
communication with officials of some of the interviewed donors, 2011).
Capacity in terms of cultural competenceMany of the interviewed INGO officials expressed that it is important to have
local staff who can relate to the culture, language and priorities of their communists
.Even the larger INGOs who have been operating in the country for a long time have
chosen to partner with domestic NGOs and take a role of facilitating successful
completion of projects by assisting and supervising the works of NGO partners.
Although INGOs in all the three sectors need cultural competence the analysis of the
interview documents showed that INGO officials in the healthcare sector gave more
emphasis to cultural competence than the other two sectors (Interview with various
INGO and donor officials in the Healthcare sector, 2011).
INGOs in the healthcare sector focused most of their effort on educating their
community members and changing superstitious and harmful traditions that often have
led to health problems. Typical example of these superstitious or harmful traditions are:
early marriages; lack of family planning and birth control; avoidance of prenatal,
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neonatal and post natal care even when it is available; female circumcision; and
extracting tonsils (Save The Children Norway, 2008). These cultural or traditional issues
needed a different kind of capacity building for INGOs or NGO partners that is not based
or financial strength or organizational sophistication. It required harnessing the support
and wisdom of traditional or religious leaders.
Healthcare sector INGO’s wide use of religious or tribal leaders to influence
community members in to following hygiene practices, using healthcare facilities, and
getting rid of harmful traditional practices like female circumcision made them effective
(Personal communication with officials of Ministry of Health, Norwegian Church Aid ,
2011). In areas where informal governance structures are strong, like the Geda system
in Oromia region, INGOs exploited that system to communicate with community
members (personal communication with official of ACRD, 2011). Even though INGOs or
their NGO partners have done so much to change harmful cultural or traditional
practices there are still some that persist. In areas like use of contraception for Family
planning or use of condoms to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS religious or tribal leaders
were not helpful. For example one INGO official stated
Religious leaders were not cooperative enough for our program. Orthodox
Church says children are blessing. Abortion is confused with family planning. Religious
leadersteach about one to one relationship, marriage before sex, but do not go to the
extra mile needed to teach about the benefit of condom.
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Capacity in regard to information and research
Incorrect information has affected the effectiveness of INGOs in many ways.
INGOs plan their projects and prepare their budget proposals to their donors based on
the information they get. Many of these INGOs and NGO partners may not be able to
afford to gather all information they need from scratch and they have to depend on the
information they get from the government and donors. If the information they get from
these stakeholders contradicts each other and there is no way of verifying which
information is correct or incorrect, INGOs operation will be flawed and subject to
problems like duplication of resources or eventual loss of support from their donors or
the domestic unit. An example for this situation was communicated by one INGO official
in the Water Resource Development sector as follows:
There is a financial and capacity problem as well as information problem.
Government record says water supply has reached 68% of the population and
sanitation service reached 60% of the population. But joint monitoring of United
Nations Children’s Fund and World Health Organization indicated that the figure
for water access and sanitation is 40% and 12% of the population respectively.
So these two sources of information are contradictory and show that there is no
reliable information.
Lack of capacity in coordinating activities with other INGOs and NGO partners
INGOs and NGO partners also need to coordinate their services with other INGOs
or their NGO partners to avoid duplication of services in the same area resulting in the
waste of resources. As discussed in the previous section these INGOs are in a tough spot
to find correct data when they are receiving contradictory information from their
donors and the domestic unit. Those INGOs and NGO partners that are members of
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networks or coalitions will get the capacity they lacked in this respect from their
networks or coalitions.
Networks like CCRDA OR PANE gather information in communities, conduct
research, host trainings in regard to teaching best practices, and become liaisons
between their members and government offices. Several INGO officials expressed their
concern about the confusion created after the enactment of the CSP regarding regional
placement of INGO projects and the absence of documentation showing that
placement. There was grave disconnect between the new CSA Agency and Woreda
government offices which did not even know who has the authority to approve INGO
projects in their localities (Personal communication with various INGOs, 2011). This was
also the period in which many new INGOs or NGO partners were registered and sent to
develop an area that could have already been given to other INGOs or local government
offices (Personal communication with officials of Marie Stoppes, and NSA, 2011).
Networks or coalitions helped alleviate this problem by providing updated information
and avoiding duplication of resources. In a time when the government does not allow
INGOs to engage in political and human right activities on behalf of their communities
networks carried on this task by negotiating with the government in a cordial way. Thus
INGOs which do not have the benefit of working through networks or coalitions may
lack capacity to be effective.
Conclusion
This chapter outlined the main challenges INGOs face in their effort to achieve
effectiveness in Ethiopia. First and foremost on the list of the challenges is the aid
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dependency culture that has been ingrained in the rural population since the early
1970s. Government policies prior to the Poverty Reduction strategies of SDPRP (2002)
were culpable in perpetuating the aid dependency culture of the public as they were
structured on providing free food assistance to the poor. INGOs and donors who have
also been providing free aid for such a long time faced a challenge when they are trying
to change the aid dependency culture. The challenge came both from their community’s
and their own staff’s mentality. This chapter also showed the problem in coordination of
activities between the three stakeholders which has a negative impact on the
effectiveness of INGOs. When the three stakeholders maintain a strong cooperation
within the meaning of type VII of the effectiveness model they can remove any barriers
and make INGOs effective. But as it was discussed in this chapter this is not always the
case in Ethiopia. Lack of capacity in local governments, INGOs, NGO partners; and lack of
stable source of funding have also been identified as the main challenges for INGOs
effectiveness. The last chapter of this research provides the conclusion of the entire
research and the recommendations I have for each of the three stakeholders to help
INGOs be effective in Ethiopia.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusion
INGOs are active development partners of countries in developing countries like
Ethiopia. There was only small number of INGOs operating in Ethiopia in the 1960s and
beginning of 1970s. But the drought caused famine of the 1974 and other subsequent
years brought several INGOs in to the country with relief and rehabilitation services. The
current government of Ethiopia which has been in power since May 1991 followed a
policy that encourages more INGOs to come in to the country and operate within the
limit of the country’s overarching development goals. INGOs however have been
functioning under the shadow of a general public and government perception of being
predatory, ineffective and self-serving rather than being a genuine development
partners (Gebru, 2011).
To change this perception and ensure that INGOs manage donors’ money
effectively the domestic unit needed to be more involved in INGO activities and hold
these organizations accountable (CSP, 2009). The domestic unit needed to establish a
system in which they maintain a positive collaboration with donors and INGOs to ensure
the effectiveness of INGOs in all sectors (Bahta, 2011). This research focused on finding
what INGO effectiveness mean to each of the three stakeholders; what each of these
stakeholders considered as reasons of INGO effectiveness and at the end find out if
there is any pattern or convergence in the perception of these three stakeholders .
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The research also categorized the perception of INGO effectiveness on the basis
of Food Security, Health, and Education sectors and showed perceptions of causes of
INGO effectiveness that are common to the three sector INGOs or that are unique to the
different sector INGOs. Even though there is abundant research in relation to INGO
activity in developing countries, I did not find any large scale research or well
documented data regarding the effectiveness of INGOs in the Ethiopian context. The
scarcity of evidence in this area led me to select exploratory qualitative research
method that was mainly based on interviewing representatives of INGOs, donors,
government officials, NGO networks and focus group members. I also used some
primary resource documents to verify the strength of the interview data. Detailed
analysis of the data led me to draw the following observations.
The data points out that there are similarities and differences in perceptions of INGO
effectiveness between the three stakeholders based on their individual priorities.
Even when common factors of INGO effectiveness or ineffectiveness have been
identified these factors could be more or less critical to INGOs in one sector than INGOs
operating in one or both of the other sectors. INGOs, donors and the Domestic Unit
define and understand effectiveness based on their own goals and priorities.
INGO effectiveness is determined not only by the strength or weakness of their
relationship with the government and donors but also by the strength or weakness of
the relationship between the government and their donors in relation to their projects
or other activities. Due to this fundamental observation this research used the
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constituency model of organizational effectiveness as theoretical framework of
analyzing INGO effectiveness in Ethiopia. According to the Constituency model the
effectiveness of an organization is measured by the degree of satisfaction each
stakeholder gets out of that particular INGO performance. As discussed in the
introduction chapter there is no one definition of effectiveness that satisfies all. Each of
the three stakeholders defines the concept from the perception of its own individual
goals. But this research has shown an important finding that can expand or enrich the
constituency model of organizational effectiveness. The analysis of the data shows that
seven different types of relationship have emerged in the interaction between the three
stakeholders. If the order of relationship of the stakeholders is kept as (1) domestic
units, (2) INGOs, and (3) donors for all types of relationship the following are the seven
possible kind of relationship between the stakeholders.27
1) Strong – Strong-Weak
2) Strong-Weak-Strong
3) Weak- Strong – Strong
4) Weak- Weak- Strong
5) Strong- Weak- Weak
6) Weak- Strong- Weak
7) Strong- Strong- Strong
The survival and effectiveness of INGOs in the first type of the model seems to
depend on the degree of disagreement existing between the Domestic Unit and Donors.
For example under the era of the previous military government in Ethiopia USAID was
27

The relationship Weak- Weak- Weak has not been considered as existence of INGOs in that kind of
environment does not seem to be a reality.
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willing to support INGOs in providing only humanitarian and relief assistance for drought
victims even when the US government was determined not to support any kind of
development assistance to the country because the military government followed
communist ideology and engaged in massive civil right violation of its citizens (Campbell,
1996). A recent example for this is the survival and effectiveness of INGOs even under
the souring of relationship between international donors and the government after the
enactment of CSP. Those INGOs which focus on human right protection and rights
advocacy services withered away while those which focus on relief and development
work continued to thrive and be effective because they continued to get the direct
support of donors and the Domestic Unit. For example although donors like World Bank
and EU stopped giving direct budget assistance to the government after the enactment
of CSP they continued to support INGOs that were monitoring the protection of basic
services through the Social Accountability Program (Personal Communication with
World Bank Official, 2011, GIZ, 2009).
1) INGOs in the second type of the model have very less chance of survival let alone
being effective because they do not have financial support from international donors.
But it is possible for some NGO partners to survive and be effective when the domestic
unit facilitates for them to raise funds internally through membership fee, telethons or
other fund raising activities. For example NGO partners like ADA, ODA, TDA received
majority of their funds internally and continued to be effective organizations.
2) INGOs in the third type of the model may have difficulty of becoming effective.
In the current Ethiopian context it is critically important for INGOs or their NGO
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partners’ effectiveness to have a positive working relationship with the domestic unit.
Since the political turmoil of 2005 and after the enactment of CSP the government
looked very paranoiac about INGOs who have a mission of supporting civil society and
democratic governance in the country. Over 1600 INGOs and NGO partners which is
nearly half of all the registered INGOs and NGO partners before the enactment of CSP
lost their license mostly because they could not abandon their mission of building civil
society and democratic governance (Personal communication with official of CSA, 2011).
Thus even if INGOs have a positive relationship with their donors it is difficult for them
to function effectively without maintaining a good relationship with the government. In
such situation the donors and the Domestic unit are likely to enter in to a negotiation to
select INGOs that would be acceptable for both of them.
3) In type IV of the model also it is unlikely to see a functioning of INGOs let alone
an effective INGO without the support of international donors and Domestic Units. In
such case donors and domestic units can select INGOs that are acceptable for both of
them.
4) In a similar way to model type II INGOs, Model type V INGOs have a chance of
functioning and effectiveness as long as the government is in support of their effort to
find financial and other resources from internal sources. The examples mentioned for
model type II INGOs would also be applicable here.
5) In type VI of the model the evidence showed that it is difficult for INGOs to
survive let alone be effective in the current environment because they have negative
relation with the domestic unit. Prior to the aftermath of the 2005 political election and
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enactment of CSP type VI INGOs may have survived even if they do not have a strong
relation with the domestic unit because the regulatory and political environment was
more open and enabling. Example for this are the 1600 plus INGOs and NGO partners
which were in existence prior to the enactment of the CSP but were shut down after the
enactment of the same legislation. Since donors and the domestic unit also have a
negative relationship there is less chance of having compromise between them to allow
specific INGOs to operate.
6) Type VII of the model would be the ideal situation stakeholders want to be in.
The analysis of the evidence showed that before the enactment of CSP 621/09 many
INGOs were functioning in an environment of harmony where there was a strong
agreement and collaboration between the three stakeholders. But the environment has
changed since then and it was not possible to see the ideal type of positive collaboration
between the three stakeholders. But this has left a room for compromise between the
three stakeholders in favor of the greater good of serving the poor in the country.
Each of the three stakeholders has to forgive a portion of its core principle or
priority to come to a common ground with other stakeholders and support the
effectiveness of INGO projects. For example after the enactment of CSP international
donors like the World Bank, EU, and all the other members of the DAG were forced to
put on hold their core principles of promoting civil society and democratic governance
and agreed to limit their donation to relief and development work.
Many INGOs and NGO partners who have a long established core principle of
supporting growth of civil society and democratic governance also agreed to amend
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their mission and focus only on relief and development activities. Even though it has a
strong stance of blocking international funding for civil society activities, the
government made a compromise when it agreed with EU to receive a limited amount of
civil society fund and distribute it to selected INGOs and NGO partners in the country.
The evidence also showed even under this carefully arranged compromise there
are certain areas where the three stakeholders supported extremely effective INGO
projects that have significant impact in changing the living condition of the people.
Examples of these areas of achievement are the PSNP in the Food Security area; the
HEWs and HIV/ AIDS prevention programs in the Healthcare sector and the ABE
program in the in the Education sector.

Recommendations
This research has focused on finding out the reasons of INGO effectiveness in
Ethiopia. INGO projects have different stakeholders and each stakeholder measures
INGO’s effectiveness from the view point of satisfaction of its own interest. Knowing
that fact INGOs try to balance the satisfaction of all stakeholders in a way that helps
them to achieve their own objectives. But as this research showed there can be conflicts
between the interests of these stakeholders which cannot be managed by the actions of
INGOs alone.
The degree of positive or negative relationship between their stakeholders
affects the overall effectiveness of INGOs. The positive or negative relationship of these
stakeholders is also determined by how far they can impose their interest on each other
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or if that is not possible how far they can compromise on their priorities to find a middle
ground with other stakeholders and advance the overall effectiveness of INGOs.
Based on the overall findings of this research I have the following recommendations
for each of the three stakeholders that have been considered in this research.
1) INGOs should build their organizational capacity in terms of office structure and
adequate number of professional and administrative staff. But capacity building is not
limited to office, equipment and staff. INGOs should build their capacity of
communication with their communities through religious and tribal leaders. They also
need to be members of networks or coalitions to increase capacity of getting
information.
2) INGOs should develop a bottom up and not top down management system to
allow the enrichment of managerial decisions with the contextual differences available
in each of their field offices or NGO partners. One INGO official in the Food Security
sector described lack of bottom up approach by saying the following, “Another problem
is having a unified single top down strategy from our head office for all country projects
which does not give room to contextual differences”. One donor official also highlighted
the benefit of having a bottom up approach in relation to accountability by saying the
following, “Regarding accountability NGO partners do not have constituency base
because they were not established from bottom up. Most of them were established by
few friends or family members. This may not make them directly accountable to the
community because they were not set up by the latter”. Bottom up management
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approach would also help being in the participation of the community and make INGOs’
project sustainable.
3) INGOs have to think of setting up a project that teaches community members
how to increase production or improve their living condition by focusing on easy locally
accessible and affordable technology. Typical example is the water pulling technology
one INGO uses in Ethiopia that can be built easily from local materials and does not cost
more than 25 ETB (1.47 USD)28. This would ensure the sustainability of the project in the
long run.
4) In order to win the trust of their donors and the domestic unit, INGOs should
document their work clearly and keep it transparent. They should also be in frequent
communication to their stakeholders about the progress of their project on each phase
of the project. INGOs decision that does not involve the support or approval of their
stakeholders may fail to be sustainable at the end.
5) An important practice all INGOs or NGO partners should do since the planning
stage of their project is inviting participation of community members and local
government officials. This will allow local government officials and community members
to be invested in the project and support its sustainability when INGOs complete their
stay and leave the project.
6) INGOs and partner NGOs would benefit from becoming members of network
organizations. Although network organizations charge membership fee and other small
expenses from their members they provide enormous amount of benefit in return like

28

Exchange rate taken was prevailing on June 10, 2011.
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training, sharing best practices, representing their members’ interest in discussions with
government officials or donors; conduct research and ensure that there would be
cooperation and efficient utilizations of resources among members than competition.
7) Finding stable source of funding is the number one priority for most INGOs and
NGO partners. INGOs should work on finding a niche area where they can find a stable
and long term financial source to ensure non interruption of their projects.
I) Government
As an important stakeholder, government offices at federal, regional, zonal and
woreda levels need to do the following to support the effectiveness of INGOs.
1) First in line is softening its position on denying INGOs and NGO partners from
carrying on projects promoting growth of civil society and democratic governance. This
is an important change which can potentially bring back the relationship between
INGOs, the government and donors to the level of model type VII. Ethiopia has
embarked on a multifaceted poverty reduction program to address the root causes of
poverty since the emergency relief aid in times of natural disasters did not change the
aid dependency situation of the people. The formation of vibrant civil society and
democratic governance is one of the cardinal goals of the government’s Poverty
Reduction Paper and needs to be realized with the assistance of development partners
like donors and INGOs. But the government backtracked on its promise of working on
this issue with its development partners when it enacted the CSP. The government
needs to realize that poverty reduction and economic development cannot come in a
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sustainable way without political liberalization and democratic governance. The root
causes of poverty can be tackled only when the huge gap between the rich and the poor
decreases and a vibrant middle class is created (Bratton, 1987, 1990, Fowler, 1996). So
government has to amend its restrictive law of CSP and create an enabling environment
for INGOs and donors to be development partners in the formation of vibrant civil
society and democratic governance in the country.
2) Along with liberalizing the political and economic system the government needs
to reform its land ownership system and pave the way to private ownership of land.
Ownership of land will encourage farmers to develop its fertility and use it as collateral
to borrow money for improving livelihood. The government should also avoid
interfering in the market and fixing the prices of some grains since doing so would mess
up the demand-supply equilibrium.
3) The government should allocate enough budgets to develop the capacity of its
local offices in terms of office facility and trained manpower. The research showed that
one of the major complaint INGOs and donors have is the bureaucratic delay of
decisions from government offices and their unavailability in their office for a lengthy
period of time because of other political assignment from higher officials. A high
turnover of government officials has also been reported as those trained leave or get
transferred for a better job. Delay in government support makes INGOs or NGO partners
ineffective in their projects and could damage their relationship with donors. The
government should fix this problem by assigning enough members of staff that would
be easily available to work with INGOs and curb turnover.
183

4) Another problem the government has to address is the misconception the
general public and some government officials have about the role of INGOs and donors
in the country. Because of negative media coverage of INGOs after the 2005 political
turmoil public opinion about INGOs in general has been filled with mistrust. Although
there has been some improvement in recapturing positive public opinion the
government has to do more to educate people and show that INGOs and donors are
important development partners.
5) Regarding source of funding the government should come away from its
restriction and allow INGOs and NGO partners to find an internal source of funding
either through private donations or small income earning activities. Especially in the
present time when international funding is declining INGOs deserve to find a sustainable
source of funding from internal donors or small business activities.
6) Regarding administrative cost of INGOs the government should abandon the
arbitrary 30% limit on administrative cost and adopt a practice of measuring what kind
of impact each dollar in cost brought in to the community. Low administrative cost
necessarily does not correlate with INGO effectiveness as it can also produce low quality
result at the end. At the least the government should consider project staff salary as
part of the project budget and not as part of the administrative cost. Without this
practice INGOs could stop their operation for lack of professional staff. As I have been
conducting this research I found out that the government is still preparing a directive to
define which costs are administrative and which costs are not. The vacuum created by
the absence of this directive caused different interpretation of the law by different
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regional governments and uncertainty on the future of many INGOs and NGO partners.
So the government should address this issue as soon as possible.
7) Another issue that needs strong government intervention is the population
growth that is outpacing the country’s economic development. Education about family
planning by INGOs, HEWs and religious or tribal leaders brought some improvement.
But religious or tribal leaders are offering only limited assistance and do not advocate to
limit the number of children parents can have. It is only the government which can use
its regulatory and administrative power to put family planning in to effective practice.
8) Access to primary education has grown at a fast scale. But the growth mainly
focused on quantity of schools built or increasing enrollment of primary students. Since
high enrollment rate has already been achieved the government should turn its focus to
quality of education and coordinate the change in focus direction of donors and INGOs
as well.
9) The government has made it one of its priorities to declare the equal role of
women in all venues including public life and private life activities. But there are many
tribal, cultural and religious traditions that place barriers on women’s equal
participation in society. Because of these traditions women were discouraged to enroll
in school, to access healthcare services or serve on official capacities. For example the
women in Afar or Somali areas are still under the influence of cultural or traditional
views that bars them from enjoying the fruits of development. The government should
lead the way to educate these communities and empower women.
II) DONORS
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1) Donors need to be flexible with the time limit they have for fund use by INGOs.
Some INGOs indicated that when the project time table is delayed because of
government bureaucracy, lack of construction materials or other reasons, donors would
not be flexible and hold their funds or entirely cancel their funding. But donors need to
understand that INGOs’ projects can be delayed for reasons that are not attributed to
the actions or inactions of INGOs and be prepared to update their time schedule and
hold contingency fund to adjust for inflation.
2) Although competition of INGOs for funding is helpful to select INGOs with strong
financial and organizational capacity it tends to benefit larger INGOs and create a
monopoly of INGOs rather than encouraging growth of small or medium level INGOs
and NGO partners. An example of this is USAID’s selection of six INGOs and one national
NGO for its PSNP and PSNP PLUS programs. Donors need to understand that it is
important to encourage small or medium level INGOs to take up projects individually or
jointly to expand the INGO pool and make their growth sustainable.
3) A lot has been discussed about administrative expenses. Donors promote a
minimum administrative cost and maximum project cost. In some cases INGOs said that
donors gave them money that is earmarked only for project cost and require INGOs to
pay the administrative cost. But donors should know that low administrative cost does
not necessarily produce a good quality project or does not make INGOs effective.
Donors need to think of a flexible administrative expense plan that will be determined
by the role it has on the effectiveness of INGOs and by the impact it produces on the
lives of community members.
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4) Donors also need to work on changing the aid dependency culture of the people
in the Food Security sector. The research showed that some donors still want to follow
the old approach of giving free aid to farmers in chronically food insecure areas. These
donors need to change their approach and encourage communities to stop seeking free
aid and build their household asset with microcredit loans.
5) Many donors have decreased or stopped their funding after the 2005
government crackdown on opposition forces and the eventual enactment of the CSP.
But this situation did hurt communities that were dependent on those funds. Donors
need to understand that stopping funds by opposing a government policy or law
ultimately hurts the poor people and thus need to give priority for compromise.
6) Newly established INGOs and NGO partners may not have a well-developed
organizational capacity or lack effective monitoring and evaluation system. Donors have
to step in and help these INGOs in developing their capacity and accountability system.
7) International donors should also avoid top down management strategy in their
fund allocation or administration and need to be attentive to contextual differences of
each community or region. In this regard donors should also be open to train local
government officials and develop their capacity to help the effectiveness of INGOs.
Future Research Questions
The current model talks about the positive or negative nature of stakeholders’
relation. But it did not go to measuring the extent of positivity or negativity of the
relationship. But future researches need to investigate if there would be a difference in
outcome of INGO effectiveness depending on the degree of positivity or negativity of
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the relation. Depending on the improvement of availability of research data, it is also my
goal to conduct a quantitative research and analysis on the same subject in the future
and find out if that research would come to the same conclusion as this research. This
research focused only on studying the effectiveness of INGOs in Ethiopia due to data
availability concerns. But future research should study the effectiveness of domestic
NGOs in Ethiopia as they are growing to become formidable partners in the country’s
growth strategy.



Despite lack of democratic governance in Ethiopia more INGOs are
coming in to the country now than ever before and currently Ethiopia has become
the leading international aid recipient country in Africa. Ethiopia also showed
progress in reducing poverty across all sectors. Does this mean that the country’s
situation is defying the conventional argument that poverty reduction or elimination
will not be achieved without democratic governance? This would be a fertile ground
for future research.
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APPENDIX- A
LIST OF ABREVIATIONS AND ACCRONYMS
ABE
ACDI-VOCA
CCRDA
CARE
CHW
CRS
CSA
CSP
DAG
DICAC
DFID
EHRC
EPRDF
ESDP
EU
EWLA
FHI
GER
GIZ
GTP
HEP
HEW
HIV/AIDS
HSDP
IMF
INGOs
MDGs
MOFED
NER

Alternative Basic Education
Agriculture Cooperative Development International
and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance
Consortium of Christian Relief and Development
Association
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
Community Health Workers
Catholic Relief Services
Ethiopian Charities and Societies Agency
Civil Society Proclamation
Donors’ Assistance Group
Ethiopian Orthodox Church Development and
Interchurch Aid Commission
United Kingdom Department for International
Development
Ethiopian Human Right Commission
Ethiopian Peoples’ Republic Democratic Front
Education Sector Development Plan
European Union
Ethiopian Women’s Lawyers’ Association
Family Health International
Gross Enrollment Ratio
Deutsche Gesellischaft fur Internationale
Zusammenarbeit
Growth and Transformation Plan
Health Extension Program
Health Extension Workers
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection/
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
Health Sector Development Plan
International Monetary Fund
International Nongovernmental Organizations
Millennium Development Goals
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
Net Enrollment Ratio
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NGOs
ODA
OFSP
OVC
OXFAM
PASDEP
PBS
PEPFAR
PRSP
PSNP
SAP
SDPRP
TDA
USAID
UK
UN
UNHCR

Non-Governmental Organizations
Oromia Development Association
Other Food Security Programs
Orphan and Vulnerable Children
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to
End Poverty
Protection of Basic Services
US President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
Productive Safety Net Program
Structural Adjustment Programs
Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction
Program
Tigray Development Association
United States Agency for International
Development
United Kingdom
United Nations
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
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APPENDIX- B
LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS TO INGO OFFICIALS
This research is interested in understanding what makes an INGOS effective in
the Ethiopian setting. In particular I am interested in INGOs doing developmental
work. My goal is to develop a set of lessons that can help INGOs become as
effective as possible in implementing their projects in Ethiopia.

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

Basic background questions
Can you tell me your name and title?
How long have you been working and living in Ethiopia?
How long has your organization been working in Ethiopia?
How long have you been associated with this organization?
Have you worked on INGO developmental projects in different parts of the
country?
Prior to coming to work for this organization did you have other INGO work
experiences? If so, what were they?
What is your educational background?
___________________________________________
Effectiveness questions
a. Can you give me some examples of INGO’s Developmental projects that
your organization considers effective?
b. “Why was each of these projects considered effective? And
c. What made each effective/why did this project work so well? ” (can you
describe the factors that are responsible for the project’s
success/effectiveness)

8) Can you point to examples of other NGO programs that are considered as
effective by such INGOs in Ethiopia?
a. If yes, what makes them effective?
b. At these INGOs who would be the best person to talk to about these
programs?
9) Can you point out to any previous researches, news articles, assessment reports
or any other literatures written in regard to effectiveness of INGOs in Ethiopia?
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10) Stepping back from the project level, which level of govt. here in Ethiopia—
federal, regional or local—is the most important to your on-the-ground
programmatic effectiveness? Why?
11) Which level of govt. is the least important to your on-the-ground success? (And
why?)
12) If a new INGO was just now trying to get started in Ethiopia doing developmental
work, what advice would you offer them on how to foster and maintain their
INGO’s effectiveness inside Ethiopia? (i.e., what should they do/ what are the
keys to success?)
a. As part of this, can you elicit the degree of importance for each element
noted? Which are by far the most important factors and which are the
least to INGO effectiveness?
b. Can you talk about the negatives – what are the things that a new INGO
should not do?
13) From your perspective, what are the top two to three obstacles to INGO
effectiveness in Ethiopia? (And why?)
14) How would you describe your organization’s relationship with the various levels
of govt. here in Ethiopia? (Federal, regional and local) strong and positive at one
end of the spectrum to weak and negative at the other end.
Accountability questions
15) What kinds of processes and procedures do INGOs use to ensure accountability?
16) Are some of these processes and procedures emphasized, or used, more than
others?
17) When it comes to being accountable, who or what puts the most pressure on
INGO? (And why?)
18) How important is effectiveness to your donors?
19) How do you communicate your successes to your donors?
20) How important is effectiveness to federal or local governments and the
beneficiary communities?
21) How do NGOs communicate their success or failure to governments or their
beneficiary communities?
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APPENDIX- C
LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
This research is interested in understanding what makes INGOs effective in the
Ethiopian setting. In particular I am interested in INGOs doing developmental
work. My goal is to develop a set of lessons that can help INGOs become as
effective as possible in implementing their projects in Ethiopia.

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

7)

Basic background questions
Can you tell me your name and title?
How long have you worked on this capacity in your office?
How long has your office been working with INGOs and donors?
How long have you been associated with this organization in this office or in any
other regions?
Have you worked with donors or INGOs in INGO projects in different parts of the
country?
Prior to coming to work for this organization did you have other work experience
that is related with the activities of INGOs or donor organizations? If so, what
were they?
What is your educational background?
___________________________________________
Effectiveness questions
a. What does INGO effectiveness mean to you?
b. Can you give me some examples of INGO’s Developmental projects that
your organization considers effective?
c. “Why was each of these projects considered effective? And
d. What made each effective/why did this project work so well? ” (can you
describe the factors that are responsible for the project’s
success/effectiveness)

8) Can you point to examples of other INGO programs that are considered as
effective by your office?
a. If yes, what makes them effective?
b. In these INGOs who would be the best person to talk to about these
programs?
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9) Can you point out to any previous researches, news articles, assessment reports
or any other literatures written in regard to effectiveness of INGOs in Ethiopia?
10) Stepping back from the project level, which level of govt. here in Ethiopia—
federal, regional or local—is the most important to INGOS’ programmatic
effectiveness? Why?
11) Which level of govt. is the least important to INGOs’ on-the-ground
effectiveness? (And why?)
12) If a new INGO was just now trying to get started in Ethiopia doing developmental
work, what advice would you offer them on how to foster and maintain their
effectiveness inside Ethiopia? (i.e., what should they do/ what are the keys to
success?)
a. As part of this, can you elicit the degree of importance for each element
noted? Which are by far the most important factors and which are the
least to INGO effectiveness?
b. Can you talk about the negatives – what are the things that a new INGO
should not do?
13) From your perspective, what are the top two to three obstacles to INGO
effectiveness in Ethiopia? (And why?)
14) How would you describe your office’s relationship with the various INGOs in
Ethiopia? Strong and positive at one end of the spectrum to weak and negative
at the other end.
Accountability questions
15) What kinds of processes and procedures do you expect INGOs to follow to
ensure their accountability?
16) Are some of these processes and procedures emphasized, or used, more than
others?
17) When it comes to being accountable, which government office or organization
puts the most pressure on INGOs and why?
18) How important is INGOs’ effectiveness to you or other government offices?
19) How do you communicate your assessment of INGOs’ projects to INGOs or
donors at the end of each evaluation?
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20) How important is effectiveness to federal or local governments and the
beneficiary communities?
21) How do INGOs communicate their success or failure to governments or their
beneficiary communities?
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APPENDIX- D
LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS TO DONOR ORGANIZATIONS
This research is interested in understanding what makes INGOs effective in the
Ethiopian setting. In particular I am interested in INGOs doing developmental
work. My goal is to develop a set of lessons that can help INGOs become as
effective as possible in implementing their projects in Ethiopia.

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

7)

Basic background questions
Can you tell me your name and title?
How long have you worked on this capacity in your office?
How long has your organization been working with INGOs and government
offices in Ethiopia?
How long have you been associated with this organization in this office or in any
other regional offices?
Have you worked with government offices or INGOs in relation to INGO projects
in different parts of the country?
Prior to coming to work for this organization did you have other work experience
that is related with the activities of INGOs or government offices? If so, what
were they?
What is your educational background?
___________________________________________
Effectiveness questions
a. What does INGO effectiveness mean to you?
b. Can you give me some examples of INGO’s Developmental projects that
your organization considers effective?
c. “Why was each of these projects considered effective? And
d. What made each effective/why did this project work so well? ” (can you
describe the factors that are responsible for the project’s
success/effectiveness)

8) Can you point to examples of other INGO programs that are considered as
effective by your organization?
a. If yes, what makes them effective?
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b. In these INGOs who would be the best person to talk to about these
programs?
9) Can you point out to any previous researches, news articles, assessment reports
or any other literatures written in regard to effectiveness of INGOs in Ethiopia?
10) Stepping back from the project level, in your opinion which level of govt. here in
Ethiopia—federal, regional or local—is the most important to INGOS’
programmatic effectiveness? Why?
Which level of government is easier to work with to donors or INGOs?
11) Which level of govt. is the least important to INGOs’ on-the-ground
effectiveness? (And why?)
12) If a new INGO was just now trying to get started in Ethiopia doing developmental
work, what advice would you offer them on how to foster and maintain their
effectiveness inside Ethiopia? (i.e., what should they do/ what are the keys to
success?)
a. As part of this, can you elicit the degree of importance for each element
noted? Which are by far the most important factors and which are the
least to INGO effectiveness?
b. Can you talk about the negatives – what are the things that a new INGO
should not do?
13) From your perspective, what are the top two to three obstacles to INGO
effectiveness in Ethiopia? (And why?)
14) How would you describe your organization’s relationship with the various INGOs
and government offices in Ethiopia? Strong and positive at one end of the
spectrum to weak and negative at the other end.
Accountability questions
15) What kinds of processes and procedures do you expect INGOs to follow to
ensure their accountability to you or government offices?
16) Are some of these processes and procedures emphasized, or used, more than
others?
17) When it comes to accountability of INGOs, which government office or
organization interacts with your organization and how positive or negative is
your relationship with these government offices? And why?
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18) How important is INGOs’ effectiveness to you or government offices?
19) How do you communicate your assessment of INGOs’ projects to INGOs or
government offices at the end of each project evaluation?
20) How important is INGO effectiveness to you or other donor organizations? How
is this relationship interconnected with the Paris declaration of aid effectiveness
and the UN Millennium Development Goals of reducing poverty and its impacts?
21) How do INGOs communicate their success or failure to your organization and
how important is this method for you and government offices to support INGOs
program effectiveness?

198

REFERENCES
Action Aid (2010) Annual Report, End Poverty together, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Action Aid (2010) Good Practices for Action Aid Governance, Approved by the AAI Board
on 17 October, retrieved on 7/14/13/ from
http://www.actionaidusa.org/sites/files/actionaid/good_practices_for_action_ai
d_governance-_governance_manual.pdf
Amhara Development Association (2010), ADA 10-United for Development, Bahir Dar,
Addis Ababa
Anheier H.; Salamon L. (2006), the Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective,
Retrieved on 6/29/2010 from
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/unlv/docPrint.action?encrypted=e178735cca1ed94e1
d41ee44734…
Ashine A. (2009), The Paranoia and Collapsing Wayane Suspends 42 INGOs, Addis
Ababa, retrieved on 3/14/11 from
http://ethiopianewsforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=14212
Barrientos A., Hulme D., and Nino-Zazazua M. (No date), Will the green shoots blossom?
A new wave of Social Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa (Draft), Brooks World
Poverty Institute, University of Manchester, retrieved on 6/12/13 from
http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/10/13/analysis-ethiopia-s-draft-civil-societyBonzi W. (2006), INGOs in conflict prevention: experiences from the water sector in
Ethiopia, Development in Practice, Volume 16, Number 2, Retrieved on 4/4/10
from
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer
?vid=6& hid=112&Sid=2f9ea4fb-264b-45df-b166c6c2d0d87c71%40sessionmgr110

199

Boulding C. (2007). Protest, Voting and Political Change: The Effects of INGOs on Politics
in Developing Democracies, A dissertation submitted in Partial Satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, University
of California, San Diego, retrieved on 5/12/10 from
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/7b19p9j1#page-27
Bratton M., (1989), Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa, World
Politics, Volume 41, No. 3, pp. 407-430, Cambridge University Press, Retrieved on
26/07/2010 from www.jstor.org/stable/2010506.
Bratton M. (1990), Non-Governmental Organizations in Africa: Can They Influence Public
Policy? Development and Change, Vol. 21, pp. 87-118, Sage, London, Newbury
Park and New Delhi , DOI 10.1111/j.1467-7660.1990t600369.
Burns & Bogale (2012) PSNP PLUS, Linking Poor Rural Households to Microfinance
Markets, Impact assessment of Honey Microfinance and Livestock Value Chain
interventions, Final Impact Assessment of the PSNP PLUS in Sekota, Retrieved
on 4/26/12 from http://sites.tufts.edu/feinstein/files/2012/07/Sekota-Final-.pdf
Brinkerhoff M.J., Smith C.S., Teegen H. (2007) INGOs and the Millennium Development
Goals, Citizen Action to Reduce Poverty, Palgrave, Macmillan.
Burris D. (2007) INGOs and multi-layered management of protected resources in Belize
and Malaysia, Development in Practice, Volume 17, Number 3,Routledge
Publishing, DOI: 10.1080/09614520701337319.pp. 439-444
Cameron K. & Whetten D. ( 1996), Organizational Effectiveness and Quality: The Second
Generation; Brigham Young University, Handbook of Theory & Research, Vol. X,
Agathon Press, New York, retrieved on 3/12/13 from
http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/cameronk/PDFs/Organizational%20Effectiveness
Org%2 0Effectiveness%20Quality.pdf

200

Campbell W. (1996) The Potential for Donor Mediation in NGO-State Relations: An
Ethiopian Case Study, Retrieved on 3/25/11 from http://edoc1.bibliothek.unihalle.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/HALCoRe_derivate_00004560/IDS_Wp33.
pdf
CARE USA & Subsidiaries, Consolidated financial statement for the year ended, June 30,
2009 & 2008, retrieved on 04/10/10 from
http://www.care.org/about/financialinfo/2009auditfinstatements.pdf
CARE International (2011) Microfinance in Africa: State of the Sector Report, Closing the
Gap, Access Africa, and The Power of Financial Services retrieved on 3/12/13
from
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ethiopia/documents/eu_ethiopia/ressources
/main_report_en.pdf
CARE International (2013) Community Score Cards in Africa, retrieved on 7/22/13 from
http://governance.care2share.wikispaces.net/Community+Score+Cards+in+Afric
a
CCRDA (2010),Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Association (CCRDA)/
Taskforce on Enabling Environment for Civil Societies in Ethiopia, Guideline for
Grant Applications, reference task force /CCRDA/2010-2011 retrieved on
11/12/11 from
http://www.crdaethiopia.org/Documents/Proposal%20Application%20Guideline
.pdf
Central Statistical Agency, (2011) Ethiopia, Statistical Abstract, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Cerritelli W.; Bantirgu A. & Abagodu R. (2008) Updated Mapping Study of Non State
Actors in Ethiopia , Last Draft, Final Report, Volume 1, A study Financed by the
European Commission Civil Society Fund in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
retrieved on 2/15/10 from

201

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ethiopia/documents/eu_ethiopia/ressources
/main_report_en.pdf
Charlton R. & May R. (1995), INGOs, politics and probity: a policy implementation
perspective, Third world quarterly, Vol. 16 No 2, retrieved on 4/4/10 from
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer
?vid=6& hid=112&sid=2f9ea4fb-264b-45df-b166c6c2d0d87c71%40sessionmgr110
Clarke G. (1998) Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and Politics in the
Developing World, Political Studies Volume 46 Issue 1, pp. 36-52, DOI
10.1111/1467-9248.00128.
Clark G. & Masoud A. (No Date), mdgs in plain language, No More Broken Promises? A
plain language guide to the Millennium Development Goals, retrieved on
2/10/10 from http://www.srds.co.uk/mdg/
Clark J. (2000), Civil Society, INGOs and Development in Ethiopia: A Snap Shot View, the
World Bank, Washington D.C., retrieved on 12/11/10 from
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/8732041111663470099/20489508/CSandDevEthiopiaSnapshotView.pdf
Connolly T.; Conlon E; & Deutsch (1980), Organizational Effectiveness: A Multiple –
Constituency Approach, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 211217, retrieved on 4/12/13 from
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/stable/pdfplus/257430.pdf?accep
tTC=true
Conradie F.H. (1999) Non-governmental organizations and financial sustainability, Vol
16, No 2 Retrieved on 4/4/10 from
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer
?vid=8& hid=112&s0id=2f9ea4fb-264b-45df-b1666c2d0d87c71%40sessionmgr110
202

Constitution of Ethiopia (1994), retrieved on 5/20/13 from
http://www.eueom.eu/files/dmfile/ethiopian-constitution-1994_en.pdf
Davison W. (2008), Ethiopia’s Investment Plan May be Unsustainable, World Bank
Official Says, retrieved on 4/13/11 from
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-08/ethiopia-s-investment-plan-maybe-unsustainable-world-bank-official-says.html
Davison W. (2013) Ethiopia makes help difficult for world donor, society, rights,
Christian Science Monitor, Retrieved on 3/25/13 from
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2013/0228/Ethiopia-makes-helpdifficult-for-world-donors-advocating-civil-society-rights
Delegation of The European Union to Ethiopia (No Date), Good Governance and Civil
Society, EC activities in Support of Civil Society, retrieved on 6/23/13 from
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ethiopia/eu_ethiopia/tech_financial_cooper
ation/goodgovernance/index_en.htm
Department for International Development of United Kingdom (2012), Annual Report
and Accounts, 2011-2012, for the year ended 31 March, 2012, retrieved on
10/15/12 from
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/67353/Annual-report-accounts-2011-12.pdf
Development Assistance Group (2006) Ethiopia: A plan for Accelerated and Sustained
Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), Comments from the Development
Assistance Group, Retrieved on 2/20/ 11 from PASDEP070206(1)(1).pdf
www.dagethiopia.org.
Development Assistance Group (2008), Annual Report, 2008, retrieved on 10/1/11 from
http://www.aideffectiveness.org/Country/Ethiopia/DAG-Annual-Report2008.html
203

Ebookbrowse (2012) Ethiopia ESDP, Education Sector Development Plan, retrieved on
4/12/13 from http://ebookbrowsee.net/ethiopia-esdp-education-sectordevelopment- program-pdf-d32530813
Edwards M. & Hulme D. (1992), Scaling up NGO Impact on Development: Learning from
Experience, Development in Practice, Vol.2, No. 2 pp. 77-91, retrieved on
3/29/12 from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4028767
Emerson R. (1962), Power- Dependence Relations, American Sociological Review,
Volume 27, No 1, pp. 31-41, retrieved on 4/10/13 from
http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~pmclean/emerson%20article.pdf
Fantahun M.; Berhane Y.; Wall S.; Byass P. & Hogberg (2007) Women’s involvement in
household decision-making and strengthening social capital-crucial factors for
child survival in Ethiopia, Retrieved on 5/12/11) from DOI:10.1111/J.16512227.2007.00147.Xhttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2049066/
Federal Democratic Republic Government of Ethiopia (1994), Education and Training
Policy, St. George Printing Press, retrieved on 6/15/12 from
http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Ethiopia/Ethiopia%20Education%20and
%20Training%20Policy.pdf
Fisher J. (1994) Third World INGOs: A missing Piece to the Population Puzzle,
Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, Volume 36, Issue
7, DOI 10.1080/00139157.1994.9929179, pp. 6-41
Food Security Coordination Bureau (2004), the New Coalition for Food Security in
Ethiopia Food Security Program, Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, October2004September 2009
Fowler A. (1991) the Role of INGOs in Changing State –Society Relations: Perspectives
from Eastern and Southern Africa, Development Policy Review, Vol. 9, pp. 53-84,

204

Sage, London, Newbury Park and New Delhi, DOI:
10.1111/j.1467.7679.1991.tb00175x
Fowler A. (1996) Demonstrating NGO Performance: Problems and Possibilities,
Development in Practice Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 58-65, retrieved on 29/3/12 from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4029356
Funds for INGOs.org (2010) Grants, resources and sustenance for international
development retrieved on 4/10/10 from
http://www.fundsforINGOs.org/alternative-fundraising/alternativefundraising/alternative-fundraising/alternative-fundraising/alternativefundraising/alternative-fundraising/9-businesses-for-INGOs/#axzz0lG6v5OJO
Gautney H. (2010), Protest and Organization in the Alternative Globalization Era: INGOs
Social Movements, and Political Parties, Palgrave, Macmillan.
Gebru F., Gentilini U., Wickrema S., & Yirga A. (No date), engaging in an multi-actor
platform: WFP’s experience with the Productive Safety Net Program in
Ethiopia, retrieved on 11/20/12 from
http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/newsroom/wfp225974.
pdf
Gibson J. & Nyhus C. (2009), Joint SCUK/ UNICEF Study, Ethiopia Country Report, Draft
for Review, Multi Year Country Research Program on the impacts of cash
transfers on Children in Eastern and Southern Africa, Save the Children
Fund/UNICEF
GIZ (2009), Protection of Basic Services (PBS) - Ethiopian Social Accountability Project;
Project description, retrieved on 6/15/11 from
http://www.giz.de/Themen/en/23596.htm
Guler E. (2008) How To Improve NGO Effectiveness in Development? A discussion on
Lessons Learned, Retrieved on 1/15/12
205

http://www.ngomanager.org/dcd/2_Organisational_Development/Capacity_buil
ding/NGO_Effectiveness.pdf
Hailegbriel D. (2010), Ethiopia, The International Journal of Not For Profit Law, Volume
12, Issue 3, A Publication of the International Center for Not For Profit Law,
retrieved on 4/12/13 from
http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol12iss3/special_3.htm
Hammer M.; Rooney C.; & Warren S. (2010) Addressing Accountability in NGO advocacy,
Practice, Principles and Prospects of Self-Regulation, Briefing Paper Number
125,One World Trust, ISSN 2043-7943, Retrieved on 6/22/11 from
http://www.oneworldtrust.org/csoproject/images/documents/Self_regulation_o
f_advocacy_among_INGOs_OWT_125_March_2010_-_final.pdf
Harrison E. (2002) The Problem with the Locals: Partnership and Participation in
Ethiopia, Development and Change Volume 33, Issue 4, pp. 587-610, Institute of
Social Studies, Blackwell publishers, retrieved on 6/12/11 from
http://www.oneworldtrust.org/csoproject/images/documents/Self_regulation_o
f_advocacy_among_INGOs_OWT_125_March_2010_-_final.pdf
Harsh M.; Mbatia P. & Shrum W. (2010), Accountability and Inaction: INGOs and
Resource Lodging in Development, Development and Change, Vol. 41, Issue 2,
pp. 253-278, DOI10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01641.x
Harwin J. & Barron T. (2007), the Role of Service Delivery Non-Governmental
Organizations in Policy Reform, Child Abuse Review Vol. 16: 367-382,
retrieved on 4/4/10 from
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer
?vid=10&hid=112&Sid=2f9ea4fb-264b-45df-b166c6c2d0d87c71%40sessionmgr110
Hearn J. (2002) the US Democratic Experiment in Ghana in: Africa in Crisis: New
Challenges and Possibilities-Pluto Press, London, pp. 97-108, ISBN 0745316484
206

Hearn J. (2007), African INGOs: The New Compradors? Developmental and Change
38(6): 1095-1110, Institute of Social Studies, Published by Black well Publishing,
Oxford, UK.Retrieved on 4/4/10 from
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer
?vid=12&hid=112&Sid=2f9ea4fb-264b-45df-b166c6c2d0d87c71%40sessionmgr110
Hickson D.; Hinings C.; Lee A.; Schneck R.; and Pennings J. (1971), a Strategic
Contingencies’ Theory of Intra-organizational Power, Administrative Science
Quarterly, Vol.16 No. 2pp. 216-229, published by Johnson Graduate School of
Management, Cornell University, retrieved on 4/7/13 from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2391831
Hobson M. (2013) Protecting the vulnerable during crisis and disaster: Part II Ethiopia’s
Productive Safety Net Program, retrieved on 7/20/13 from
http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/protecting-the-vulnerable-duringcrisis-and-disaster-part-ii-ethiopia-s-productive-safety-net-program
Human Rights Watch (2008) Analysis of Ethiopia’s Draft Civil Society Law, retrieved on
5/13/12 from http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/10/13/analysis-ethiopia-s-draftcivil-society-law-0
Human Rights Watch (2012), Ethiopia, Supreme Court Ruling Marks a Further Erosion of
Human Rights Work retrieved on 7/12/13 from
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/19/ethiopia-supreme-court-ruling-marksfurther-erosion-human-rights-work
IRIN Humanitarian news and analysis (2012), Ethiopia: Cooperatives Championed amid
NGO Restrictions, retrieved on 4/15/13 from
http://www.irinnews.org/report/96718/ethiopia-cooperatives-championedamid-ngo-restrictions

207

IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis (2013), Ethiopia: Surge of doctors to strengthen
health system, retrieved on 6/14/13 from
http://www.irinnews.org/report/96101/ethiopia-surge-of-doctors-tostrengthen-health-system
Jauch H. (2012), How the IMF- World Bank Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)
Destroyed Africa, Labor Resources and Research Institute, Namibia, retrieved
on 6/24/13 from http://newsrescue.com/how-the-imf-world-bank-andstructural-adjustment-programsap-destroyed-africa/#axzz28eUHslGH
Johnson E. & Prakash A. (2007) NGO research Program: a collective action perspective,
Policy Science volume 40, pp. 221-240, retrieved on 3/10/11 from
http://www.faculty.washington.edu/aseem/
Keeley M. (1978), A Contingency Framework for Performance Evaluation, The Academy
of Management Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 428-438, retrieved on 10/5/13 from h
ttp://www.jstore.org/stable/257534
Kindornay S. & Morton B (2009) Development effectiveness: towards new
understandings, Issue Brief, Development cooperation Series, The North- South
Institute, retrieved on 8/10/11 from http://www.nsi-ins.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/2009-Development-effectiveness-towards-newunderstandings.pdf
King G.; Keohane R.; & Verba S. (1994), Designing Social Inquiry, Scientific Inference in
Qualitative Research, Princeton University Press.
Kushner R. (2002), Action Research Validation of an Inventory of Effectiveness
Measures, retrieved on 3/12/12 from
http://rjkushner.com/Action%20Research%20Validation%20of%20an%20Invent
ory%20of%20Effectiveness%20Propositions.0402.pdf

208

Lautze S.; Roberts A. & Erkineh T. (2009) Advancing knowledge, shaping policy, inspiring
practice, retrieved on 9/10/11 from
http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinionfiles/4178.pdf
Lewis D. (1998), Development INGOs and the Challenge of Partnership: Changing
Relations between North and South, Social Policy & Administration. Vol. 32
No. 5, retrieved on 4/4/10 from
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer
?vid=14&hid=112&Sid=2f9ea4fb-264b-45df-b166c6c2d0d87c71%40sessionmgr110
Lingan J.; Cavender A.; Lioyd R. & Gwynne B. (2009) Responding to NGP Development
Effectiveness initiatives, One World Trust/ World Vision Briefing Paper Number
122, retrieved on 6/14/11 from
http://www.oneworldtrust.org/csoproject/images/documents/Responding_to_S
outhern_Effectiveness_WVI_OWT_Joint_Paper.pdf
Lioyd R. (2005) The Role of NGO Self- Regulation in Increasing Stakeholder
Accountability, One

World Trust, retrieved on 6/21/11 from

http://coddeconduitaong.ro/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/The
roleofNGOSelf-Regulation_in_Increasing_Stakeholder_-Accountability.pdf
Lioyd R. & De las Casas L. (2009) NGO Self –Regulation: Enforcing and balancing
accountability, One World Trust, retrieved on 6/15/11 from
http://www.oecd.org/dev/devcom/44251309.pdf
Lutheran World Federation (2008), Annual Report, Department for World ServiceEthiopia Program, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Makoba W. (2002) Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and Third World
Development: An Alternative Approach to Development, Journal of Third World
Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 53 -63.
209

Manji F. & O’Coill (2002), The Missionary Position: INGOs and development in Africa,
International Affairs 78, 3, 567-83, retrieved on 4/4/10 from
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer
?vid=16&hid=112&Sid=2f9ea4fb-264b-45df-b166c6c2d0d87c71%40sessionmgr110.
Martin J.; Oksanen R. &Takala T. (2000), Preparation of the Education Sector
Development Program in Ethiopia, Association for the Development of
Education in Africa, International Insitute for Educational Planning, retrieved
on 3/12/11 from
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ethiopia/documents/eu_ethiopia/ressources
/main_report_en.pdf
Martens K. (1999), The Role of INGOs in the UNESCO system, University of Nottingham,
Transitional Associations, Issue 2, 1999, pp. 68-82, retrieved on 3/10/11 from
http://www.uia.org/archive/role-INGOs-unesco
Mebrahtu E. (2002), Perceptions and Practices of Monitoring and Evaluation:
International NGO experiences in Ethiopia, Development in Practice, Volume
12, Numbers 3&4, pp. 501-517 DOI10.1080/0961450220149645
Ministry of Education (2005), Education Sector, Development Program III (ESDP- III),
2005/2006- 2010/2011, Program Action Plan (PAP), Addis Ababa, retrieved on
11/15/12 from
http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Ethiopia/Ethiopia_Education_Plan_Aug
ust_2005.pdf
Ministry of Education (2010), Education Sector Development Program IV (ESDP IV),
2010/2011- 2014-2015 Program Action Plan, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, retrieved on
13/5/12 from
http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Ethiopia/Ethiopia_ESDP_IV.pdf

210

Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (2002), Ethiopia: Sustainable
Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
Retrieved on 2/25/10 from
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTETHIOPIA/Overview/20207639/2002_07
prsp.pdf
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (2006), Ethiopia: Building on Progress, a
Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP),
(2005/06- 2009/10), Volume I, Main Text, Retrieved on 3/14/10 from
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/PolicyDocuments/Plan_for_Accelerated_and_Sustained_(PASDEP)_final_July_2007_Vo
lume_I_3.pdf
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (2010), Growth & Transformation Plan
(GTP), 2010/11-2014/15, retrieved on 8/5/10 from
http://www.ethiopians.com/Ethiopia_GTP_2015.pdf
Ministry of Health (2002), The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Health Sector
Development Part II, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, retrieved on 6/10/11from
http://www.etharc.org/resources/download/finish/33/86
Ministry of Health (2010), Health Sector Development Program, IV, 2010/11-2014/15,
Final Draft, retrieved on 9/12/11 from
http://www.internationalhealthpartnership.net/fileadmin/uploads/ihp/Docume
nts/Country_Pages/Ethiopia/Ethiopia_HSDP_IV_Final_%202010%20-2015.pdf
Ministry of Health (2010), Health and Health Related Indicators, 2008-2009, Policy Plan
Directorate Monitoring and Evaluation Case Team.
Moore M. & Stewart S. (1998) Corporate Governance for INGOs? Development in
Practice, Volume 8 No. 3, pp. 335-342, retrieved on 5/12/10 from
http://www.csokenya.or.ke/site/uploads/resource/243.pdf

211

Najam A. (2000) NGO- Government Relations: The Four Cs of Government- Third Sector
Relations: Cooperation, Confrontation, Complementarity, Co-optation, Research
Report, Series #25, retrieved on 5/12/13 from
http://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/R25The%20Four%20Cs%20of%20Government-Third.pdf
Nathan S, Rotem A. and Ritchie J.(2002), Closing the gap: building the capacity of nongovernment organizations as advocates for health equity, Health Promotion
International, Vol. 17, N0. 1 retrieved on 4/4/10 from
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/ehost/detail?vid=5&hid=112
&sid=a84b372c-2ae5-4af0-8e0a-ee04d776b976%40sessionmgr114.
National Committee for Traditional Practices of Ethiopia &Save the Children Norway
(2008), follow up National Survey on the Harmful Traditional Practices in
Ethiopia, With a Financial Support from the Royal Norwegian Embassy in
Ethiopia, Addis Ababa.
OBiyan A. (2005) A Critical Examination of the State Versus Non-Governmental
Organizations (INGOs) in the Policy Sphere in the Global South: Will the State
Die as the INGOs Thrive in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia? African and Asian
Studies, Volume 4, No. 3, pp. 310-325
OECD (2005), The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, retrieved on 2/12/13 from
http://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/34428351.pdf
OXFAM, Annual Report, 2008, retrieved on 04/10/10 from
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/files/annual-report-2008.pdf
OXFAM (2011) Annual Report, 2010-2011, retrieved on 5/12/12 from
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/oxfam-annual-report-201011.pdf

212

Parks T. (2008), the rise and fall of donor funding for advocacy INGOs: Understanding
the impact, Development in practice, Vol. 18, No. 2 retrieved on 4/4/10 from
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer
?vid=9&hid=112&Sid=a84b372c-2ae5-4af0-8e0aee04d776b976%40sessionmgr114
Path Finder International (2005), Compendium of Reproductive Health and Family
Planning Operational Research, 2002-2005
PBS News hour (2012), USAID administrator: Food Security a “Grand but Achievable
Goal” retrieved on 7/26/13 from
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/jan-june12/foodsecurity_05-18.html
Pereira J. (2009) Action for Global Health: Ethiopia Aid Effectiveness in the Health Sector
case Study retrieved on 10/12/11 from
http://www.gulelepost.com/2012/11/13/german-ngo-pulls-out-of-ethiopia/
Plan USA, Annual Review, Fiscal year, 2009, July 1, 2008-June 30, 2009 retrieved on
04/10/10/ from http://www.planusa.org/docs/planusaannual09.pdf
Proclamation Number 621 (2009), Charities and Societies Proclamation: Proclamation to
Provide for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies, Federal
Negarit Gazeta of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
http://cnhde.ei.columbia.edu/files/4/1/2004-Oct-Tue-040225.pdf
Quinn R. & Rohrbaugh (1981), Public Productivity Review, Vol. 5, No.2, A Symposium on
the Competing Values Approach to Organizational Effectiveness, pp. 122-140,
retrieved on 5/9/13 from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3380029
Quinn & Cameron (1983), Organizational Life Cycles and Shifting Criteria of
Effectiveness: Some Preliminary Evidence, Management Science, Vol. 29, No.
1, pp. 33-51, retrieved on 12/4/13 from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2631164

213

Rahmato D.; Bantirgu A.; & Endeshaw (2008),CSOs. INGOs in Ethiopia, Partners in
Development and Good Governance, A Report Prepared for the Ad Hoc
CSO/NGO Task Force, Final Draft, Addis Ababa, retrieved on 3/12/11 from
http://www.crdaethiopia.org/Documents/CSOs-INGOs%20in%20Ethiopia%20%20Partners%20in%20Development.pdf
Reimann K. (2006) A view from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the
Worldwide Growth of INGOs, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.50, pp. 4567, retrieved on 12/15/10 from
http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1064&context=political
_sciencefacpub
Reinert K. (2007), Ethiopia in the World Economy: Trade, Private Capital Flows, and
Migration, African Today, Volume 53, No. 3,pp. 65-89, retrieved on 11/10/10
from
http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1096&context=afric
ancent`er_icad_archive&seiredir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fhl%3Den%2
6q%3DKenneth%2BReinert%252C%2B2007%26btnG%3D%26as_sdt%3D1%252C
29%26as_sdtp%3D#search=%22Kenneth%20Reinert%2C%202007%22
Sandberg E. (1994) Introduction: The Changing Politics of Non- Governmental
Organizations and the African States, Praeger, Westport, CT.
Sargeant A.; Lee S.; & Jay E. (2009), Communicating the “Realities” of Charity Costs: An
Institute of Fundraising Initiatives, Non Profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly,
Vol.38 No. 2, p.p. 333-342.
Save The Children (2008), Food Crisis; Emergency Appeal for Children in Ethiopia,
retrieved on 9/13/11 from http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/news-andcomment/news/2008-06/food-crisis-emergency-appeal-children-ethiopia

214

Seckinelgin H. (2005) A Global Disease and its Governance: HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan
Africa and the Agency of INGOs, Global Governance Volume 11, pp. 351-368,
retrieved on 10/12/10 from
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/stable/pdfplus/27800576.pdf?&a
cceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true
Smillie I. (1997), INGOs and development assistance: a change in mind set? Third World
Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 563-577, retrieved on 4/4/10 from
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer
?vid=11&hid=112&Sid=a84b372c-2ae5-4af0-8e0aee04d776b976%40sessionmgr114.
Sowa J., Seldenn S., & Sandfort J. (2004) No Longer Unmeasurable, A Multidimensional
Integrated Model of Non Profit Organizational Effectiveness, Non Profit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4 pp. 711-728, retrieved on 2/10/11
from
http://www.hhh.umn.edu/people/jsandfort/pubs/peer_reviewed/nonprofit_org
effective.pdf
S.O.S., Children Villages ((2010) Annual Report, Central Printing Press, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia.
Steel B.; Henderson S.; Warner R. (2007) INGOs and The Development of Civil Society in
Bulgaria and the USA, A comparative analysis, Innovation, Vol. 20, No. 1, DOI:
10.1080/13511610701197858
Stromquist N. (2000), Globalization and Education: Integration and Contestation across
Cultures, Rowman & Little Field publishers, ISBN.0847699196.
Suarez R. (2012), USAID Administrator: Food Security a “Grand” But “Achievable” Goal,
retrieved on 5/12/13 from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/janjune12/foodsecurity_05-18.html

215

Szporluk M. (2009), A Framework for Understanding Accountability of INGOs and Global
Good Governance, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 16#1,
retrieved on 4/4/10 from
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer
?vid=13&hid=112&Sid=a84b372c-2ae5-4af0-8e0aee04d776b976%40sessionmgr114.
TANGO (2011), PSNP PLUS Project, Final Evaluation, Executive Summary, retrieved on
6/25/12 from
http://edu.care.org/Documents/PSNP%20Plus_Final%20Evaluation%20Report.p
df
Taylor K. (2009) The Missing piece of the Puzzle? The institutional importance of CSOs in
the Development Effectiveness Agenda, retrieved on 12/11/10 from
http://www.guidestarinternational.org/SiteImages/The%20Missing%20Piece%20
of%20the%20Puzzle%20%20The%20Institutional%20Importance%20of%20CSOs%20in%20the%20Develo
pment%20Effectiveness%20Agenda.pdf
Tembo Fletcher (2003) The multi-image Development NGO: an agent of the new
imperialism?, Development in Practice, Volume 13, No. 5, pp. 527-532, DOI
10/080/0961452032000166456.
The Earth Institute (No Date), One Million Community Health Workers, Technical Task
Force Report, retrieved on 3/30/13 from
http://www.millenniumvillages.org/uploads/ReportPaper/1mCHW_TechnicalTas
kForceReport.pdf
The Economist (2013), Ethiopia and Kenya, Doing it my way, an ideological competition
between two diametrically opposed economic models, retrieved on 7/25/13
from http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21572379-ideologicalcompetition-between-two-diametrically-opposed-economic-models-doing-it-my
216

The Gulele Post (2013), German INGOs pulls out of Ethiopia, retrieved on 3/13/13 from
http://www.gulelepost.com/2012/11/13/german-ngo-pulls-out-of-ethiopia/
Thompson E. (2004), The Role of INGOs in Challenging the Conservative Agenda: Some
Empirical studies, social Alternative Vol. 23, No. 1, Frist quarter. Pp. 43-49.
Transitional Government of Ethiopia (1993), Health Policy, retrieved on 12/5/11 from
http://phe-ethiopia.org/resadmin/uploads/attachment-157Health_Policy_Sept_1993.pdf
Ungpakorn J. (2004), INGOs: Enemies or Allies? International Socialism, A quarterly
journal of Socialist Theory, Issue 104, retrieved on 10/15/10 from
http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=18&issue=104
USAID (2008), EXTERNAL End –of Project Evaluation: The Ethiopia Family Planning and
Reproductive Health Project, Final Report, prepared by the Mitchell Group Under
Contract No. 663-C-00-08-00409-00.
USAID (2013), Ethiopia, retrieved on 5/12/13 from
http://www.usaid.gov/ethiopia/education
Walsh & Lenihan (2006), Accountability and Effectiveness of INGOs: Adapting Business
Tools Successfully, Development in Practice, Vol. 16, No.5, pp. 412-424,
retrieved on 11/10/10 from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4030037
Warren S. & Lioyd R. (2009), Civil Society Self-Regulation, The Global Picture, Briefing
paper Number 119, One World Trust, retrieved on 6/13/11 from
http://www.oneworldtrust.eu/csoproject/site_downloads/CSO-self-regulationthe-global-picture-OWT-119-2009.pdf
White C.L. (1968), International Non-Governmental Organizations, Their Purposes,
Methods and Accomplishments, Green Wood Press Publishers, New York.

217

World Bank (2013) Data for Mortality Rate Infant (Per 1000 live births) retrieved on
5/8/13 from
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ethiopia/documents/eu_ethiopia/ressources
/main_report_en.pdf
World Vision Ethiopia (2010), Annual Report Fiscal Year 2009, Quality Assurance
Department, Monitoring and Evaluation Department, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
World Vision Ethiopia (2010), Annual Progress Report of Fiscal Year, 2010, DME &
Partnership Department, Monitoring & Evaluation Department, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia.
World Vision (2010), Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Projects Saving Lives
Through Safe Water, Sanitation and Hygiene retrieved on 2/14/12 from
http://www.globalgiving.org/pfil/6468/projdoc.pdf
Worth J.M. (2009) None Profit Management Principles and Practice, The George
Washington University, Sage Publishers.
Wunsch J. (No date), Decentralization, Local Governance and the Democratic Transition
in Southern Africa: A Comparative Analysis, African Quarterly, The Online Journal
of African Studies, retrieved on 12/17/13 from
http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v2/v2i1a2.htm
Yanacopolos H. (2005), The Strategies that bind: NGO coalitions and their influence,
Global Networks Volume 5, No. 1 pp. 93-110, Blackwell Publishing Ltd & Global
Network Partnership, DOI- 10.1111/J.1471-1374.2005.00109X
Yin R. (1994), Case Study Research, Design and Methods, Second Edition, Applied Social
Research Methods Series Volume 5, Sage Publications.
Yuchtman E. & Seashore S. (1967), A System Resource Approach to Organizational
Effectiveness, American Sociological Review, Vol. 32, No. 6, pp. 891-903,
retrieved on 12/4/13 from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2092843
218

Zamuto R. (1984), A Comparison of Multiple Constituency Models of Organizational
Effectiveness, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 606-616, DOI
131.216.162.40

219

VITA
Graduate College
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Ermias Abraham

DegreesBachelor of Laws, Law, 1989
Addis Ababa University Law School, Ethiopia

Bachelor of Arts, Political Science and International Relations, 1998
Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia

Masters of Social Work, 2005
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Special Honors and Awards –
Scholarship to attend a four month long training award on airline contract law
from the Dutch Civil Aviation Authority, 1998
Various Week long training awards regarding airline laws from the International
Air Transport Association, 1995-2000
Graduate and Professional Student Association Travel Award (summer, 2011)
School of Environmental and Public Affairs Travel Award (summer, 2011)

220

Dissertation Title: What are the Factors that Impact the Effectiveness of INGOs in
Ethiopia?

Dissertation Examination CommitteeChairperson- Jessica Word, Ph.D
Committee Member- Chris Stream, Ph.D
Committee Member, Patrick Carlton, Ph. D
Graduate College Representative, Michele Kuenzie, Ph.D

221

